Thread by @kamilkazani

What is happening in Russia?

The mutiny is real. It is also unlikely to succeed. Most probable outcome is:

1. The mutiny fails
2. The regime stands (for a few months)
3. Upon its suppression, regime becomes increasingly dysfunctional -> falls

In other words, Kornilov putsch🧵

Let's start with the "real" part. A sizeable force of Wagner troops have left their positions in East Ukraine and entered the Russian region of Rostov Oblast. This is a real mutiny

It is also likely to fail. Not because there is few of them, but rather because they are far away

Russia is a hypercentralised country. Control over Moscow is the only thing that matters. And it is unlikely these fellows will be able to reach it, let alone occupy it

Moscow is just too far away. Even if you leave all the heavy equipment behind, successfully transporting thousands of troops over >1000 km will be almost impossible

What you most probably gonna get is a mammoth traffic jam = a target for the airforce

Unless something radical happens in the next 12 hours, I bet on the regime surviving through this incident. Control over Moscow is the only thing that matters, and it is unlikely the mutineers will be able to assume it by this point. Too far

Again, if nothing radical happens

Still, even if this mutiny fails (as it probably will), it is likely to have the most detrimental effect on the Russian war efforts and thus on the regime's viability. If I were to find a metaphor to describe it, I would frame Prigozhin's mutiny as a modern Kornilov Rebellion

Now who is Prigozhin? He is first and foremost a junior member of the St Petersburg gang. With the rise of Putin, the gang members rose very high. Still, the initial status in the gang matters

Prigozhin wasn't a Putin's man. He was a Rotenberg's man. The vassal of a vassal

I can neither confirm, nor deny that in the late Soviet era Rotenberg brothers had a side hustle of burgling the Leningrad antiquaries houses. Obviously, such a business could not prosper other then under the KGB patronage

You snitch + do the dirty job -> they let you to hustle

I can also neither confirm nor deny that such a hustle involved sacrificing some of the gang members from time to time. Some gang members have to be given to justice. But the Rotenbergs had a saying in who will be sacrificed

At some point they may have chosen Prigozhin

After being sentenced to 13 years and having spent 7 in jail, Prigozhin was released. Still, he got compensated. I can neither confirm nor deny his patrons helped him with launching a restaurant business

He was a junior, invaluable member of the gang, but a member nonetheless

In 1996, a patron of Prigozhin's patron got a job in Kremlin and started his meteoric rise. Once Putin succeeded into power in 2000, the membership in a gang became priceless. It gave a direct access to The First One, the Access to the Body as we say in Russia

Invaluable asset

That's what you should know on Prigozhin's personal profile

1. A junior member of the gang
2. Not a valuable member. Worthless enough to be sacrificed as a scapegoat
3. But a member nonetheless

So once the boss of his boss becomes the Tsar, Prigozhin becomes a courtier

Now on the Wagner group. An important thing about the Wagner group is its somewhat outcast-ish character. You obviously heard about the recruitment of prisoners

Its rank and file may indeed largely consist of criminal/semi-criminal folk or just rando folk who got in by accident

But Wagner commanders are *not* randos. They are most typically the army/special forces/much more rarely intelligence officers who have been kicked out, usually for crimes or gross misbehaviour. And then had to start their career anew

Consider this guy to the right of Putin. A special forces officer. In 2008 convicted for robbery & kidnapping. In 2013 released to joined Wagner

Many others were kicked out for minor offences But the pattern is typical. Wagner is your second chance, after you lost the first one

A typical Wagner commander's profile is:

- Trained officer with relevant military experience
- Selected out from the regular forces, for crimes, misbehaviour or just not fitting in
- But given a second chance in Wagner

You are supposed to be grateful to the system. Are you?

If you consider that the Wagner leadership consists of the former officers selected out by the system, the constant dick measuring contest with the regular army becomes a bit more understandable

It is very important to prove we are better, an not only for pragmatic purposes

The peculiar Wagner iconography with a focus on unhinged lawlessness makes more sense, too. I don't think it is all optimised for pragmatic purposes, like propaganda. Like, why would you choose this type of propaganda in the first place?

I think that the exaggerated and sometimes counterproductive focus on being far, far superior than the regular army may have something to with most of the Wagner leadership being selected out from the latter

Now on the consequences. Should the mutiny fail (as it probably will, unless some radical development follows today), it will have the most detrimental consequences for the Russian war efforts

Observers describe Wagner as a mercenary army. But the truth is: all of the Russian army is a mercenary army. Some of the file and rank were mobilised, some enlisted voluntarily. But the overwhelming majority has no positive motivation to stay in the trenches except for salary

Foreign observers who ascribe the tolerance of the Russian society to the war to the "propaganda" are clueless. The preaching ("propaganda") is not worth much. Incentives are worth everything. Putin is smarter than foreign observers, so he is paying soldiers exorbitant salaries

"Beliefs move actions" causality is overrated

More often than not, it's the other way around. Incentives move actions and actions move beliefs. You do as you are incentivised to and then you rationalise why it was amazing thing to do in the first place

That's how it should be

Putin knows that and pays soldiers exorbitant salaries they would never ever earn as civilians

BUT

The more you earn, the less incentive you have to stay in the trenches. It's like playing with casino. At some point you better collect your winnings and leave

190 000 rubles a month may sound as a great deal at first. Which they probably are. But the longer you stay in trenches, the less likely you are to have a chance to spend what you have already earned

The mercenary army is getting tired quickly

Add here very little rotation and no realistic prospect of demobilisation until the war is over and what you get is the extreme tiredness. While being in defensive may be advantageous strategy-wise, it has a horrible effect on the Russian army morale, just as it always did

It is not impossible that the current situation would not even arise, if not for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. With the pressure applied some links of the chain can break (as they did)

Now about the consequences. Should the mutiny fail (as it probably will) what will follow is the decrease in trust and quite plausibly purges against the real and supposed disloyals

Much of the army's rank and file may be of questionable loyalty. They won't uprise, but they may not lift the finger for the regime either. Same goes for much of the warrior cops, etc. Even if they are loyal to the regime, the latter can't be sure

If I were to name one single institution that the regime may rely on the most, I would name not the FSB, but rather the FSO. Not the Federal Security Service but the Federal Protective Service. The outsized service of the bodyguards

We are all used to thinking of the FSB as of the modern Russian nobility. But if you look at the ministerial or gubernatorial appointees of the last decade, you will notice a rapidly rising share of the FSO officers

Putin's personal bodyguards becoming governors basically

Underestimation of the FSO role may have something to do with us always framing Russia in Soviet terms, always looking for the Soviet parallels and allusions

I would argue however, that modern Russia is much more of a cosplay of the Holstein-Gottorp empire than most would admit

Our focus on the FSB and FSB alone may largely result from our refusal to think about Russia otherwise than in Soviet terms. FSB-KGB-NKVD. We focus on the FSB and only because we have a Soviet parallel for it

We don't really have a Soviet parallel for the FSO. So we ignore it

But we do find such a parallel in the Russian Empire. The best way to think about the modern FSO is to frame it as a cosplay of the Transfiguration Regiment. At least that is where it has been evolving through the late Putin's era. The rule by the Imperial Guard

If trusted with guarding the emperor's sacred body, you can be trusted with anything (like ruling a province). And when it comes to putting down the internal revolt, it is probably not the FSB that constitutes the last line of defense. It is probably the FSO regiments

The end