A 🧵on redcoats, reenactors, and revisionist history. Representations of the past are powerful. How did the British army fight, and how can we know? Many people will never read a scholarly book, but they will attend a film, watch a reenactment, or play a game. 1/25
As a result, representations of the past, whether professional historians like it or not, are often more powerful than scholarly books. This thread examines the work of one revisionist historian, now almost 15 years old, and its impact on the memory the AWI. 2/25
Since 1980, a number of brilliant scholars have redefined how historians understand the British Army in the eighteenth century. However, today, we are going to specifically focus on the work of one historian: Matthew H. Spring. 3/25
Over a decade ago, Spring authored his first book, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only. Like many revisionist histories, Spring's work has generated controversy. However, it is possible to sum up 10 of Spring's contributions to understandings of the British Army in the AWI. 4/25
Spring sought to show that the British Army wasn't a incompetent, slow, and ineffective organization tactically outmoded by American backwoodsmen with long rifles. After all, especially in the first half of the war, the British won the majority of battlefield engagements. 5/25
So: 10 take-aways from this book. 1) In North America during the American War of Independence, British commanders often sought to maintain the operation and tactical offensive, frequently targeting rebel forces in flank attacks. 6/25
2) In the course of their offensive actions, quickly-moving British troops often fought individual combats between regiments, in "fluid and ragged" battles, rather than deploying slowly with geometric precision. 7/25
3) British soldiers were highly motivated by unit pride, a sense of their superior military abilities, and a distaste for rebellion. 8/25
4) The British Army fought deployed in open order, in two ranks, rather than close order and three ranks. 9/25
5) The British "made their initial advances into action at about a quick step, accelerated to a trot or a jog within small-arms range of the enemy, and then broke into a run for the bayonet charge." The British frequently cheered when close to the enemy. 10/25
6) British junior officers directed the battle at the regimental level (see point 1) and exercised a large degree of initiative in North America that would have been impossible in Europe. 11/25
7) The British Army relied on shock tactics, rather than only firepower, to cause enemy retreat. As a result, the effectiveness of British firepower suffered. Technical problems, such as the low quality of flints, also decreased British fire effectiveness. 12/25
8) Early in the war, the British reliance on bayonet charges proved useful, but by the later stages of the conflict, continental troops had become adept at standing firm in the face of British steel. 13/25
9) British light infantry troops, though adept at seizing defensive positions and making use of individual cover, often employed the same bayonet tactics as the rest of the army. In open and light terrain, this was effective, but often more costly in heavily wooded areas. 14/25
10) Despite winning the majority of battlefield engagements during the American War of Independence, British policymakers overestimated the politic results of battlefield victory and were eventually incapable of fully destroying the rebel field armies. 15/25
Published in 2008, Spring's book has certainly made a stir in certain circles of the historically-conscious community. The main battleground over Spring's ideas hasn't been in scholarly journals, but among those who try to represent the past: reenactors and wargamers. 16/25
Many "progressive" reenactors who portray the British Army, attempt to demonstrate Spring's ideas to the public. Progressive reenactors attempt to reenact in a more immersive way, often engaging in long road-marches in addition to public-facing battle reenactments. 17/25
However, the majority of British American War of Independence reenactors continue to portray an army which looks more like the eighteenth-century British army in Europe, or perhaps in The Patriot, than the historical reality of the British Army. 18/25
Why? Revisionism often meets with pushback, and many individuals resist thinking about the past in new ways. "Established wisdom," or "tradition," often views revisionist thinking with extreme skepticism. 19/25
Spring has killed the notion that the British army fought in rigid lines during the American Revolution. Despite this fact, few reenactors, or even other historians have updated their information to reflect this incredible work of scholarship. 20/25
This is why reading historiography, or what historians have written, is important. Many members of the public I interact with say, "I hate reading historians' books, but I love reading primary sources!" If you just read primary sources, you are getting half the picture. 21/25
When professional historians call someone a revisionist, we are talking about people like Matt Spring. Revisionists have done the backbreaking archival work to change how their field views the past. Politically, I am aware it has another meaning. 22/25
We need revisionist historians, in this sense of the word, to provide a clearer, more accurate (I know, I'm a dinosaur) picture of the past. In many ways, the past is a moving target- and historians always write with the lens of their own time. 23/25
That doesn't mean they shouldn't strive to be as objective and accurate as possible. Objectivity is a journey, not a destination. Just throwing up your hands and saying, "objectivity is impossible" doesn't serve the public. Instead: be a revisionist, and do the work... 24/25
...necessary to claim that hard-earned title. Work in the archives. Write an accessible book. Once you've done that, go to * your * public. Talk to reenactors. Go on podcasts. Tweet. Revisionism going viral is the lifeblood of more accurate representation. 25/25
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I'm my dissertation, I examined the letters of 18. century soldiers.
Today, I wanted to share how some letter collections end.
The following (not the image below) death notice was sent by an officer in the 13th Prussian Infantry (Regiment @vonItzenplitz) during the SYW. 1/4
This death notice is the last piece of correspondence associated with two soldiers from the village of Nitzahn, about 40 miles west of Berlin-Mitte today. These men, Christian Friederich and Johan Diederich Zander, were an uncle and nephew from the same village. 2/4
"Greeting in Jesus and May God be with You.
My dear Mrs. Village Elder and son Wielhelm:
I owe you the knowledge that both your Friederich and Diederich are missing in the sharp skirmish we had near Hochkirch [Oct. 1758] and we do not know..."
3/4
Today, a thread on how to evaluate popular military history. Just how accurate is that history book you are reading? How can we evaluate the claims that historians make? We are going to explore this through the use of of some examples, both positive and negative. 1/33
Fair warning, I am going use two authors who are much more popular than I am, as negative examples. This isn't a hit at them as writers: they are great writers. They are much better at writing than I am. It does show that we can't always be all things to all peoples. 2/33
Unlike many historical fields, military history, has a popular authorship. That is to say, people who are non-specialists (who did not obtain graduate degrees in the field they are writing in) author books that appeal to the broad audience that military history garners. 3/33
Just transcribed a delightful French account of the Austrian surprise at Quistello on September 14th, 1734. One of the funniest AAR's I've seen in my time as an historian, and not for the reason contemporaries found it funny: a French Marshall fled without his pants on. 1/6
Extract of a letter from a French officer, probably in the Du Roi Regiment.
"We had two very cruel days and nights: on the morning of the 15th, the enemies attacked Mr. de Broglio's camp and captured all his equipage. He fled with his children in his nightshirt..." 2/6
"...The French Camp was almost without soldiers who were all in the grapes and distracted, the enemies almost dispersed us, but in the end we got together and we stood firm, after which we retired in very good order..." 3/6
A thread on NOT applying modern models of combat psychology retroactively to the 18th cent. Yes, we are going to talk a bit about SLA Marshall and Dave Grossman. Yes, we are going to address the "longbows are deadlier than muskets but muskets are scarier" idea. 1/25
This is a thread that argues for the "pastness of the past"/past is another country, and that we shouldn't assume that human beings have processed combat in the exact same way throughout time. 2/25
SLA Marshall provided us with a unique conversation piece study on WW2, which suggested that only 15-20% of soldiers fired their weapons in that combat. For Marshall, the vast majority of soldiers are, "non-firers." This idea sparked a firestorm of controversy. 3/25
A follow up to my thread from yesterday. It definitely had some "don't tweet while angry" vibes, and I apologize for that. If eighteenth-century warfare wasn't a lot slower than Napoleonic Warfare, how was it different? A thread on restraint in 18th century conflict. 1/32
Napoleonic Warfare was a much larger in scale than eighteenth-century warfare: mass armies vs. smaller professional armies. Napoleonic campaigns were often conducted with greater focus on combat: fighting a battle, or multiple battles, was the ideal. 2/32
Frederick the Great thought this way, but a lot of eighteenth-century commanders didn't. In terms of common soldiers motivations, some aspects might have changed, and some didn't. I'll probably do a whole thread on that later. What does change, is soldier-civilian relations. 3/32
Horrified (enraged?), by the references to eighteenth-century warfare in The New Makers of Modern Strategy. Some snippets:
"A rigid system of discipline based on fear bound the armies of the eighteenth century. As obedience was based upon fear, desertion plagued... 1/24
...Frederician armies. Consequently, every aspect of a Frederician army, tactics, marching, logistics-was designed to prevent the individual from deserting."
"Desertion also occurred if the army did not provide the soldier 'with a tolerable standard of living... 2/24
since to make a living, not to fight or die for a cause...'"
See my past posts on desertion, or a scholarly work from the last 40 years, including my own.
Unsurprisingly, 7 of the 8 citations in this section of the chapter are to secondary works published before 1945. 3/24