Pete Profile picture
May 2, 2023 9 tweets 5 min read Read on X
"BURNT ALIVE IN #ODESSA "
"Ukrainian nationalists locked communist trade union members and protesters in Odesa's TUH and set the building on fire."
"...terrible tragedy, when Ukrainian nationalists burned dozens of their fellow citizens alive in the House of Trade Unions in… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… ImageImageImageImage
I would like to direct your focus to two specific aspects of the Council of Europe's investigation:

1. "Other than the fire in the lobby, the fires could only have been started by the acts of those inside the building."

2. "However, there is also footage showing pro-unity… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… ImageImage
Peaceful supporters of Russia fire 'peace' from windows at supporters of Ukraine.
Shooters on the roof, fire inside the building.
This is Andrey Krasilnikov, a Russian citizen and Euromaidan activist, who has been shot in Odesa by snipers on the roof that day.

He recovered and has been fighting against separatists in Donbas since 2015 ImageImage
Before the fires broke out, Pro-Maidan Ukrainians were being shot and killed by Russians in Odesa, leading to chaos. The Ukrainians managed to push the Anti-Maidan protestors back, and they were eventually compelled to seek shelter in the Trade Union Building.

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More from @splendid_pete

Oct 9
#MafiaState 🔟 🧵 0/25

Picture a country where the government isn’t just running the show, it’s a tightly knit racket funneling money and power to loyal insiders.
Welcome to Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, a textbook mafia state.

At the center stands Péter Szijjártó, Orbán’s trusted Foreign Minister and one of the system’s most valuable enforcers. Behind his polished diplomatic image lies a web of family enrichment, insider deals, and crony patronage that connects directly to Hungary’s oligarch elite.

This thread dissects the architecture of corruption built through Szijjártó’s rise. It traces how loyalty to Orbán became a pipeline to luxury villas, offshore wealth, and unchecked power. Every section draws from Hungarian investigative outlets, official records, and archived media reports.

This is not politics. It is organized state capture.
Follow the money.

x.com/splendid_pete/…Image
1/25 — The Railway Cartel: Szijjártó’s Family and the Early Blueprint for Corruption

Before Péter Szijjártó entered government, his family name appeared in one of Hungary’s most brazen corruption cases. Between 2004 and 2005, the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) uncovered a cartel that manipulated EU-funded railway construction contracts worth about 24 billion forints (≈ €96 million). The contracts were split among companies that coordinated bids to guarantee shared profits.

One of them, Vasútépítők Kft., was tied to Szijjártó’s father, István Szijjártó. The GVH imposed a record 7.2 billion HUF fine, yet no one faced criminal punishment because cartel offences were not yet criminalized. Vasútépítők escaped its penalty entirely by turning state witness, then led a lawsuit that delayed enforcement long enough for the rest of the network to keep the money.

It was an early prototype of how Fidesz’s National Cooperation System would function: insiders use EU funds, exploit legal loopholes, and walk away untouched. The system did not appear in 2010 — it was already being built.

hvg.hu/itthon/2011070…Image
2/25 — The 2012 Money Surge: When Income and Wealth No Longer Matched

By 2012, Szijjártó’s personal wealth leapt beyond any plausible salary. His asset declaration showed a savings increase of 12.5 million HUF (≈ €50 000) while his combined official income as Orbán’s spokesman and MP was 9.8 million HUF (≈ €39 000). The explanation that it came from “bank deposits” did not hold up mathematically.

Hungary’s asset-declaration system was never enforced. There is no audit, no verification, and no penalty for falsification. Journalists flagged the inconsistency, but institutions stayed silent.

The 2012 enrichment was small yet symbolic: in Orbán’s Hungary, wealth accumulation no longer needed credible sources. Loyalty replaced transparency.

hvg.hu/itthon/2013022…Image
Read 26 tweets
Oct 9
BREAKING!

1/11

Joint investigation by Direkt36, Der Spiegel, Der Standard, and De Tijd uncovered that Orbán’s government built and ran a secret spy network in Brussels, using Hungary’s Information Office (IH) to infiltrate EU institutions. Image
2/11

2012–2018: Hungarian intelligence entrenched itself in the EU’s core.
Hungarian agents were embedded at the country’s EU Permanent Representation in Brussels, officially registered as diplomats dealing with economic or financial affairs. In reality, they were IH officers, sent to collect classified or politically sensitive information from inside the EU.
3/11

“V.” — the charming recruiter turned exposed spy.
The central figure, known as V., was described by EU insiders as sociable, intelligent, and easy to talk to. Over several years he held informal meetings with Hungarian officials working at the European Commission, probing them for internal insights and office gossip. At first he played the friendly networker, but later tried to formalize recruitment, asking one Commission employee to sign a declaration making them a “secret collaborator” of the IH. When money failed, he offered donations to a charity the target supported. The employee refused and later shared the experience with journalists.
Read 13 tweets
Oct 2
As I said yesterday, the 🇷🇺 is a guarantee for brain-dead bullshit.

1/N

Here’s the shovel for your manure pile. “America built Nazism in Ukraine through Operation Aerodynamic” is a Cold War fairy tale. Aerodynamic was a CIA info op run through émigré outfits like Prolog to beam anti-Soviet content at the USSR. Diaspora press. Pamphlets. Radio. Not “growing Nazis” inside Soviet Ukraine. It later morphed into QRPLUMB and wound down by 1991. That is not post-1991 Kyiv policy and not “Washington manufacturing Nazis.” Read the files instead of licking Telegram: CIA reading-room docs describe Aerodynamic as exploiting anti-Soviet resistance and working via émigrés, with Prolog publishing Suchasnist. That’s propaganda support against the USSR, not a Frankenstein lab for Ukrainian fascism.

cia.gov/readingroom/do…

archives.gov/files/iwg/decl…Image
2/N

The Nazi smear face-plants in elections. Ukrainians elected a Jewish, Russian-speaking president in a vote that the OSCE described as competitive and respecting fundamental freedoms. Zelensky won about 73%. In 2019, the far-right alliance flopped at 2.15% and got zero list seats. Nazis running the country? Only in Kremlin fanfic.

apnews.com/article/26e344…

osce.org/odihr/election…Image
Image
3/N

“Maidan was a U.S.-staged coup.”

No. Mass protests erupted when Yanukovych ditched the EU deal for Moscow. Subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections were observed by OSCE and widely recognized. You don’t get a “coup” followed by multiple internationally supervised elections unless your brain runs on RT clips.

oscepa.org/en/documents/e…Image
Read 10 tweets
Sep 30
🧵1/N OSINT TIME

Geo-ID.

Russia, Republic of Tatarstan, Pestrechinsky District, village of Kulaevo, Federal Highway M-7 “Volga,” km 847.
This is an IRBIS truck-friendly roadside complex on the M-7 east of Kazan. Directory cards confirm the address and photos.

yandex.com/maps/org/irbis…Image
Image
2/N

Why no shortage?

1. Geography & logistics

The station is only ~35 km from Kazan and ~200 km from TANECO (Nizhnekamsk). The refinery resumed normal operations after the April 2024 drone strike and even expanded its diesel output in July 2025. Short, direct tanker hauls keep IRBIS sites in Pestrechinsky rayon stocked.

2. Refining slate

TANECO is already diesel-heavy (≈ approximately 8.5 Mt of diesel vs. 2.7 Mt of gasoline in 2024) and has just added 0.64 Mt/yr of hydrocracking diesel capacity. Local product balance favors gasoil, exactly what truck-row IRBIS stations need.

3. Policy shields

Moscow imposed a gasoline export ban and a partial diesel export ban in Sept 2025. Producers must keep barrels at home. That protects republics with refining like Tatarstan, though prices float upward.

4. Political optics

Kazan is a showcase region. Officials are highly motivated to avoid empty pumps. When rumors of caps spread in mid-Sept, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Tatarstan publicly denied them and emphasized “plan reserves.”

5. Contrast to deficit regions

Acute rationing and shortages appear in Crimea, Belgorod, Rostov, and some southern oblasts, places far from major refining or under military priority. Tatarstan, with close refineries and political cover, does not share that fate.

Result: pressure expressed in higher prices, not in empty tanks.
3/N

Price and pressure

➤ The numbers. Diesel in Tatarstan: ~55 ₽/L a year ago, ~67–70 ₽/L now. Gasoline (AI-92/95) up ~17%, diesel up ~22%. Your station is at the high end, 69.99 ₽/L, typical for truck corridors.

➤ Wholesale squeeze. Refinery attacks knocked out units across Russia. Output fell, wholesale diesel surged from ~59k to ~69k ₽/ton in just three months.

➤ Export brakes. Moscow froze gasoline exports and slapped caps on diesel resellers to contain the bleed. That kept supply inland, but it didn’t mute price hikes.

➤ Harvest demand. Peak agricultural season piled extra diesel pull on top of the structural crunch.

➤ End result. No queues at your pump, but every liter costs more. The “shortage” shows up in your wallet, not in empty tanks.
Read 5 tweets
Sep 6
1/N And you’d be right.

She didn’t grow up in Russia. She’s Russian–American, raised abroad, and only settled in Russia as an adult. Her English is native-level because she learned it as a child. Image
2/N Identity / handles. Influencer based in Russia. Instagram @sashajost, X @sashameetsrus, YouTube “Sasha and Russia” (after deletion of her first channel). Age 26–27 in 2024–25.

occrp.org/en/investigati…Image
@sashajost @sashameetsrus 3/N Name correctness. Known as Alexandra Jost in English media, Александра Йост in Russian. Sometimes written Yost. Same person.

novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/…Image
Read 14 tweets
Jun 23
1/14 🟥 How MET Group became one of Europe’s shadiest energy giants. And Hungary’s most profitable political fix.

Let’s talk about MET Group, a Swiss-registered, Hungarian-rooted energy trader that somehow turned gas arbitrage into one of the most profitable political businesses in Europe. You’ve probably never heard of them.

That’s by design.

But this company isn’t just another trader. It’s a monument to how Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz machine monetized state power, funneled public money to loyalists, and courted Russian blessing, all while pretending to be “market players.”

Here’s the story.Image
2/14 💼 A MOL baby turned Swiss giant (2007–2013)

MET was born in 2007 inside MOL, Hungary’s state-adjacent oil giant. It started small, led by Benjamin Lakatos, a former MOL executive. The game? Buy gas cheap in Austria, sell it for more in Hungary. Fair enough.

Except they didn’t compete.

In 2011, Orbán’s government handed MET exclusive access to the Hungary–Austria HAG pipeline, the main artery for Western gas, via Government Decree 13/2011 (IV.7).

There was no public auction, no competitive process. Just a decree.

This access displaced E.ON Földgáz, a German-Hungarian venture, from a dominant pipeline position. Foreign players out. Orbán’s inner circle in.

From 2011 to 2015, MET was allowed to buy cheap gas in Austria and re-sell it in Hungary at inflated prices, sometimes selling it to state-owned MVM, then buying it back through murky shell games. It was a closed loop of public-to-private wealth transfer.

The result? Billions of forints in profit for MET and its owners, while Hungarian taxpayers footed the bill.
3/14 💸 Who got rich? (2012–2017)

This isn’t theory. In 2012 alone, MET paid out HUF 55 billion (~€180 million) in dividends.

That money didn’t go to pensioners or reinvested into Hungarian infrastructure. It went to a tiny elite circle, including:

‣ István Garancsi – Orbán’s football buddy, Fidesz’s go-to oligarch.

‣ György Nagy – another Fidesz-linked businessman, close to both MOL and OTP Bank.

‣ And, surprise, a mysterious Russian investor, Ilya Trubnikov, who secretly owned 12.6% of MET between 2009 and 2017 via a chain of offshore firms in Belize, Cyprus, and Zug.

Trubnikov’s background? Obscure. His role? Silent. His presence? Highly suspicious.

And who was left out? Lajos Simicska, Orbán’s old financial kingmaker. According to Direkt36, Simicska was furious that the “MOL–OTP–Garancsi” axis got the golden goose. That helped trigger his infamous fallout with Orbán in 2015.
Read 14 tweets

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