First, (can't stress this enough), this variant though *compiled* for macOS is not specifically designed for macOS.
It's buggy (crashes), has an invalid signature, nor takes into account as of macOS's file-system security mechanisms.
So, impact to macOS users (for now): 0
Still as noted by others, the fact that a large ransomware gang (LockBit) has apparently set its sights on macOS, should give us all pause for concern.
So, wise to dig into this (test?) sample & gain a throughout understanding of its capabilities and approaches ๐พ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐ผโ๐ซ
And though its a bit dated (+needs some TLC), the tool had no problem generically detecting & stopping LockBit's ransomware ...even with no a priori knowledge of this threat ๐ฅฐ
โข โข โข
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RE: The 3CX VOIP supply chain attack, vendors have stated that macOS was also targeted - but I couldn't find any specific technical details (yet) ๐๐โ ๏ธ
One vendor stated, "we cannot confirm that the Mac installer is similarly trojanized"
...let's dive in! 1/n ๐งต
We'll start with 3CXDesktopApp-18.12.416.dmg
(SHA 1: 3DC840D32CE86CEBF657B17CEF62814646BA8E98)
It contains a *notarized* app ("3CX Desktop App.app") ...meaning Apple checked it for malware "and none was detected" ๐โ ๏ธ 2/n
This app is massive - 381mb ๐คฏ
...let's focus on libffmpeg.dylib
found in the App's /Contents/Frameworks/Electron\ Framework.framework/Versions/A/Libraries directory
Ever wondered what it's like writing security tools for macOS? ๐ค
As Apple provides no official way to detect what app is using the webcam/mic, OverSight simply monitored the system log.
This was (independently) reported to Apple, who decided to assign it a CVE/patch it ๐ฅฒ๐คฆ๐ปโโ๏ธ
Unfortunately this means OverSight is now broken on macOS 13.3
Apple still doesn't provide a method for security tools to determine what app is accessing the mic/camera, even after years of requesting (begging) for this capability ๐ญ
There are other log msgs that can still be used (even on macOS 13.3+) to determine what App is using the mic/camera
...but I'm reluctant to update OverSight if they will just be reported and given CVEs ๐
After creating a custom C&C server, we can uncover the malwareโs full capabilities - simply by asking (tasking) the right questions! ๐คญ
1๏ธโฃ First, we must understand how the malware figures out how to find its C&C server - so we can coerce it to talk to our C&C instead!
As this (encrypted) info is embedded within the malware, we can write a simple decryptor/encryptor to (re)configure the malware ๐พ๐โ๐ผ๐ โ ๐ฅโ
2๏ธโฃ Second, we need to understand its protocol, so we can task the malware to reveal its capabilities.
A brief triage of the malware's binary shows us it sets up a local server and registers various "routes" - taskable via requests from a remote C&C server.