People usually hold delusional ideas about the Russian military supply chains presuming they are highly secretive and use complex unobvious routes
When it comes to production base, this assumption is almost always wrong
They don't hide because THERE'S NO NEED TO HIDE
What makes it even more straightforward is the asymmetry of production base:
Casting/Forming equipment have sizeable non-military consumers, e.g. metallurgy
Cutting tools do not. Even back in 2013, the military counted for 80% of consumption
That was before the militarization
The rapid and verifiable militarization commenced in 2015. For the post-2015 period, the share of military consumption for the cutting machines can be estimated at well over 90%
If we focus on the high end, it is about 100% because no "purely" civilian plant ever needs them
Who can even buy a high end machine tool?
a) Plant with a sizeable share of the military output
b) School that trains the workers for (a)
c) Very, very rarely, by a plant with no military output, that will be converted to the military production when the war starts
That's it
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Prigozhin's mutiny looks shady. And that is fine. Many coup stories sound shady even in retrospective, as they often included some elements of 4D chess by the political leadership. Still, their consequences were real.
So let's talk of the consequnces🧵
Raising a mutiny in the south, far off from the capital may sound like a dumb plan. Unless this was not a plan at all. My hypothesis: it looks like a false start
23 June - Wagner mutiny
24-25 June - "Scarlet Sails" in St Petersburg
Both Putin and Medvedev were expected to come
The ruling gang is first and foremost a St Petersburg gang. The core of the Russian leadership including Putin, Medvedev and many others including Prigozhin were originally an extensive crony network from St Petersburg. With Putin's succession in 2000 they became the regime
The mutiny is real. It is also unlikely to succeed. Most probable outcome is:
1. The mutiny fails 2. The regime stands (for a few months) 3. Upon its suppression, regime becomes increasingly dysfunctional -> falls
In other words, Kornilov putsch🧵
Let's start with the "real" part. A sizeable force of Wagner troops have left their positions in East Ukraine and entered the Russian region of Rostov Oblast. This is a real mutiny
It is also likely to fail. Not because there is few of them, but rather because they are far away
Russia is a hypercentralised country. Control over Moscow is the only thing that matters. And it is unlikely these fellows will be able to reach it, let alone occupy it
"Only those deserve to be called Communists who understand that it is impossible to build or implement socialism without learning from the [corporate] trust founders"
(Vladimir Lenin. On the Left-Wing Childishness. May 1918)
"For socialism is not a figment of the imagination, but the implementation and application of what had been created by the [corporate] trusts by the proletarian vanguard, which has seized power"
"We, the party of the proletariat, have no other way of acquiring the ability to organise large-scale production ... except by acquiring it from the first-class capitalist experts"
IF there are unprecedentedly wide sanctions imposed on Russia
BUT Russia is able to increase its production of cruise missiles
THEN the implementation and especially targeting of sanctions are wrong. Like actually, wrong
Military production base is not targeted
@McFaul you are doing it wrong. Your focus is wrong. You are not alone in doing it wrong, but it does not make your work any less wrong
To do it in a correct way, you must be targeting the production base. Not only the components, but the production processes themselves. Disincentivizing the U.S. allies-based companies to supply the metal-cutting, especially machining equipment would be a good start
Very good thread, I actually mostly agree with what is said here. Still, I will outline my own perspective on it:
First, it is of crucial importance to understand that the "popular uprising", generally speaking, is not a category of politics. It is a category of *theology* 🧵
We often see the debates on whether this or that upheaval constituts an "uprising" or a "coup". But the truth is that a successful uprising usually has at least an element of a military coup in it. If the military/paramilitary stands united for the regime, the regime will stand
In the popular perception a revolution is a miracle, a magic, when the impossible happens: the people defeat the regime. Hence, its theological significance. Credo quia absurdum
The element of absurdity is very important. If it is not absurd, it won't make a miracle
You unironically have some logical reasoning capabilities. Yes, that is exactly what happened. If in the 1960s the USSR still tried to compete, by the 1970s it essentially gave up. Consequently, Western imports comprised the ever increasing share of its high end consumption
By the 1970s Soviets could machine precise parts -> produce sophisticated weaponry either:
a) conventionally = essentially manually
b) on imported NC/CNC tools
That's it basically
And "manually" is not nearly as sexy as it sounds. First, supply of machinists that can do precision machining manually is highly inelastic. There's simply no way to train more in the short term perspective. At any given moment their quantity is given and you can't increase it