1/15
Almost everything Zakaria says here is wrong, and unanchored in any understanding of how the global balance of payments actually works. Like many people in Washington, Zakaria assumes (perhaps without realizing it) that the only things that should matter to the US are...
2/15
US geopolitical power and the dominance of Wall Street. He is ignoring the needs of American workers, farmers, producers, and the economy more generally. That is why a diminished role for the US dollar is something that he and many others find so frightening.
3/15
He complains that both US debt and US deficits have surged in recent years, and he argues that these can only be sustained by the global dominance of the dollar, but he fails to see that he has it backwards.
4/15
It is because of the dominance of the US dollar that foreigners must acquire massive amounts of US assets to balance weakness in their domestic demand, which means that the US must run massive deficits to accommodate these inflows.
5/15
Zakaria also doesn’t understand that in an economy in which investment is constrained by weak demand, and not by scarce savings, foreign inflows (like the rise in domestic inequality, which has the same impact) cannot be absorbed by more investment.
6/15
That is why it must be absorbed by changes in the US economy that force down savings elsewhere. Foreign inflows, like domestic inequality, must be resolved in the form either of higher US unemployment or (more likely) higher household and fiscal debt. scholar.harvard.edu/straub/publica…
7/15
He says that thanks to USD dominance, “Washington can spend freely, certain that it’s debt will be bought up by the rest of the world.” This is simply not true, and is yet another example of why thinking incrementally about the economy rather than systematically leads...
8/15
to so many mistakes. As long as foreign demand for US debt does not cause US investment to rise, it must cause US savings to fall by an equivalent amount, and so foreign savings do not supplement US savings.
9/15
They replace US savings. This may seem incredibly counterintuitive at first, but it is the inevitable outcome of the arithmetic of the balance of payments.
10/15
He comes close to recognizing the costs of a having globally important currency when he talks about China, and why it is not taking the required steps to increase the global use of the RMB.
11/15
He says: “If Xi Jinping wanted to cause the greatest pain to America, he would liberalize his financial sector and make the RMB a true competitor to USD”.
12/15
But Beijing won't, not because it wants to be kind to the US but rather because doing so would force China to absorb demand weaknesses from the rest of the world rather than use the USD to export its own demand weakness. Beijing knows this would be terrible for its economy.
13/15
The global dominance of USD is great for Wall Street and great for US geopolitical dominance, but it comes at a high and rising cost to the US economy – more household and fiscal debt, a declining American share of global manufacturing, worsening income inequality, etc.
14/15
But the great strength of the US has always been its economy. It seems incredibly short-sighted to sacrifice the needs of the economy for the ability of Washington to impose financial sanctions on other countries.
15/15
For Zakaria to suggest that the erosion of the dominance of the global role of USD is one of the greatest threats facing the US is absurd. Not only is it not happening, but it would be better for the US if it did.
1/9 Good article, although we should have been seeing these several years earlier, when it first became clear that an unsustainable increase in SOE and local-government debt was embedded in China's growth model.
2/9 For over a decade the only way Beijing could achieve GDP targets that exceeded the economy's real growth rate (2-3%?) was to force entities operating under soft-budget constraints (basically SOEs and local governments) to borrow liberally and build.
3/9 Two things worth noting in the article. First, it cites Zhao Jian, from Beijing Jiaotong University, as warning "that high-speed railways could become the 'gray rhino' that crushed the Chinese economy because many local governments had taken on a lot of debt to build them."
1/7 WSJ refers to an interesting and important study by Sebastian Horn, Brad Parks, Carmen Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch about how China is dealing with the payment difficulties among developing countries to whom it made large loans.
2/7 According to a WSJ summary of the study, "China has doled out more than $230 billion of emergency support in the past decade to foreign governments and central banks through new loans, rollovers of old loans and currency-swap agreements."
3/7 But there doesn't seem to be much debt forgiveness. My friends involved with official development loans often tell me that it would be politically difficult for Beijing to accept principal forgiveness as part of any substantial restructuring.
1/5 In its editorial on what problems SVB has uncovered in the US banking system, and what China can learn, after a discussion of the causes of the SVB crisis, Caixin adds: "However, we cannot take the risks in China’s financial system lightly."
2/5 Ths is because, the editorial goes on to explain: "In addition to the increased pressure on China’s economy, making financial risks more prone to erupt and more difficult to control, Chinese regulators face some unique challenges."
3/5 "The most prominent", it notes, "are the financial and fiscal risks brought by the large amounts of local debt and the financial risks caused by the recent downturn in the real estate industry."
1/7 Interesting article. It notes that developing countries around the world, "including India, Mexico, Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines are competing on subsidies, tax breaks and other perks...
2/7 to convince businesses that their country is the next best thing to the well-oiled manufacturing machine that China has honed over decades."
3/7 This is the key point: manufacturing in China has been globally very competitive largely because the government provides not just the highest amount of direct subsidies to its manufacturers but also, and more importantly, heavily subsidized business infrastructure.
1/13
Zhiwu Chen writes that "Wall Street, the Western media and economists" who every few years make "predictions of Chinese financial doom" have always gotten it wrong because they don't understand the Chinese financial system.
2/13
I think he is right, but in fairness I don't think most economists and analysts who follow China closely ever expected China to collapse in a financial crisis. One of the old cliches has always been that "China's banking system doesn't do instability; it does inefficiency."
3/13
I, for example, was one of the first to point out, over a decade ago, that China was on an unsustainable debt path that would create enormous costs for the economy, but I've always gone out of my way to say that China was nonetheless very unlikely to have a financial crisis.
1/4 Financial markets have grown so large relative to the underlying economies that regulators have no choice but to intervene to protect failing banks, even though this only reinforces further growth in the financial system.
2/4 Perhaps the solution is not to keep saving the banks, nor even to let them fail, but to take longer-term measures to cut down the size and important of the financial system in the US and global economies.
3/4 Banks should be cut down, different sectors of the financial system segregated, financial transactions taxed, and capital controls implemented that limit massive hot money flows. Critics will say that these measures will reduce the efficiency of...