A few stories from the past week have shown just how much drones are transforming warfare. It’s not their increased lethality or even their improved targeting for ground-based systems, but one of the biggest command-and-control revolutions of the past century. Thread.
The first is an article on Ukraine’s use of drones for indirect fire control. This alone is nothing new—it’s been apparent since last March that guided artillery, far more than ATGMs, has been the most effective weapon of the war. 19fortyfive.com/2023/04/artill…
The article compares Ukrainian indirect fire roles for all types of weapons to sniper rifles. But it only focuses on efficiency, and doesn’t really get into tactical effectiveness. For example, how has Ukraine used that increased efficiency to break up assaults?
We get a better sense of this from an interview with Syrksky on Russian tactics in Bakhmut. Specifically, how targeting data is integrated with terrain analysis and other intelligence to plan assaults. en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/9…
This is the most interesting quote:
A recent video of a Russian drone team guiding an assault shows what this looks like. The drone operator alerts the men on the ground to enemy firing positions, available cover, and an approaching vehicle. He even micromanages their entry into a building.
For maybe the first time in history, a command element has better situational awareness at a very low level than the men on the ground. This allows it to make better decisions, at a much faster rate.
It’s striking how effective this is, even though the Russian troops don’t even look especially well trained (e.g. the fire and movement at 5:40-7:00 and the way they fire blindly into windows, often ignoring instructions).
Granted, this is only a partial picture and at very small scale—it looks to be maybe a squad against a fireteam. We don’t see any fires larger than mortars and the Ukrainian defenders have already sustained casualties, while the only vehicle present is an M113 used for CASEVAC.
But now imagine a well-oiled battalion staff directing an assault on a fortified position. Not only are squads being directed by drone, but so are platoons and companies. Commanders can direct one subordinate unit to support another when it gets stalled.
Enemy positions are suppressed much faster and more effectively. Individual units’ target priorities are integrated into a larger fires AND movement plan, allowing the entire assault to keep up its momentum. Less of a chance of stalling out under the defenders’ artillery.
It’s hard to say how much this will tilt things in the attacker’s favor—on balance, accurate artillery fire is still probably much better for the defender. But this will definitely set a new gold standard in combined-arms integration.
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One of the most sought-after Indian allies in these wars was the Marathas. As the preeminent Hindu power during the height of Mughal expansion, they had survived by developing a strong cavalry arm—which the Europeans competed to win to their side.🧵
Mughal military power rested on their excellent cavalry, which was mounted on superb Turkic and Arabian breeds they brought in from Central Asia. At their height, they imported upwards of 100,000 horses a year through Afghanistan.
Their geographic position magnified this advantage. India is not good country for raising horses, and the Mughal power base in the northwest allowed them to cut off the supply of horses to their rivals, making it very difficult for them to source remounts.
Before the 1750s, no European power had much in the way of Indian colonies—just a few scattered trade stations, dependent on the good graces of native princes.
That began to change with the Second Carnatic War, the most fascinating and complex of Franco-British wars in India.🧵
The small size of colonial possessions in India meant that when European powers went to war there, as Britain and France began doing in 1744, they usually did so as parts of larger coalitions, with native princes supplying a majority of troops.
Unlike the First Carnatic War, which was directly precipitated by events in Europe, the Second was fought purely for regional influence—both countries held several important ports in the Carnatic. What threw a wrench in things was that their home governments were at peace.
Good overview of how little weapons training and physical conditioning Greek hoplites did. But the claim that they did not drill at all, which has been floating around for some time, is absolutely NOT true, and badly misreads the sources.
Warfare is governed by two inherently opposing logics: the “economic” logic of optimization and balance, and the logic of decision—overwhelming force at a critical point that decides an outcome. This tension runs through all levels of war.
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The logic of economics encompasses purely attritional warfare, although it also extends far beyond: warfare by balance sheet, allocating forces to where they can get the best casualty ratios, while defending terrain whose capture might improve the enemy’s ratio.
This can apply to anything from tactical dispositions to force structure. Exploiting Ricardian advantage—itself a concept borrowed from economics—to maximize cost-effectiveness is an application of economic logic to grand strategy.
It’s easy to overlook New York City’s military geography since it hasn’t faced a live threat in over 200 years. But it is perhaps the finest natural naval bastion in the world, one of the major reasons for its place as America’s economic capital.
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Any good naval base has traditionally had a few key elements: a defensible harbor, a large roadstead for assembling the fleet, and access to deep water. All major naval bases have this: Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay, Southampton on the Solent, Brest and Sevastopol Roadsteads…
The eastern seaboard of the US is endowed with plenty of these: Boston Harbor and Newport on the Narragansett; Wilmington/Philadelphia on the Delaware Bay, Norfolk, Baltimore, and Washington on the Chesapeake—even Charleston Harbor, although small.
There’s a lot of overlap between the concepts of “small wars” and the “little war” of the 16th-18th centuries—the regular skirmishes and raids that took place during lulls in the action of major wars. Both in the nature of the fighting and their roles in the broader context.🧵
“Small wars” occupy a pretty wide conceptual horizon—from old-school colonial wars to large-scale insurgencies to periodic border skirmishes between large states. Yet in all of these, combat is usually limited to the tactical or lower operational level. dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/the-chain-of…
The fighting in “little war” was similarly small-scale—it consisted mostly of smaller actions designed to spoil enemy preparations, impose friction, and test the enemy’s strength—but took place firmly within the context of regular large-scale wars.