With the current developments especially the improved defense & economic relations between the Philippines & Sweden, it is becoming apparent that the DND still aims to go with the Saab JAS-39C/D Gripen for the Philippine Air Force's MRF Acquisition Project. Here's why: 1/x
1. Price - the PAF's budget for MRF has practically unchanged, which means only Saab can meet the budget vs quantity needed. Lockheed Martin's offer for 12 aircraft, sans the other package inclusions, is still beyond the PAF's budget. At best it can onpy afford 6 Vipers. 2/x
2. Delivery - apparently Saab can deliver the first 4 aircraft in less than 1 year from NTP release. Meanwhile Lockheed Martin can't do the same, even for the freebie F-16 Block 30 that they committed to provide which may take at least a year to transfer to PAF. 3/x
3. Despite this, it appears that its not the end of the Philippine Air Force's attempt to have the F-16 fighter in its arsenal. The PH-US Security Sector Assistance Roadmap is still open for options to obtain used F-16s, probably Block 30 or 40 for transfer to the PAF. 4/x
4. We mentioned before, the US remains open to the transfer of used F-16s for free, but requires the recepient to pay for mid life extensions & upgrades using American companies. The PAF may still have F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers in this way. 5/x
5. But this means the Philippines will need to shell out money for the upgrades, and this may cost almost half the price of a brand new Gripen C. The US may assist by using FMF to shoulder part of the costs, or provide loans to assist in the payment of the upgrade works. 6/x
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Looking at the US' inventory of sea assets available for transfer/sale to allies, we fear that there isn't too many options that can be provided to the Philippines as part of the US-PH Security Sector Assistance Roadmap.
Either they are too old or too expensive to sustain. 1/x
1. The Oliver Hazard Perry-class are now old & expensive to revitalize, not to mention the availability for allies. Bahrain got a 2nd ship for $150m but needs a lot of work which may cost more than $100m extra. 2/x
2. The closest option the PN could have would be the Littoral Comvat Ships, some of which are available to US allies for transfer/sale. While these are said to be maintenance-heavy & have hull issues, remember there are difference in USN & PN operation tempo & standards. 3/x
Hyundai Heavy Industries' plan to setup a shipbuilding facility at the Cerberus Agila Subic Shipyard (former Hanjin Subic Shipyard) appears to be aimed at four potential market developments where the Korean shipbuilder may take advantage in participating. 1/x
1. The US Navy is studying the use of Japanese shipbuilders to maintain its ships in the region. And this is believed to potentially expand to South Korea, the Philippines & Singapore.
HHI's facility in both Korea and the Philippines may be able to take advantage of this. 2/x
2. HHI signed an agreement with the Philippine DND for the maintenance of PN's Jose Rizal-class frigates, and other HHI-built ships.
Having a facility in Subic allows for an easier implementation of this contract while augmenting the existing facilities in South Korea. 3/x
With the DND and AFP formulating drafts of their Horizon 3 phase procurement plans, it remains to be seen what their intentions are with regards to Horizon 2 projects that have failed to reach award to proponents. There appears to be 3 options for the AFP and DND... 1/x
1st option is to continue these balance projects as Horizon 2 (and Horizon 1) at the same time as Horizon 3 projects. 2nd is to move them as they are as Horizon 3 projects. Both options will mean the projects will proceed with the same objective, budget, quantity, and specs. 2/x
The 3rd option will be to scrap the unfunded Horizon 1 and 2 projects, and restart the planning process for Horizon 3. Some projects might return with a different spec, budget & quantity. Others might be scrapped & no longer pursued. 3/x
Disappointed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines' new defense strategy that appears to be a passive "Retreat to Shore" strategy, where we would rely too much on allies to fight outside our EEZ while our defenses become effective only when the enemy gets too close to shore. 1/x
Too much emphasis will be given to Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) and reduced overreaching capabilities of defending the outer regions of our EEZ and Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC). This means reducing reliance on ships & aircraft to venture out & for weapons delivery. 2/x
I believe A2/aD using land based missile systems are force multipliers to warships & combat aircraft, and should't be the other way around. Export-model SSMs are limited by range due to MTCR. Brahmos for PH is only 290km (156nmi), not 450km like those used by India. 3/x
Japan is expected to formally offer some of its Type 74 tanks to the Philippines soon, with the Philippine Army expected to accept several units which it will use for shore defense, fire support, and training for armor and combined arms operations. 1/
Being a tank with a 105mm gun and weighing less than 40 tonnes, the Type 74 can be classified as a "Medium Main Battle Tank" under the Philippine Army planning and procurement. Which is the same as its upcoming ASCOD 2 Sabrah tanks.
2/
Based on original Horizon 1 to 3 procurement plans, the Philippine Army has a requirement for 144 MMBTs. So far only 28 have been fulfilled with 18 ASCOD 2 Sabrahs and 10 Pandur 2 Sabrahs. 3/