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On the surface, 2 June 1984 appeared to be uneventful with no firing or curfew. This turned out to be a facade of calm used to prepare for the storm of destruction, desecration, unimaginable violence and horrific human rights violations inflicted on the Sikh population by the
barbaric Indian state and its Army.
On the morning of 2 June a team of five reporters, including the BBC’s Mark Tully, came to Darbar Sahib to report on the events of the day before. They were taken around the complex and shown the damage caused by the Army’s unprovoked firing;
On the morning of 2 June a team of five reporters, including the BBC’s Mark Tully, came to Darbar Sahib to report on the events of the day before. They were taken around the complex and shown the damage caused by the Army’s unprovoked firing;
34 large wounds caused by bullets on all sides of Darbar Sahib, some of them as big as 3 inches in diameter.
Sikhs from across Punjab began arriving at Darbar Sahib in large numbers as the next day, 3 June, was the Shaheedi Diwas (Martyrdom Day) of Sri Guru Arjan Dev ji.
Sikhs from across Punjab began arriving at Darbar Sahib in large numbers as the next day, 3 June, was the Shaheedi Diwas (Martyrdom Day) of Sri Guru Arjan Dev ji.
This significant religious day in the Sikh calendar saw crowds of tens of thousands of pilgrims visiting Darbar Sahib every year.
Despite the Indian states impending attack, there were no restrictions for pilgrims entering Amritsar or Darbar Sahib.
Despite the Indian states impending attack, there were no restrictions for pilgrims entering Amritsar or Darbar Sahib.
The superficial appearance of peace and calm was only surface level. Beneath the surface, planning and preparations were taking place to ensure maximum casualties and complete devastation and destruction.
Although there had been no restrictions for pilgrims entering the city,
Although there had been no restrictions for pilgrims entering the city,
or Darbar Sahib, the exits out of the complex and the city were deliberately and rapidly being closed. All outgoing trains from Amritsar had already been cancelled by 12pm.
By nightfall, all international media and press had been expelled from Amritsar, and rail, road and air
By nightfall, all international media and press had been expelled from Amritsar, and rail, road and air
services across Punjab had been suspended.
A complete communication blackout was enforced, all telecommunication lines were cut. Water supply and electricity to Darbar Sahib and Gurudwaras across Amritsar were disconnected.
A complete communication blackout was enforced, all telecommunication lines were cut. Water supply and electricity to Darbar Sahib and Gurudwaras across Amritsar were disconnected.
In effect Punjab was cut off from the rest of the country, and more importantly, the world, ensuring there would be minimal witnesses to the Indian state’s pre-planned massacre of Sikhs.
That day, all BSF and CRPF forces outside of Darbar Sahib were replaced by Army soldiers.
That day, all BSF and CRPF forces outside of Darbar Sahib were replaced by Army soldiers.
Although there was no formal curfew in place yet, and visitors were able to freely enter Darbar Sahib, anyone who left the complex on the evening of June 2 was being taken into custody.
The Indian army had by this time completely sealed the international border right from
The Indian army had by this time completely sealed the international border right from
Jammu and Kashmir to Ganga Nagar.
At the same time Army divisions were extensively deployed in all villages of Punjab and troops took up their predetermined positions. Tanks, Artillery and Armed Personnel Carriers were spread across the state and on standby.
At the same time Army divisions were extensively deployed in all villages of Punjab and troops took up their predetermined positions. Tanks, Artillery and Armed Personnel Carriers were spread across the state and on standby.
It’s imperative to note that the Army’s requisition of Darbar Sahib and its surrounds on 2 June 1984 was in fact illegal; the Army had been given no power by Punjab or Parliament.
Kuldip Brar in his book ‘Operation Blue Star: The True Story” wrote of June 2:
Kuldip Brar in his book ‘Operation Blue Star: The True Story” wrote of June 2:
“The day commenced with informal meetings with Senior officers of the police and intelligence agencies, the aim being to take stock of the situation.
I stress the word informal because though the district administration had received information through their own channels about
I stress the word informal because though the district administration had received information through their own channels about
my troops heading for Amritsar in ‘aid of civil authority’, neither had an official requisition been placed on us, nor had the police and paramilitary forces yet been placed under the overall control of the Army.”
At 6pm on 2 June 1984, the Punjab Governor, BD Pande, summoned Chief Secretary; KD Vasudeva, Home Secretary; AS Pooni, Inspector General Police; PS Bhinder and Inspector General Intelligence HS Randhawa to his residence for a meeting. The Punjab situation was discussed and
it was unanimously agreed that the Army should not be used to attack Darbar Sahib.
The Governor agreed and called PC Alexander, in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office, and advised him that the officers were concerned that the Army may be sent in to Darbar Sahib.
The Governor agreed and called PC Alexander, in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office, and advised him that the officers were concerned that the Army may be sent in to Darbar Sahib.
He expressed that they were against such a step being taken and that he endorsed their view. PC Alexander rejected this advice and instructed the Home Secretary to provide the Governor with a letter requesting Army intervention in Punjab.
The Punjab officers present pointed out that there was no assessment or decision taken by the Punjab government to call upon the Army.
The Governor said this did not matter as the decision to call the Army into Punjab had already been taken by the Central government.
The Governor said this did not matter as the decision to call the Army into Punjab had already been taken by the Central government.
The Home Secretary, AS Pooni, hesitated but could not evade the order. The Governor summoned his private secretary & made Pooni dictate & then sign a letter requesting the Army to come to the aid of Punjab’s Civil Powers.
Pooni’s letter addressed to the Army Commander stated;
Pooni’s letter addressed to the Army Commander stated;
“On the orders of the Governor, I have been asked to request you to send the Army to the aid of the Civil Administration as law and order has broken down in the State.”
This order was not based on the advice of Punjab’s state administration to the Governor, nor
This order was not based on the advice of Punjab’s state administration to the Governor, nor
on the Governor’s advice to the Union government, nor on Union government communication to the State government but merely on the direction of the Prime Minister's Office to the Governor, making it an illegal and unconstitutional order.
Another letter followed, to Punjab’s Deputy Commissioners, instructing them to give full cooperation to the Army.
These orders raise serious questions around the validity of them and violations of constitutional law:
These orders raise serious questions around the validity of them and violations of constitutional law:
1. Was the requisition of the Army, at the request of a pressurised Home Secretary, valid and legal?
2. Did the Prime Minister’s Office have constitutional authority to directly order a State Governor to call in the Army?
2. Did the Prime Minister’s Office have constitutional authority to directly order a State Governor to call in the Army?
Not a single Deputy Commissioner of Punjab’s districts had indicated that law & order was threatened or out of control, nor had they asked for Army support.
There was also no such demand or report from Punjab police indicating that the situation warranted calling on the Army.
There was also no such demand or report from Punjab police indicating that the situation warranted calling on the Army.
Calling in the Army is usually a complex procedure in India. The District Magistrate, after advising the state administration and seeking its consent, approaches their counterpart in the Army with a request to come to the aid of civil administration.
The Army counterpart then forwards the request to their superiors & meanwhile makes their own assessment of the situation so they can advise the Army command how many troops will be required to stabilise the situation.
In June 1984 none of these procedures were followed.
In June 1984 none of these procedures were followed.
Instead a letter was demanded from the Home Secretary, under duress & under orders of the Central government.
Even before this letter was provided, Army troops were already deployed all around Darbar Sahib, at all crucial points in & around Amritsar & were spread across Punjab.
Even before this letter was provided, Army troops were already deployed all around Darbar Sahib, at all crucial points in & around Amritsar & were spread across Punjab.
The Army’s actions prior to Pooni’s letter, and subsequent actions after the letter were against all procedure and constitutionally illegal.
On the evening of 2 June 1984, at 9.15pm, Indira Gandhi addressed the nation on the state-owned television and radio channels.
On the evening of 2 June 1984, at 9.15pm, Indira Gandhi addressed the nation on the state-owned television and radio channels.
She appealed to the nation, stating “don’t shed blood, shed hatred”, with absolute knowledge that on her orders tens of thousands of Army troops were about to launch a full scale war against unarmed civilian targets inside and around Darbar Sahib.
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