Really solid article here discussing Section 8 of the Clayton Act and why, even if BBBY+NWL meet the de minimus sales loophole (2% of revenue or less), regulators might still demand Brett step down from the Newell board to allow Icahn #BBBY M&A.
"The essence of these safe harbors is that an interlock will not be prohibited if the two corporations only compete for a small portion of business … In practice … safe harbors are sufficiently complicated … that they should not be relied upon without a detailed analysis."
Despite BBBY's accounting for < 2% of NWL's revenue preventing an Icahn NWL/BBBY board interlock, regulators could have standing to ask for more concessions.
Recent NWL board changes as well as Brett Icahn's resignation and divestment of 50.2% of his personal NWL equity could very well be antitrust concessions to receive HSR M&A consent from regulators.
Note: none of my tweets should be construed as legal, tax, financial, or investment advice. I'm sharing my personal research as an individual investor for educational purposes.
⚠️ INVESTING IS RISKY ⚠️
I hold a BBBY position because my personal risk tolerance is off-the-charts.
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Note: none of my tweets should be construed as legal, tax, financial, or investment advice. I'm sharing my personal research as an individual investor for educational purposes.
⚠️ INVESTING IS RISKY ⚠️
I hold a BBBY position because my personal risk tolerance is off-the-charts.
Our previous thread discussed how today's FTC is increasingly hostile to M&A activity. In order to understand WHY the 3/15 $NWL filing is so important for potential #BBBY M&A, we need to go in-depth on exactly HOW the FTC has changed its enforcement focus over the past two years.
Possible #BBBY M&A is heavily dependent on the FTC (and the requisite HSR consent).
As a result, it's important to understand the commission's make-up and attendant political implications.
With this background we can seek out circumstantial clues pointing to M&A activity.
👇
The FTC has 5 commissioners. The sitting US President nominates commissioners when a vacancy arises and the Senate approves nominations. Partisan effects are (theoretically) limited by statute; no more than 3 members from a single party may sit on the commission at one time.
Commissioners serve 7 year terms (unless they resign). Historically, it's *generally* the case that FTC commission Rs are more friendly to M&A than Ds. Assume Ds nominate Ds, Rs nominate Rs.
At the onset of the Biden term, the commission consisted of 3 Rs and 2 Ds (pic).
Possible the Hudson Bay and Sycamore Partners #BBBY rumors were real as FTC/DOJ may want to see three potential divestiture buyers when examining M&A antitrust ramifications.
Specifically, this references potential divestiture remedies to gov’t competition concerns.
e.g. if you wholly control the BoD at Newell (which manufactures baby products via its Learning & Development segment), buying BBBY (and BABY by extension) starts looking “antitrusty”
If a #BBBY acquirer controls manufacturing, it could unfairly advantage Newell brands in its retail distribution to harm competition.
Historically, M&A parties look to remedy these concerns by divesting "problematic" businesses to appease regulators.