Great investigation by @meduzaproject on how Russia's FSB has recruited ex-ISIS fighters to try to infiltrate Chechen and Tatar military units fighting for Ukraine: meduza.io/feature/2023/0…
Several years ago I did a long piece on how Russia instrumentalizes (back then one might have even said 'weaponizes') the very jihadists it claims to be fighting. thedailybeast.com/russias-double…
The FSB established a 'green corridor' to allow migration of known Islamists from the Caucasus to Syria via Turkey, knowing these fighters would join Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS) or ISIS.
The scheme was intended to alleviate threats during the Sochi Winter Olympics, drum up the terrorist quotient in Syria (thereby making Assad look more amenable to the West), and of course to create an agent network.
Former KGB spymaster Oleg Kalugin said this was a tried-and-true method for the Soviet/Russia services going back decades. Holy war is a problem, until it's useful.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Excellent analysis by Kiel Institute. Some conclusions track with what @JimmySecUK wrote for @newlinesmag here: newlinesmag.com/argument/can-e…
“To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do.”
“Currently, European governments contribute about €44 billion annually to Ukraine’s defense, or roughly 0.1% of their
combined GDP, a relatively modest fiscal commitment. To replace total US aid, Europe would need to increase its annual support to approximately €82 billion per year, or 0.21% of GDP —essentially
doubling its current financial effort.
the United States allocated just 0.15% of their GDP per year to Ukraine, European states the 0.13%, and the EU institutions just below the 0.1%.”
This is an excellent and timely factsheet on Ukraine, U.S. v. European security assistance, and other misunderstood or lied about aspects of the war, by our friends at @TheStudyofWar. I'll summarize a few main points below, with additional sources of my own: understandingwar.org/backgrounder/u…
Russia's advances have slowed considerably in the last few months. It was taking, on average, 28 sq km per day in November; it took 16 sq km in January. Why is this? Russians are suffering severe manpower and equipment losses and Ukraine is causing them greater pain with its fleet of domestically sourced FPV drones, which now include fiber-optic wire-guided drones to evade electronic warfare. (Drones increasingly compensate for artillery shortages on the Ukrainian side.) Such is the state of Russia's army, its soldiers are now using donkeys to transport ammunition to the frontlines: independent.co.uk/news/world/eur…
Of course, Russia still has its own formidable capabilities and advantages on the battlefield, especially in glide bombs and drones: it, too, deploys fiber-optic wire-guided FPVs. But, as @Jack_Watling, one of the best military analysts of the war has noted, the "Russian military is massively underperforming, largely because of the poor quality of its [third big advantage] infantry and a lack of lower-level command and control." theguardian.com/world/2025/feb…
New: After an eighteen-month investigation, @InsiderEng has uncovered new evidence suggesting that Russia’s GRU paid tens of millions of dollars to the Taliban in Afghanistan to target American, coalition, and Afghan military forces. GRU Unit 29155 was behind this operation. We have unmasked the officers and their Afghan agents. theins.ru/en/politics/27…
The program, per four former Afghan intel (NDS) sources we queried, averaged $200,000 per killed American or coalition soldier. There were smaller allowances for killed Afghan troops. One former official estimated that Russia paid a total of approximately $30 million to the Taliban via the scheme.
We confirmed much of what the NDS told @InsiderEng using data exfiltrated from three different Unit 29155 operatives' email boxes. From there we assessed the travel patterns of the Afghan couriers/liaisons, matching their presence in Afghanistan with several noted Taliban attacks on U.S., NATO or Afghan targets.
"The situation on the frontlines has not significantly changed in the last month. For UA, the most difficult area remains the southern part of the eastern front—Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. RU continues to advance there, but very slowly and at the cost of heavy losses."
"Some bloggers claim that Kurakhove has already fallen into RU's hands, but it seems that this is not yet the case. UA continues to resist, but after some time, RU will take the town. Pokrovsk is farther away, and urban battles there could last a long time. There is no real threat of RU capturing it within a couple of months."
Breaking: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has released an unclassified report into the IC and its work on Havana Syndrome, or Anomalous Health Incidents. From the first lines of the executive summary: "It appears increasingly likely that a foreign adversary is behind some AHIs."
Last March @InsiderEng and @60Minutes concluded a yearlong investigation pointing at evidence that Russian military intelligence -- specifically GRU Unit 29155 -- was likely behind AHI. You can read that here: theins.ru/en/politics/27…