Some thoughts on #RajouriAttack. I will be factual and hope you read without prejudice
1. We lost 05 soldiers today. Two weeks ago we lost 05 in an ambush. Since 1990 we have lost 02 Brig, 9-10 COs and several Lt Cols in the valley. This is much more than all our losses of
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these ranks from 1948 in all wars including 1962.
Worse, we have not inflicted any casualty to Pak Army except the odd Lt/Capt and that also in retaliation on LC ops
2. We've lost 15,000+ civilians, 7,500+ security force but only eliminated expendable jihadis. A costless
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strategy for Paksitan Army and very costly for us.
3. We are fighting a defensive battle on our territory. In this terrain with heavy forests, hilly areas it is a given that they will get lucky sometime and we will take big losses
The problem is not our tactics or drills
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as some will say but the basic structural losing proposition of fighting a defensive war against expendable proxies on our own soil.
Wars must be fought on enemy soil. The battle must be taken to the enemy
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PS - we have also lost 01 Brig to Pak action in Afghanistan
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Just discovered a 80 G donation to ''National Foundation of Communal Harmony'' is 100% eligible for tax relief with no cap. But a donation to @daksinvrindavan etc gets only 50% capped at 10% of Gross Total Income. So with a big capital loss you get 0% relief
@MNageswarRaoIPS sir this is grossly unfair. The state first takes my tax money & temple money for triptikaran of jihad and then does not even allow me to get tax relief for giving donations to a gaushala. But tells me I will get unlimited relief for donations for jiahd 😡
1. Intelligence - There was some intelligence about unusual and significant build up by Pak given by IB, R&AW. But it did not say that heights, posts vacated by us would be occupied. Such INT is very hard to get because you need
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a source at the heart of the enemy military leadership
Could the Army have put the INT pieces together and read enemy intentions ? Yes, some did that but senior cdrs did not heed them. Ml warned in Aug '98 that 500 Afghans had been concentrated to Gurikot NJ7959 for ingress
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Brig Surinder Singh Cdr 121 INF Bde had given warnings on how intrusions could happen and how NH1A could be interdicted. GOC 3 Div Maj Gen VS Budhwar had been warned of weaknesses in Kargil defences but he ignored these warnings. Famously, he had ordered units to procure wild
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Sir allow me to first look at impact to the war fighting ability of army because that is the critical issue. I will address your questions at the end of the thread
1. Training - Training period in regimental centres in Infantry is 9 months. But is a jawan ready to fight
when he joins the unit after 9 months training ? NO
He is not even trusted with a LMG. It takes years of structured training plus operational experience to grow into a useful soldier. He does MMG, Mortar, Driving, missile courses over the years in training schools. He is
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groomed during operations by senior NCOs, JCOs. Decades of hard earned knowledge is passed down. Imbibed. Internalised. Its only at 5 years that senior jawans stop calling him a recruit. That's when he does the Umeedwar Cadre for promotion to L/Nk
I have insight into the govt point of view. It is - we don't want to spend more on defence, Revenue/capital expenditure ratio must be reduced. Their think tanks also believe that army is too big and must be reduced. Fine. But then lets evaluate reducing nos. But we are raising 1/
Lets look at troop & firepower mix, HQs etc. For example, do we need SWC now that it controls only 10 Corps ? Can we move officers into DPSUs, MOD and reduce Col and above vacancies in army. I doubt all of this will make any substantial difference to costs
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but will enhance efficiency, welfare and morale.
But we are keeping same troop nos, in fact increasing them by new raisings but bringing in this TOD which will just decimate the quality, cohesion and fighting capabilities of existing units
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Ranchi Police exercsied extreme restraint in dealing with murderous mobs who's modus operandi was very similar to Kashmiri terrorists
1. Two terrorists (read thread to see why they should be classified as terrorists) died in hospital several hours after being injured. Ranchi
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Police is seen to be equipped with AK series rifles. A 7.62*39 AK round at 250 yards is almost guaranteed to kill the target on the spot. One reason is that army is trained to shoot at centre of mass to ensure "ek goli ek dushman". In Ranchi both terrorists received a few
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rounds but died several hours later. Police fires at murderous mobs at ranges shorter than 250 yards (230 meters) because they do this as a last resort. There is ample video evidence that police was very close to the rioters. Remember, they had lathi charged before and then
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General sahab and his wife were to visit an artillery unit deployed somewhere on the western border. The entire unit was doing hectic preparations. Soon preparations were complete. CO sahab being a thorough professional
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naturally conducted rehearsals. Adjt being even more thorough suggested that a Young Officer be detailed to spend the night in the beautiful ''machan'' accomodation they had prepared for Gen and his lady wife so that any lucanae maybe identified and fixed before the visit
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Capt sahab was duly detailed and armed with his notebook and pen (to note down ''points'') he spent the night in the VIP accomodation
After breakfast Capt sahab gave his recce report - Sir everything was fine but my sleep was disturbed at dwan by chirping of birds. This is
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