Turtle Bay Profile picture
Mar 21 19 tweets 12 min read
"One of the greatest Wall Street coups":

Gibson Greetings, Inc.

In January 1982, Bill Simon bought 33% of Gibson for $330K. The value of that $330K investment when Gibson went public in May 1983: $66.7 million.

That's a 202X return in 17 months.

Here's how he did it…
Bill Simon, a trader-turned-statesman, left his job as Treasury Secretary in 1977.

His financial position:
- Salary: $66 thousand
- Net Worth: $2.5 million

He spent the next five years:
- Consulting
- Value investing
- Commodity trading

Then he found his niche: LBOs
In 1981, Bill Simon and Ray Chambers, an accountant-turned-investor, formed Wesray. The plan: Use Simon's contacts and Chambers's analytical skills to buy good companies with borrowed money.

Wesray's first buyout? Gibson Greetings
Why buy Gibson?

Gibson, the third-largest maker of gift cards and wrapping paper, had qualities Wesray liked:
- Low-tech business
- Low-price, high-value product
- Non-cyclical demand

These qualities produced:
- HSD sales growth (w/o a decline)
- Low-thirties ROICs
Another reason to buy Gibson: Valuation

Wesray paid $84.6M for:
- $28.0M LTM EBIT
- $39.2M NTM EBIT

EV/EBIT Multiples:
- Trailing: 3.0x
- Forward: 2.2x

Why the low price? Two reasons:
- Macro
- Forced seller
MACRO

Wesray bought Gibson when:
- The US was in a recession
- Interest rates hit 15%
- Inflation exceeded 10%

Simon: "When we bought Gibson, all the market conditions were wrong. Interest rates were too high. Inflation was too high. But that's when bargains exist."
FORCED SELLER

Wesray bought Gibson in a carveout from RCA. At time of sale, RCA's "mountain of debt and disappearing profits left it so starved for cash that its new chairman was trying to sell off important hunks of its business."

The result: Gibson's firesale for $84.6M
Where'd Wesray get the $84.6M?

DEBT = $83.6M
- $39.8M revolver
- $13.0M term loan
- $30.8M sale-leaseback

EQUITY = $1.0M
- Simon: $330K
- Chambers: $330K
- Management: $200K
- Other: $140K

Think that's too much debt? It wasn't.
Gibson had…

Equal-to-better credit metrics

…Compared to today's LBOs.

DEBT/EBIT
- Gibson: 2.1x (2.9x at peak)
- LBO: 3x - 6x

EBIT/INTEREST
- Gibson: 2.0x (including rent)
- LBO: 2x - 5x

Gibson also had more upside.
Why more upside?

Compare the LTVs:
- Gibson: 98.8%
- LBO: 80% (or less)

High LTVs mean that (a) small changes in profits and multiples produce (b) outsized changes in equity value.

This is all it'd take for Gibson to 100X:
- 30% EBIT growth
- 2 turns multiple expansion
How'd Gibson actually do?

Results over Wesray's 17-month hold:
- 40% EBIT growth
- 4.7 turns multiple expansion

After adjusting for…

- Changes in debt
- Share issuances

…Gibson produced a 193x return.

Wesray's dollar gain: $192.5M on $1M
Simon did even better.

On closing day, Simon paid himself:
- Deal fees: $290K
- Financing fees: $125k

His net investment: - $85K

He also received…

- $321K consulting fees
- $901K distributions

…In the first 17 months.

Simon's dollar gain: $66.7M on $330K
Simon made more on the deal than Lehman Brothers, Gibson's investment bankers, made in a year. It was so good that Steve Schwarzman, the Lehman banker overseeing Gibson's sale, and Pete Peterson, Lehman's CEO, quit and started their own LBO firm.

That firm: Blackstone
Simon's biggest deal risk? Closing

Gift card and wrapping paper seasonality required large working capital investment:

- Receivables: 6 to 11 months
- Inventories: 3 to 9 months

To fund the WC swings, Gibson needed a $100M credit line, which exceeded the $84.6M purchase price.
The solution? A sale-leaseback.

Wesray arranged a $30.6M sale-leaseback of Gibson's real estate. This enabled Wesray to fund the $84.6M LBO and still have $60.2M of drawdown left for seasonal working capital needs.

+ $84.6M cash for LBO
+ $60.2M undrawn
= $144.8M total funding
Want to learn more about Simon? Check out his autobiography. It includes background on both his government service and his investing career.

amazon.com/Time-Reflectio…
APPENDIX

More reasons Gibson was cheap: RCA Insider

Julius Koppelman, "the RCA exec handling the sale," brought Gibson to Wesray. He also "wasn't interested in getting the highest price." And "when the deal closed, Koppelman left RCA to become a consultant for Wesray."
APPENDIX

Bill Simon giving hope to us slackers:
APPENDIX

Bill Simon on patience:

"Patience is the hardest thing in the world for an investor. Just to sit there, it's hard to do nothing."

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Turtle Bay

Turtle Bay Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @72types

Feb 21
Warren Buffett's Salomon letters: Image
Buffett’s YE 1991 Letter: ImageImageImage
Salomon’s YE 1991 Financials: ImageImageImageImage
Read 4 tweets
Feb 15
Munger's Daily Journal AGM Info:

Date: Today (2/15)
Time: 1 PM (ET)

Here's some Daily Journal history…

In 1976, the California Newspaper Service Bureau, a mutually-owned public notice ad sales agency, settled a restraint-of-trade lawsuit. The settlement terms required that they (a) pay the plaintiff $1.5M and (b) sell their 100% interest in the Daily Journal Corp ("DJCO").
Munger's New America Fund ("NAF") bought the DJCO for $2.2M in 1977. DJCO had circulation of 18,000 and $4M of revenues, making it:

- The US's largest legal publisher
- SoCal's dominant legal daily

The purchase price? $2.2M (7x net profits)
Read 6 tweets
Feb 7
Munger's first buyout attempt:

The Cincinnati Enquirer ("CE")

In 1971, Munger's Blue Chip Stamps ("BCS") agreed to buy CE for $29M. That purchase price was a big commitment for BCS, amounting to:

- 30% of liquid assets
- 80% of shareholders' equity

Here's the story…
CE was Cincinnati's largest newspaper. Scripps, a newspaper chain, bought the paper in 1956. But there was a problem: Cincinnati was one of the last "two-newspaper towns," and Scripps controlled both papers. This led to an antitrust suit and DOJ-imposed sale of CE to Munger.
Why'd Munger bid on CE?

Consider the newspaper economics:

→ More content → More readers
→ More readers → More advertisers
→ More advertisers → Higher ad rates
→ Higher ad rates → More content

This feedback loop led to what Buffett called "survival of the fattest."
Read 10 tweets
Jan 13
Buffett's BPL results:

- 30% a year
- 28X total return

Even more impressive: No down years

How'd he do it? Arbitrage

Arbitrage investments produced:

- Market-neutral results
- +20% unleveraged returns

Here's a thread on an arbitrage deal from Buffett's PA:

Bayuk Cigars ImageImageImage
Buffett invested in Bayuk in March 1982. At the time, the company had two assets:
- $3M EBIT cigar business*
- $15M net cash & investments

They also announced a plan to:
- Sell the cigar business
- Liquidate & dissolve the company

———
*Bayuk's brands:
- Garcia + Vega
- Phillies ImageImageImageImage
Why'd Buffett invest?

In early March 1982, Bayuk:
- Sold Garcia + Vega for $10M
- Declared full liquidation by YE1986
- Disclosed $15 per share liquidation NAV

Bayuk's mid-march stock price:

~ $13.50 per share ImageImageImageImage
Read 8 tweets
Jan 3
KKR's first deal: Vapor Corp

In 1972, Jerry Kohlberg, Henry Kravis and George Roberts bought Vapor for Bear Stearns. Despite closing on the eve of a recession, the deal worked so well that they used it as a template for future buyouts.

See below to learn why...
Bear bought Vapor from Singer Corp (sewing). The company had three divisions:

- Mass transit equipment
- Oil & gas valves and pumps
- Industrial process control parts

Think these were low-return cyclical businesses? They weren't.

Vapor:
- Earned +20% ROIC
- Grew every year
Why was Vapor such a good business?

Vapor's products:
- Were proprietary
- Had high aftermarket sales

Vapor, for example, sold mass-transit bus systems that:
- Ran under harsh conditions
- Required sole-source replacement parts

The result:
- Pricing power
- Steady demand
Read 8 tweets
Dec 21, 2022
Another 1960s Berkshire tech investment:

Rank Organization

Rank was a cheap way to buy Xerox. It owned a 50% interest in Rank-Xerox, which controlled the non-US rights to xerography. Berkshire paid just ~15x for Rank. Xerox Corp, on the other hand, traded at a ~60x multiple.
Rank invested $1.7 million into Rank-Xerox. Yet by the time of Berkshire's investment in late 1966, Rank-Xerox:

- Grew revenues to $125 million
- Produced 40% operating margins
- Earned a 30% return on equity

Rank-Xerox accounted for 60% of Rank's 1966 consolidated net profits.
How'd Berkshire's Rank investment turn out? Over the next few years, Rank-Xerox grew revenues by ~35% a year and increased profits by 3x. Rank Organization's multiple also increased from 15x to 30x.

The result: Berkshire's two-year investment produced a 3.6x MOIC and 90% IRR.
Read 6 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(