As promised... time for a classy D.C. read-through of the 2nd edition of the TM-EABO! #PME at its finest.
Will post highlights of changes of the 2nd edition compared to the 1st edition. And an old fashioned or two. 1/
For the uninitiated, the TM-EABO was part of an effort to develop the concept of EABO, and to inform force design and development.
Iterative by design, the 2nd edition of the TM-EABO is meant to include lessons gained over a campaign of learning. 2/
Structurally, the 2nd edition condenses some parts of the 1st edition's chapters 1-3 into the 2nd editions chapters 1-2. 3/
The introduction notes key changes throughout the document, including factors involving host populations, irregular warfare, and FARPs.
It emphasizes that chapters concerning aviation and logistics have been significantly rewritten. 4/
A perfectly timed reinforcement to my laborious scholarly undertaking. 5/
Continued experimentation and revision will be part of the way forward.
Interestingly, 1st ed. had a link to NIPR and SIPR MCWL websites calling for open feedback from readers. Not so in the 2nd ed. Perhaps a sign that the other listed mechanisms have matured. 6/
2nd ed. still has chapters based on warfighting functions.
Notably, the IW chapter in 1st ed. was titled ‘Ops in the Information Environment, while in 2nd ed. it is titled ‘Information Activities in Support of EABO’. Probably based on the drop of OIE as a doctrinal term. 7/
In addition, while the 1st ed. had 'Sample Orders' for EABO (see below), the 2nd ed. has no such orders in its appendices.
You'll see a trend that while the 1st ed. was much more explanatory with fundamental concepts, 2nd ed. focuses more on EABO proper. 8/
The 2nd ed. references 'A Concept for Stand-in Forces', among other pubs, that were published since the release of the 1s ed. The 2nd ed. mentions 'Stand-in Forces' 26 times, while it is mentioned only 18 times in the 1st edition. 9/
The 2d ed. discusses the significance of irregular threats to SIF operating out of EABs. Irregular threats aren't mentioned at all in the 1st ed.
This demonstrates a maturity in the thinking regarding the environment in which SIF will operate. 10/
While 1st ed discusses strategic, historical, and naval context, 2d ed instead discusses operational context.
And this highlighted banger of a line, summarizing the operational logic of EABO. 11/
Before the sections on EABO missions and tasks, the 2d ed. adds a section discussing specifically how EABO can support the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
While EABO's ability to support the joint force is common in both additions, this early nod to the JFC is new. 12/
The missions for EABO remain the same... except that the 'sustainment' mission is expanded.
In 1st ed, it is simply, 'Provide forward sustainment'.
In the 2d ed, this includes sustainment to the 'joint force, and partners and allies.' 13/
This refined mission reflects the development of EABO and SIF as more than just a USMC or naval mission, but one that is joint, allied, and partnered in nature. This theme of expanding the operational reach of allied and partnered capabilities runs through the 2d edition. 14/
Both editions discuss operating on sides of a cut line of violence. The 1st ed. frames this as above or below the threshold of armed conflict or violence.
For the 2d edition, this 'below' cut line isn't described in terms of violence, but as 'during campaigning.' 15/
The emphasis on campaigning is another theme that runs through the 2d edition vice the first.
While both editions discuss the competition continuum repeatedly, the 1st ed mentions only 10 times, while the 2d ed mentions campaigning 38 times. /16
While the 1st ed. discusses types of bases (see screenshot), the 2d ed. doesn't discuss them at all.
I suspect this is an effort to get away from the idea that a base in the EABO context is a fixed, built up structure (read: static target). 17/
This was a much discussed issue in the early debates on EABO. The word 'base' puts an image in your mind that is contradictory to what EABO and SIF do.
This is complicated by the existence of two different joint definitions for 'base', one of which includes 'installations'. 18/
The planning framework from 1st ed is on the left, 2d ed is on the right.
1st ed includes subsections on op design, purpose, task, sequencing, and phasing, along with integration and risk.
2d ed condenses much of this, excludes design, and focuses on integration and risk. 19/
Composite Warfare remains in the 2d ed, and the Expeditionary Warfare Commander (EXWC) remains a 'proposed' concept. 2d ed explains that the EXWC is, "... described in a draft Tactical Memo on the composite warfare construct to support further wargaming and experimentation." 20/
The 1st ed commits a paragraph to the role of each CWC commander - defining the Strike Warfare Commander, for example. The 2d ed does not do this. Perhaps 2d ed presumes advanced knowledge of CWC within readers of the TM-EABO. Or, assumes readers will go elsewhere to learn. 21/
The vignettes from 1st ed have vanished from 2d ed. 1st ed contained several vignettes illustrating the concepts under discussion. A page from one such vignette from the 1st ed is below. 22/
Forward sustainment operations were successful - will need a moment to take care of this essential task. 23/
Moving onto Ch. 3, "Intelligence Operations"...
2d ed discuss the importance of a maritime Common Operational Picture (COP) when developing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). 1st ed references these concepts but not discuss them. 24/
While describing naval and joint integration in intel ops, the manual surprises us with this graphic depicting the all-domain environment. 25/
2d ed's description of the Information Environment in the chapter on Intel has changed significantly from that presented in the 1st ed. The citation for the 2d ed relies on joint doctrine, while 1st ed used the now defunct term 'OIE' as its point of departure. 26/
The 2d edition employs Network Analysis, and abandons Systems Analysis, though both editions referenced PMESII when broaching this subject. 27/
As we move onto the chapter on Information, the big shift is doctrinal terminology - 1st ed used OIE, and the 2d ed uses Information Activities.
Similarly, 'military information power' is replaced by 'military information advantage'. 28/
Forward arming and refueling complete! 29/
The Information maneuver forces in the 2d edition add a 'Multi-Domain Effects Team' that was not present in the 1st edition. 30/
...and, the battery is about to go. Will have to wrap things up here. I'm barely halfway through, and there's still lots great new material to dig through. Hopefully this thread encouraged other folks to give this thing a read - snag it here, and cheers! tinyurl.com/229ewv9n
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Everything Stu Scheller proposes in this essay is a non-starter. He argues, vaguely, that the #DOD requires #reform. My goal in this thread is to clarify the discourse and prevent others from buying into undercooked thinking. 1/ realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/…
The nature of the #problem Stu is trying to solve is #unclear, as is the goal of the desired goal of the reform. Given these shortcomings, critical engagement becomes difficult. Still, I’ll engage with Stu’s three key proposals in turn. 2/
Stu first proposes firing all GO’s because he believes they were #promoted for counterproductive reasons. Stu doesn’t say what those reasons are. We can infer that Stu means that they were NOT promoted because of #warfighting capability. 3/
Shortly after the #Vietnam War, the the @us_awc was tasked to examine what went wrong. The result is COL Summers's masterful, "On #Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context." 1/
This is not a play-by-play history of the war itself. Rather, as noted in the foreword, it argues that, "... a lack of appreciation of military theory and military strategy - especially the relationship between military strategy and national policy - led to..." 2/
"... a faulty definition of the nature of war. The result was the exhaustion of the Army against a secondary #guerrilla force and the ultimate #failure of military strategy to support the national policy of #containment of #communist expansion." 3/
So, check it. If you want to seize an objective, you put the resources you're going to use to take that objective in place before you conduct the attack. This is true at echelon, from a squad sized attack to an invasion of a country.
The fundamental issue you're tackling is one of mass and relative combat power. You want a decided advantage of combat power hurled at whatever the enemy might have between you and the objective. You want to have a LOT MORE than the enemy does.
For the consideration of #navalists everywhere, I offer you a scene from “Landstander: The Unauthorized Biography of the first Army commander of INDOPACOM.” 1/
The 2d ed ID's three key characteristics for aviation operations in support of EABO that don’t exist in the 1st edition: persistent distribution of aviation elements across extended distances; ops of distributed aviation elements with minimal sustainment from rear-areas... 2/
... and networking distributed aviation elements with the littoral force command and control architecture. These characteristics inform the 2nd edition’s entire discussion of aviation operations. 3/
"Since 1775, the iconic image of the American Marine has been that of a disciplined, tough rifleman moving forward in battle, often with fixed bayonet."
This is wrong. The image of the American Marine has changed with time. The author should read @Heather_at_ACTS's book:
"The Marine Corps is small, agile, and flexible, priding itself on being the first to fight, anywhere."
I love our Corps, but while this makes for a great slogan it often isn't the first to fight. Operationally, the Marine Corps won't fit every situation. And that's okay.