Thread by @jacoposcita

A short 🧵 on today's (not so) breaking news: Saudi Arabia's cabinet has approved the MoU to become a dialogue partner of the #SCO.

A bit of context, first. 1/10

reuters.com/world/riyadh-j…

The SCO is a strange-yet-fascinating beast: A China-led international organisation that does all and nothing, which spans from East Asia to South Asia, from Central Asia to West Asia, including old-time rivals (India and Pakistan) and Eurasian giants (Russia). 2/10

Yet, because of the differences and rivalries between its members and the consensus-based mode of government, SCO "functions more as a forum for discussion and engagement than a formal regional alliance" (as put by @NicoleGrajewski washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…). 3/10

A nothing burger, some will say, but still a tasty one for many countries across Asia and the Middle East, as well as for its chef and sous-chef, China and Russia.

Saudi Arabia is now an SCO's dialogue partner, the third membership level. 4/10
eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq…

Now, the news of KSA joining the SCO as a dialogue partner was broken at the 2021 summit in Dushanbe, and the status was then granted a year later in Samarkand. So, today's announcement was expected and, I'd say, mostly procedural. 5/10

Notably, at the 2022 Dushanbe summit, Qatar was also accepted as a dialogue partner. Iran, instead, obtained full member status after almost 15 years of tormented negotiations (see Nicole's piece linked before). 6/10
news.cgtn.com/news/2022-09-1…

Saudi Arabia will not need 15 years to be elevated to full membership (it's just a matter of political will, and I don't see huge barriers). For now, though, it has entered the SCO at the lowest pyramid step. As it should be. 7/10

Now, the beef. Is this a cataclysm for the old world/Middle East order? I doubt. The SCO remains a mostly symbolic organisation with no resemblance to an alliance. Yet, being part of it matters and signals the will to become more and more part of China's worldview. 8/10

There isn't a direct link between the Iran-KSA deal and today's announcement (as said, this has been in the making since Sept. 2022). But China's momentum in the Persian Gulf continues building up, and regional countries want to be part of it, thus fuelling it. 9/10

Saudi Arabia has quickly understood that it could gain a lot from multipolarity. Therefore, it's favouring it (SCO is part of this calculus). UAE, Qatar, and many other states are doing the same. Would you blame them? Their bid, however, is not a zero-sum game. 10/10

Bonus: the always bright @SinemCngz has a great thread on the broader context of Saudi (and Persian Gulf) tilt towards non-Western organisations.

https://twitter.com/SinemCngz/status/1640983098950123520

Bonus 2: This chapter by @eleonoratafuro and Filippo Costa Buranelli is an excellent starting point to understand what the SCO is and isn't.

https://twitter.com/eleonoratafuro/status/1640996615405051905?s=20

Bonus 3: Obviously, @jonathandfulton is your go to guy for everything China-Persian Gulf:

https://twitter.com/jonathandfulton/status/1641299473623031808