A few stories from the past week have shown just how much drones are transforming warfare. It’s not their increased lethality or even their improved targeting for ground-based systems, but one of the biggest command-and-control revolutions of the past century. Thread.
The first is an article on Ukraine’s use of drones for indirect fire control. This alone is nothing new—it’s been apparent since last March that guided artillery, far more than ATGMs, has been the most effective weapon of the war. 19fortyfive.com/2023/04/artill…
The article compares Ukrainian indirect fire roles for all types of weapons to sniper rifles. But it only focuses on efficiency, and doesn’t really get into tactical effectiveness. For example, how has Ukraine used that increased efficiency to break up assaults?
We get a better sense of this from an interview with Syrksky on Russian tactics in Bakhmut. Specifically, how targeting data is integrated with terrain analysis and other intelligence to plan assaults. en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/9…
This is the most interesting quote:
A recent video of a Russian drone team guiding an assault shows what this looks like. The drone operator alerts the men on the ground to enemy firing positions, available cover, and an approaching vehicle. He even micromanages their entry into a building.
For maybe the first time in history, a command element has better situational awareness at a very low level than the men on the ground. This allows it to make better decisions, at a much faster rate.
It’s striking how effective this is, even though the Russian troops don’t even look especially well trained (e.g. the fire and movement at 5:40-7:00 and the way they fire blindly into windows, often ignoring instructions).
Granted, this is only a partial picture and at very small scale—it looks to be maybe a squad against a fireteam. We don’t see any fires larger than mortars and the Ukrainian defenders have already sustained casualties, while the only vehicle present is an M113 used for CASEVAC.
But now imagine a well-oiled battalion staff directing an assault on a fortified position. Not only are squads being directed by drone, but so are platoons and companies. Commanders can direct one subordinate unit to support another when it gets stalled.
Enemy positions are suppressed much faster and more effectively. Individual units’ target priorities are integrated into a larger fires AND movement plan, allowing the entire assault to keep up its momentum. Less of a chance of stalling out under the defenders’ artillery.
It’s hard to say how much this will tilt things in the attacker’s favor—on balance, accurate artillery fire is still probably much better for the defender. But this will definitely set a new gold standard in combined-arms integration.
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Military strategy is supposed to be guided by war aims determined by political figures—this has largely been true for Western nations in the past 200 years. But far more often, the demands of strategy determine the war aims themselves. Thread. bazaarofwar.substack.com/p/theories-of-…
Consider the case of the Japanese in World War II. In 1942, their aims were to complete the conquest of China and Southeast Asia. But in response to this, the US imposed an oil embargo which crippled their ability to keep fighting.
This left the oilfields of the Dutch East Indies as their only potential source, but an invasion would bring the US into the war against them. Continuing the war in Asia therefore meant war with America—which convinced planners to launch a preemptive strike on Pearl Harbor.
What is operational art? Most people today would say something about connecting tactics to strategy.
WRONG!
This is an innovation introduced in 1982, which clouded an otherwise clear concept and led to 4 decades of pointless doctrinal bickering. Thread. bazaarofwar.substack.com/p/the-levels-o…
The 1982 version of FM 100-5 Operations introduced the operational level of war, which it defined as using "available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war."
Most criticisms focus on the use of the word 'level'. But that's not the real problem.
The term 'level of war' was first used by Edward Luttwak in an influential 1980 paper. Although this was never used by the Soviets, it's not a bad coinage—it reflects their understanding of a 3-part division of war, and the precedents go even farther back. bazaarofwar.substack.com/p/the-levels-o…
The concept of strategy has undergone three distinct evolutions from its original meaning of 'generalship'. Each was associated with a different level of war.
It also carried some sense of the campaign, but this did not really extend so far as an entire campaign plan - it was more the maneuvers outside of battle that gave an army the jump on the enemy.
The second evolution occurred in the 18th century. Classicists looked to Byzantine authors for inspiration, but adapted the term 'strategy' for their own purposes. This is when the strict division emerged of tactics=battle, strategy=campaign. bazaarofwar.substack.com/p/the-levels-o…
Tactics, strategy, logistics, lines of operation/communication all entered common usage during in the second half of the 18th century. Together with the mid-17th c., this period basically invented modern strategic language.
This ferment originated in France in reaction to her defeat in the Seven Years' War.
The Count of Guibert, who elaborated the concept of grand tactics, laid the intellectual groundwork for fast, decisive warfare - he was a major influence on the armies of the French Revolution.
The Welshman Henry Lloyd introduced "lines of operations" in his 1781 Reflections on the Principles of the Art of War", an addendum to his famous history of the Seven Years' War.
It's striking how *late* the concepts of tactics & strategy were applied to warfare. It was not until the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in the 1750s that tactics caught on.
Strategy took even longer to develop: the term was first used in the 1770s, and only by the 1790s was it firmly established as meaning the realm of warfare outside of battle. Why was this?
Although it’s anyone’s guess whether the conflict on the Sino-Indian border will escalate, it’s one of the few places in the world where the defender could exploit a reverse-slope defense. Thread.
A reverse slope defense is simply when the defender positions himself at the bottom of a slope. This protects him from long-range direct fire weapons and forces the attacker to trickle into the kill zone. Wellington used it to great effect against the French in Spain.
Indirect fire weapons made this mostly obsolete above the small unit level, although the reverse slope still provides concealment from artillery observers. Drones negate even this advantage.
But there’s an exception for very high mountains, like on the Sino-Indian border.