A few stories from the past week have shown just how much drones are transforming warfare. It’s not their increased lethality or even their improved targeting for ground-based systems, but one of the biggest command-and-control revolutions of the past century. Thread.
The first is an article on Ukraine’s use of drones for indirect fire control. This alone is nothing new—it’s been apparent since last March that guided artillery, far more than ATGMs, has been the most effective weapon of the war. 19fortyfive.com/2023/04/artill…
The article compares Ukrainian indirect fire roles for all types of weapons to sniper rifles. But it only focuses on efficiency, and doesn’t really get into tactical effectiveness. For example, how has Ukraine used that increased efficiency to break up assaults?
We get a better sense of this from an interview with Syrksky on Russian tactics in Bakhmut. Specifically, how targeting data is integrated with terrain analysis and other intelligence to plan assaults. en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/9…
This is the most interesting quote:
A recent video of a Russian drone team guiding an assault shows what this looks like. The drone operator alerts the men on the ground to enemy firing positions, available cover, and an approaching vehicle. He even micromanages their entry into a building.
For maybe the first time in history, a command element has better situational awareness at a very low level than the men on the ground. This allows it to make better decisions, at a much faster rate.
It’s striking how effective this is, even though the Russian troops don’t even look especially well trained (e.g. the fire and movement at 5:40-7:00 and the way they fire blindly into windows, often ignoring instructions).
Granted, this is only a partial picture and at very small scale—it looks to be maybe a squad against a fireteam. We don’t see any fires larger than mortars and the Ukrainian defenders have already sustained casualties, while the only vehicle present is an M113 used for CASEVAC.
But now imagine a well-oiled battalion staff directing an assault on a fortified position. Not only are squads being directed by drone, but so are platoons and companies. Commanders can direct one subordinate unit to support another when it gets stalled.
Enemy positions are suppressed much faster and more effectively. Individual units’ target priorities are integrated into a larger fires AND movement plan, allowing the entire assault to keep up its momentum. Less of a chance of stalling out under the defenders’ artillery.
It’s hard to say how much this will tilt things in the attacker’s favor—on balance, accurate artillery fire is still probably much better for the defender. But this will definitely set a new gold standard in combined-arms integration.
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Louis XIV & Louis XV were very different in character, but both fought 3 major wars that followed a remarkably similar arc:
1. Small war over points of honor that rapidly expanded 2. Large war that saw many victories but no real gains 3. Large war that saw defeats and losses
🧵
1. The Franco-Dutch War (1672-78) & War of the Polish Succession (1733-35)
These were the smallest large wars of their reigns. Both started out limited conflicts over points of honor, then spread to other parts of Europe as natural rivalries with the Habsburgs took over.
Louis XIV invaded the Holland in 1672 to punish it for its lack of support in a brief war with Spain a few years earlier (the War of Devolution). This was coordinated with a naval attack by England, which had already fought two wars with the Dutch in as many decades.
The wars of Louis XIV are criminally neglected in popular anglophone historiography. They were enormous in scope and consequence, shaping the map of modern Europe arguably even more than the Napoleonic wars.
In the American market, the two most popular topics by far are WWII and the Civil War. The reasons are obvious: the scale, personal connection, US involvement, etc. But there's another reason they continue to draw more scholarly and professional military attention...
And that is that they're interesting at every level of war: from the grand strategic to theater strategy, tactics and operations.
Battles affected campaigns, campaigns in one theater affected those in another, so on and so forth. Endlessly fascinating complexity.
The gap between operations and strategy is tough to bridge because it usually overlaps with the civil-military divide. This was even harder when armies were composed of mercenaries.
The Venetians did it by employing officers resembling communist political commissars.🧵
Every Venetian army was accompanied by two officers called provveditori. This is sometimes translated as “commissioner” or “commissary”, as they oversaw army administration of the army. But they also had a political and strategic role.
Perhaps uncoincidentally, this other role is best described by the word commissar—the Russian word for commissary. Proveditors were tasked with ensuring the loyalty of mercenary captains and making sure their operations supported Venice’s overall war strategy.
The internationalization of wars in the 16th c. made strategy dependent on events far away. This meant that states needed not just accurate information, but effective analysis. But how good was their intelligence?
A 1532 report to the Venetian College gives some indication.
Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino and an experienced condottiere, had just been contracted as captain-general of the Republic’s armies. While he was in Venice that spring to celebrate his confirmation, he was asked about the military situation in Europe.
The Venetians were in particular worried about the Ottomans. They fought two losing wars with them in the past 70 years, losing many valuable ports around the Med to them; as recently as 1499, Ottoman cavalry had raided Venice’s Italian lands.
The takedown of a 2017 London Bridge terrorist could serve as a lesson in combined arms:
-Artillery (fire extinguisher) suppresses
-Cavalry (narwhal tusk) turns his flank
-Infantry closes
Done on the fly by three total strangers using improvised weapons.🧵
Tactics are almost always simple in their essence, an obvious response with the means available—even animals show tactical instinct: ambushes, flanking attacks, swarms, feigned retreats, etc.
The real difficulty lies in executing these maneuvers with large bodies of men.
Even a simple flanking attack is difficult in organized combat: how do you get a group of men around the enemy’s flank while maintaining formation? That’s the REAL challenge of tactics—it may have driven some of the Greeks’ organizational innovations.
In honor of the first day of the Battle of Leipzig—OTD in 1813—I’m sharing an excellent article by Michael Leggiere (next post) on the strategic miscalculations that led Napoleon to be trapped by three converging armies that outnumbered him nearly 2-to-1.
Leggiere’s argument is that Napoleon became fixated on an initial “master plan” for the campaign, and continued to pursue it long after the situation changed, detracting from his usual strategy of directly targeting the main enemy army. muse.jhu.edu/article/40473
As Napoleon assembled a new army in Saxony following the 1812 Russian disaster, he planned to sweep northeast with one wing to rescue French veterans in fortresses on the Oder & Vistula, then cut off the Russians advancing through Poland.