"Shifting to smaller, more distributed groupings not only complicates Chinese targeting, but increases the presence of U.S. troops in the arc of islands east of Taiwan." #networkqualitydefensenews.com/pentagon/2023/…
"The two countries also may be considering modest locations from where U.S. Marine or Army forces could operate surveillance drones or launch less expensive, mobile missiles."
"U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said she’s hopeful the Philippines, alongside Australia, Guam and Japan, will host logistics hubs for pre-positioned fuel and other supplies the Army wants to bring to the region."
"The Okinawa-based 12th Marine Regiment, an artillery unit, will become the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment ― with advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, anti-ship and transportation capabilities."
"Japan may use Okinawa as it adds bases, radars and air defense units on its chain of southwestern islands, which extend from Japan’s largest island to Yonaguni, which is 70 miles east of Taiwan."
"The idea of this distributed presence with self-reliant comms, ISR capabilities and weapons has a pretty strong logic if it plays out according to concept.”
"In line with the Marine Corps concept of stand-in forces, the Marines are supposed to be able to conduct sea-denial [missions] and be able to bottle up Chinese forces to ensure they don’t go outside the first island chain.”
"... Australia is also expected to host new rotations of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines as it begins a long ramp-up to 2040, when the plans call for the boats to arrive. That would give Australia’s naval personnel a chance to acclimate themselves..."
"Also likely... is that the Pentagon acquires rotational basing for its ships and submarines in locations like Perth... the U.S. could seek to build Australia-based stockpiles of missiles for its ships and submarines with vertical launching systems..."
"The moves in 2023 dovetail with rotations in 2021 of F-22, B-2 and B-1 aircraft, and with fuel, runway and ordnance storage infrastructure projects underway at the Darwin and Tindal airfields in Australia’s Northwest Territory."
"... the Air Force wants to establish a system of resilient basing that relies less on established forward bases that are well known to enemies and more on the “agile combat employment” concept of flexible satellite bases dispersed in a “hub-and-spoke” system."
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Reactions from 🇦🇺 🇺🇸mates and others have been largely positive re: capability development plans, even if implementation remains full of risks (many, many threads have been largely on this bandwagon).
“…Richard Marles has said he wants to move even beyond interoperability to “interchangeability” …frequently using each other’s weapons, equipment and ammunition supplies, and coordinating logistics and supply chains more efficiently.” #networkqualitywsj.com/articles/to-co…
“One challenge to further integration between U.S. and allied militaries are U.S. rules, called International Traffic in Arms Regulations, that control the export of defense and military technologies…”
“… Australian officials have been particularly focused recently on improving the ability to partner with U.S. forces. The U.S., meanwhile, is planning to increase its presence in strategic northern Australia, a possible staging ground for any conflict in the Indo-Pacific…”
"Defense-related sales account for only 4 percent of the total sales of major Japanese manufacturing companies, and in 2020, defense-related procurement from domestic manufacturers made up less than 1 percent of Japan’s total industrial production value." foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/09/jap…
"In the past 20 years, more than 100 companies have exited Japan’s defense sector due to a lack of business sustainability. Without reform, many promising companies will continue to withdraw or downsize their operations to invest elsewhere..."
"... if Japan wants to be an attractive supplier, it needs to make the defense transfer process easier and more accessible for potential buyers, particularly developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region..."
“Tim peneliti juga menemukan, hanya 17 persen responden rutin mengikuti berita-berita luar negeri. Bahkan, hanya 25 persen responden pernah mendengar istilah “bebas aktif”. Padahal konsep itu menjadi jangkar politik luar negeri Indonesia sejak merdeka” kompas.id/baca/internasi…
We asked lots of Qs, so there's plenty to chew on. But here's a brief 🧵 on a few personal highlights for me:
1) Indonesians are generally less "internationally plugged in"
- only around 17% follow major overseas events "very closely" and "somewhat closely"
- around 93% do not travel abroad (*though this could be pandemic-related)
2) Indonesians do not know or understand major foreign policy concepts or platforms
- only around 25% have ever heard of "bebas aktif", the sacrosanct principle of RI's entire foreign policy
- less than 30% thought ASEAN is the most important int. org. for RI (G-20 gets 2.5%)
Dua posisi ekstrem dalam narasi publik--"ga perlu, buang duit di saat pandemi" vs. "perlu banget dan bahkan harus dirayakan" sama2 tidak 100% salah tapi juga kurang tepat guna.
Persoalannya bukan perlu atau ga (guns vs. butter), tapi sbg kebijakan pertahanan perlu dipertanyakan lebih lanjut:
1) Transparansi (tmsk audit internal dan publik) seluruh proses dari nego kontrak hingga purna beli (mis. maintenance, repair, overhaul). Ini seharusnya SOP.
2) rencana platform standardization. 🇮🇩 punya jumlah foreign supplier alutsista tertinggi di Asteng. Kesannya kita "mandiri" tapi long-term cost menumpuk (mis. training, perawatan), inter-operability, etc). Beli alutsista tanpa rencana standarisasi = numpuk masalah masa depan.