A few stories from the past week have shown just how much drones are transforming warfare. It’s not their increased lethality or even their improved targeting for ground-based systems, but one of the biggest command-and-control revolutions of the past century. Thread.
The first is an article on Ukraine’s use of drones for indirect fire control. This alone is nothing new—it’s been apparent since last March that guided artillery, far more than ATGMs, has been the most effective weapon of the war. 19fortyfive.com/2023/04/artill…
The article compares Ukrainian indirect fire roles for all types of weapons to sniper rifles. But it only focuses on efficiency, and doesn’t really get into tactical effectiveness. For example, how has Ukraine used that increased efficiency to break up assaults?
We get a better sense of this from an interview with Syrksky on Russian tactics in Bakhmut. Specifically, how targeting data is integrated with terrain analysis and other intelligence to plan assaults. en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/9…
This is the most interesting quote:
A recent video of a Russian drone team guiding an assault shows what this looks like. The drone operator alerts the men on the ground to enemy firing positions, available cover, and an approaching vehicle. He even micromanages their entry into a building.
For maybe the first time in history, a command element has better situational awareness at a very low level than the men on the ground. This allows it to make better decisions, at a much faster rate.
It’s striking how effective this is, even though the Russian troops don’t even look especially well trained (e.g. the fire and movement at 5:40-7:00 and the way they fire blindly into windows, often ignoring instructions).
Granted, this is only a partial picture and at very small scale—it looks to be maybe a squad against a fireteam. We don’t see any fires larger than mortars and the Ukrainian defenders have already sustained casualties, while the only vehicle present is an M113 used for CASEVAC.
But now imagine a well-oiled battalion staff directing an assault on a fortified position. Not only are squads being directed by drone, but so are platoons and companies. Commanders can direct one subordinate unit to support another when it gets stalled.
Enemy positions are suppressed much faster and more effectively. Individual units’ target priorities are integrated into a larger fires AND movement plan, allowing the entire assault to keep up its momentum. Less of a chance of stalling out under the defenders’ artillery.
It’s hard to say how much this will tilt things in the attacker’s favor—on balance, accurate artillery fire is still probably much better for the defender. But this will definitely set a new gold standard in combined-arms integration.
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Lots of focus on the difficulty of creating a breakthrough in a long-range precision strike regime, but that’s only half the problem. Assuming it can be done, pushing exploitation forces up from the rear would be another challenge in itself.
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A basic element of combined arms is their simultaneous offensive and defensive function. Hitting an objective in several ways increases the odds of success, while making it harder for the enemy to hit vulnerable troops at the point of attack—an overwhelming pulse of combat power.
LRPFs frustrate this by being harder to suppress and quicker to counterattack. Successful offensives require either extreme incrementalism (what we see in Ukraine), or an absurd concentration of deep strikes, AD, EW, artillery, etc. that exceed any current military’s capacity.
Saltpeter, or crystallized potassium nitrate, was the most important component of gunpowder. It naturally occurs in deposits around the world, but for countries like Sweden that lacked them, it could be created through an involved and somewhat disgusting process.🧵
Saltpeter provides the oxygen for rapid combustion, giving gunpowder its bang. Early formulas were more fast-burning incendiaries than explosives, with pitch or oil mixed in, until the optimal ratio was discovered: 75% saltpeter, 15% charcoal, 10% sulfur
Europe as a whole had little naturally-occurring saltpeter: much of it came from the Americas, where it formed in caves from bat guano, and India, where it was refined from certain soils—this drove Dutch, English, French, and Danish colonial trade with India in the 17th century.
OTD 1814, the Battle of Bladensburg: the British defeat an American force defending Washington, DC.
Although not a terribly interesting battle in itself, American tactics resemble Hannibal’s at Zama—and both lead to the sacking of their respective capitals (sort of).🧵
The first two years of the War of 1812 overturned expectations: on land, the American invasion of Canada made no headway, but at sea her privateers & frigates had great success—the Napoleonic Wars were raging, and the Royal Navy could not spare the effort.
But following Leipzig, Napoleon was all but defeated, allowing the British to redeploy forces in 1814. They extended their blockade to the entire eastern seaboard, occupied Maine, sent an expedition to the Gulf of Mexico, and launched an overland invasion via Lake Champlain.
Despite being small and poor, Sweden became a major player in the 17th century through the feats of its superb army. But military power depended in turn on the extremely efficient organization of all society and expansive investment in industry.🧵
Sweden's disadvantages were partly offset by some critical natural resources. Much of the crown’s revenues came from raw material exports: iron, timber, naval stores, and above all copper.
The enormous Falun mine supplied up to two-thirds of Europe’s copper in the 17th century.
Swedish kings tried to move up the value chain by investing in smelters, forges, and eventually cannon foundries. For this they relied on commercial connections with the Dutch, whose merchants were very active in the Baltic.
Chinese bureaucracy was a sort of intangible infrastructure that made their military more effective—preserving and disseminating techniques, driving weapons development, etc. But Europe was developing its own intangibles which by the late 1700s completely surpassed this.🧵
Western writers began seriously recording military knowledge only a little before the Chinese developed countermarch musketry (although at first much of this was more humanists’ naively searching for classical precedence than practical techniques: )dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/paperback-ed…
Over the following two centuries, however, Europe saw an explosion in books on military organization, weaponry, and techniques, which were ruthlessly copied and modified by rival military establishments.
Andrade takes seriously the hypothesis that endemic warfare among semi-stable states is what drove European military advances, and applies that model to China.
In particular, he identifies three "warring states" periods in which China saw great leaps in military technology:
1. The "Song Warring States Period" (960-1234): northern China was controlled by various steppe dynasties (Xi Xia, Liao, Jin, later Mongols), south by the Song.