Count Draghula Profile picture
Apr 24 13 tweets 4 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
Credit Default Swaps (CDS).

Lots of attention on US Sov CDS given the debt ceiling. 1Y has traded higher than in the 2011 episode.

CDS at the best of times is a bad market. DM sov CDS is even worse.

1/ Image
2/ Debt ceiling deadlines have heavily distorted the extreme front-end of the Treasury curve.

This is entirely a resulted of the predicted d-day for the Treasury. nothing more.

No-risk cash doesn't want to deal with risk.

@dampedspring has covered this well. Image
3/ This has heavily inverted the curve for US Sov CDS spreads, with immediate maturities pricing in more risk.

If this was a corporate you would say 1Y CDS at 130bp implies a 2.6% chance of default within the year with 50% recovery on capital.

But it obviously isn't a corp. Image
4/ This is where problems start.

I'm not a big fan of CDS in general. It has so many bad characteristics. DM sov CDS amplifies these.

CDS was created to have a use (hedging physical bonds), but it doesn't do that job particularly well. So it becomes a degen trading contract.
5/ Here are the contract details for US sov.

Note that the currency is "EUR" and not "USD".

Why? Because of this thing called "quanto" risk. Image
6/ "Quanto" risk is the conditional correlated risk between the default of the name on the CDS, and the currency of the contract.

This was a big problem with CDS on banks in the GFC.

If your banking system died, your ccy would probably go with it. This risk is hard to price.
7/ If this was a problem for banks, you could imagine what it would be like with a sovereign. Therefore the US sov CDS is priced in EUR.

But hold on, the US doesn't issue bonds in EUR. So how does a default get settled?
8/ This brings me to the real problem with CDS.

The default event process is not determined by the market, but by a bunch of lawyers at ISDA.

Once they agree that a default has occurred, people can submit bonds into an auction and a settlement price is reached.
9/ The event of default process has created some bizarre situations in the past.

One of my favourite was the restructure of debt by Cemex (a Mexican cement company) after buying Rinker in 2007.

The ISDA board couldn't decide if it was an event and didn't trade for 2 months.
10/ This paper covers the CDS market well if you want to know more.

It highlights the size of sov CDS as a market. Note that most of that 14% is emerging markets, and not DM.

federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/f… Image
11/ This point highlights where sov CDS isn't totally useless.

Turkish or Brazilian CDS denominated in USD provides a useful hedging instrument when a large portion of that debt is issued in USD.

Event of default determinations will still be problematic, but at least it works.
12/ For a DM sov CDS like the US, none of these things are true.

You might be thinking then...why not just sell US CDS and collect the premium in normal times?

Well then you run into the costs of balance sheet and collateralisation. Earning 10bp for that?
13/ For these reasons, the spread on US CDS bears little relationship to implied default probabilities.

For a corporate (non-bank) and EM sov, you can do this.

For US CDS, it's just a illiquid measure of sentiment, with no real world use and implication.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Count Draghula

Count Draghula Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @countdraghula

Apr 19
What is "macro"?

What should you concentrate on to learn "macro trading"?

I get this question frequently by beginners, and I understand their frustration.

The answer isn't straightforward because it is so far from being a science.



1/
2/ The first question we have to answer is what "macro" is.

This can be confusing because macro covers macroeconomics (i.e. being an economist) and macro markets (trading securities that aren't exposed to individual companies, but more to the entire economy).
3/ There is obviously a link between the two, as the economics affect the pricing of macro markets.

This is far from the only (or most important) factor.

Flows, sentiment, micro-economics, probability and risk distributions etc etc

Sometimes each will matter more than others
Read 17 tweets
Apr 17
CCC credit spreads has levelled out with equity vol as a measure of value, undoing their richness held since late 2020.

If realised equity vol continues to trade like it has been recently (super low), expect credit to keep up and tighten further.

1/ Image
2/ The model above uses the average true range of the SPX over a 3 month window to gauge the relative position of low-rated credit.

For IG, bond vol has mattered a lot more, but down in the lower rated stuff equities still matter more. Image
3/ For this reason, low rated credit has underperformed on the recovery rally, mostly because it didn't really sell off before.

IG was far more affected due to a high weighting toward financials.
Read 8 tweets
Apr 5
The behaviour of CBs over the last year highlights that, despite the hoards of economists that work for each bank, the setting of monetary policy is a highly emotional and sentiment driven decision.

This makes sentiment king and turning points in policy hard to pick.

1/ Image
2/ To see this, let's review how banks have acted during this hiking cycle.

I have sliced the pricing of the market up into 7 periods, dividing up the current hiking cycle into "themes". Most (but not all) were central bank driven, using highly divergent communication. Image
3/ It is no secret that markets are highly sentiment driven.

Central bankers, however, are too.

Take the 4th period outlined, from Aug to Nov 2022. While there was some recovery from the mid-year recession worry, a few higher prints on core CPI sent every CB into a tailspin.
Read 14 tweets
Apr 3
Insurance protecting against brutal Fed cuts this year are still SUPER rich, despite the relative calm.

Calls that protect against a Fed that suddenly cuts >175bp in a year are RIDICULOUSLY expensive compared to puts (which protect against higher for longer).

Explainer.

1/
2/ The bank led re-pricing of the rates curve had an expected effect on rates vol.

The MOVE index considers swaption vol for longer tenors, weighted towards the 10y.

We are back to the 2022 average here.
3/ We aren't seeing the same thing for out-of-the-money calls on front-end futures.

BUYING A CALL on front-end futures is taking a bet on Fed rates collapsing, especially if it is considerably out of the money, as below.

Pricing for these is still sky high, despite some calm.
Read 10 tweets
Mar 28
Real financial crises stop the flow of credit to those who NEED it.

This "mini-crisis" hasn't seemed to have done that.

My new newsletter is out explaining why out of control banking crises happen and how they are necessary to cause deep recessions.

macroisdead.com/p/bad-lending-…

1/
2/ The flow of credit to the economy is vital to avoiding a deep recession.

Once this flow stops, refinancing may not occur, and this opens up potential losses from forced selling.

The effect of this cascades, and leads to failures and job losses.
3/ But how does this process start?

It starts when loans go "delinquent" and start to become a worry for the bank.

When this starts to happen, and the economic cycle turns, banks will increase provisions for loan losses as negative assets.
Read 15 tweets
Mar 28
This might be the first <15bp daily range in the US 10y for 2.5 weeks. If we've calmed down then US rates are worth a look again.

Most banks now have us through the penultimate hike...but I can't see how this can be given the Fed's and FDIC's behaviour.

1/
2/ This "banking crisis" was precipitated by known and quantifiable losses on securities, which caused a bank run.

The Fed allowed borrowing at par value for banks to escape the liquidity trap, and the FDIC covered uninsured deposits and took losses to enable SVB to trade.
3/ These are strong actions that support the smaller end of banking in the US.

If this didn't happen, deposits would've run to larger banks, promoting consolidation.

A run to MMFs was in train as well - which made the Fed even more important as a deposit destination.
Read 12 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(