Very good thread, I actually mostly agree with what is said here. Still, I will outline my own perspective on it:
First, it is of crucial importance to understand that the "popular uprising", generally speaking, is not a category of politics. It is a category of *theology* 🧵
We often see the debates on whether this or that upheaval constituts an "uprising" or a "coup". But the truth is that a successful uprising usually has at least an element of a military coup in it. If the military/paramilitary stands united for the regime, the regime will stand
In the popular perception a revolution is a miracle, a magic, when the impossible happens: the people defeat the regime. Hence, its theological significance. Credo quia absurdum
The element of absurdity is very important. If it is not absurd, it won't make a miracle
Consequently, criticising a revolt, usually a successful revolt as a "coup" is basically pointing out that it is not a true miracle. True miracle should be absurd and what happened there is not absurd, so it is not a revolution. It does not meet our strict theological standards
That is why differentiating *successful* revolts as either a popular uprising or a coup makes little sense outside of the field of political theology. If it was successful, it had both elements in it.
It wouldn't work with just one
Like having an angry mob in Paris is nice. But to actually take the Bastille you may need the French Guard. Having an angry mob in St Petersburg is nice, too. But you probably won't overthrow the regime without the St Petersburg garrison and the nearly based Baltic Navy
Popular will is not a category of political science, but of political theology. The former deals with mechanics, the latter - with miracles. These two are inherently contradictory. So, if you pay too much attention to the mechanics, the miracle may look less miraculous
I personally very much like Ivan Vladimirov's caricatures on the 1917 revolution and the Civil war. They visualise what you can read in so many diaries and memories of the era. Not so much the popular upheaval as the people in grey coats running amok
An idea that civilians in any numbers can defeat the organised military force if this force stands united behind the regime is purely delusional. If we don't see it, that is because we are used to think in categories of theology and ignore the mechanics
So let's talk about the mechanics
There is another theological category that only seems to be political. It is the "democracy vs autocracy" distinction. When framed in binary terms, it has little usage except to distinguish the saved from the damned, the lambs from the goats
If we presume that:
Autocrat = damned
Democrat = saved
discussions like this start making sense. Putin, Erdogan, Duda (Kaczynski?) are all autocrats -> will burn in hell
There's nothing wrong with this kind of thinking. It's just that it is theology
If we are theologists, then what we should care about is probably about drawing a correct line between the lambs and the goats. Hence, the heavy focus on the normative over the positive
And that is exactly how much of the media and often the academic discourse looks like
So let's forget about the normative for a while and focus on the positive. Under normal circumstances, the transfer of power comes as a result of the civil war.
Democracy is supposed to provide an alternative to the civil war - a mechanism of peaceful transition of power
So the key test for democracy is: does this mechanism work? And, as we cannot answer it otherwise than based on the past, what we should be asking is - did it ever work? In other words:
"Did the supreme executive power in this country ever change as a result of elections?"
"Did the supreme executive power ever change as a result of elections?"
Poland - Yes
Turkey - Yes
Russia - No
The prospect of the supreme executive power in Russia changing as a result of elections is purely hypothetical (not to say made up). It never materialised in reality
Russia does not have elections and never had. Elections have a least a chance of the supreme executive power changing = the sitting President losing. As the sitting President in Moscow never loses, then it is not elections at all, but rather the acclammations. A ritual
The foreign analysts' autistic obsession with "approval" is just laughable. Approval matters when you have to be elected. But when you only need to be acclaimed it does not matter much. Yeltsin was successfully acclaimed with about 6% rate of approval
"Approval" does not matter
The undervalued fact:
In 1999, Putin was a nobody elevated from nothing. Totally unknown, having little reputation or credibility even in the security apparatus. Not to say in the masses who just did not know who he was. With the supreme power backing him, it did not matter
The Putin's rule is not an aberration from normality. It is the normality. Because the normality is:
1. The acting ruler never failed to be elected 2. Therefore, Russia never had elections, only acclamations 3. Consequently, it has no working alternative to the civil war
When the Russian oppositionaries discuss the prospect of the "fair elections", keep in mind that they discuss something purely hypothetical that has never materialised in reality
An alternative to the civil war in form of "elections" does not exist here and never did
"Did the supreme executive power ever change as a result of elections?"
So in other words: "Have you ever had any elections at all?"
Is not a bad litmus test for the democratic institutions of a country. If the answer is no, they probably do not exist and never did
If the democratic institutions never existed in the first place, then building such institutions will require a fundamental change, rather than replacing a bad ruler with a good one. Those who advocate for the latter solution are hardly aiming to change the system
They are most probably aiming to keep it intact.
The end of thread 🧵
PS As @elonmusk or the managerial hivemind in general are suppressing my outreach here, I will be gradually increasing my presence on other platforms. If you want to read my content, add yourself to the email list in the description of the profile
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Let's have a look at these four guys. Everything about them seems to be different. Religion. Ideology. Political regime. And yet, there is a common denominator uniting all:
Xi - 71 years old
Putin - 72 years old
Trump - 79 years old
Khamenei - 86 years old
Irrespectively of their political, ideological, religious and whatever differences, Russia, China, the United States, Iran are all governed by the old. Whatever regime, whatever government they have, it is the septuagenarians and octogenarians who have the final saying in it.
This fact is more consequential than it seems. To explain why, let me introduce the following idea:
Every society is a multiracial society, for every generation is a new race
Although we tend to imagine them as cohesive, all these countries are multigenerational -> multiracial
In 1927, when Trotsky was being expelled from the Boslhevik Party, the atmosphere was very and very heated. One cavalry commander met Stalin at the stairs and threatened to cut off his ears. He even pretended he is unsheathing he sabre to proceed
Stalin shut up and said nothing
Like obviously, everyone around could see Stalin is super angry. But he still said nothing and did nothing
Which brings us to an important point:
Nobody becomes powerful accidentally
If Joseph Stalin seized the absolute control over the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, the most plausible explanation is that Joseph Stalin is exercising some extremely rare virtues, that almost nobody on the planet Earth is capable of
Highly virtuous man, almost to the impossible level
Growing up in Russia in the 1990s, I used to put America on a pedestal. It was not so much a conscious decision, as the admission of an objective fact of reality. It was the country of future, the country thinking about the future, and marching into the future.
And nothing reflected this better than the seething hatred it got from Russia, a country stuck in the past, whose imagination was fully preoccupied with the injuries of yesterday, and the phantasies of terrible revenge, usually in the form of nuclear strike.
Which, of course, projected weakness rather than strength
We will make a huuuuuuge bomb, and drop it onto your heads, and turn you into the radioactive dust, and you will die in agony, and we will be laughing and clapping our hands
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.