A few thoughts on DPICM. Providing cluster munitions to Ukraine, at this stage, could have a significant impact beyond what other capabilities might achieve. Despite the drawbacks, unlocking this stockpile has important implications for the course of Ukraine's offensive. 1/
Ukraine's offensive is limited by the artillery ammunition available. The US, and other countries, provided a significant amount for this operation. Much of this was borrowed from South Korea. Without this ammunition it is difficult to imagine this offensive taking place. 2/
Progress has been slow, difficult, and without sustained breakthroughs thus far. While UA retains the bulk of its combat power, artillery use rate is likely higher than anticipated, especially as the past weeks have seen a largely attritional approach. 3/
Consequently, Ukraine's hardest limit is proably not manpower, or equipment, but arty ammunition. This is foremost about the numbers. Providing DPICM gives access to a sizable stockpile of artillery ammo that can alleviate the time pressure on UA operations. 4/
With DPICM the US is also in a much better position to sustain Ukraine's war effort into next year, which requires significant amounts of artillery ammunition on a monthly basis. While other capabilities may be great to have, providing DPICM may prove more impactful. 5/
While UA retains options, the offensive may culminate whenever the ammunition runs low. Extending that timeline is critical. I wont get into the debate on effectiveness vs the risks, dud rates, etc. My view is these considerations are ultimately best left for Ukraine to weigh.
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A few thoughts on Prigozhin's armed insurrection/mutiny/rebellion. For now it appears over. Wagner seems to be standing down, and leaving Rostov for LNR. Prigozhin launched a mutiny that ultimately challenged Putin’s power, and the system. Thread. 1/
This was not a traditional coup, but with Putin’s video and FSB statements it became a challenge that would reveal the extent of brittleness in the regime. It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge. 2/
I had long wondered whether Prigozhin understood something intuitively about the system, if the regime was fundamentally hollow, prominent members like Shoigu were weak, and Putin could be pressed into deals, etc. or if he was grossly miscalculating. 3/
A few thoughts on the dam’s destruction and its implications for Ukraine’s offensive. In brief, I doubt it will have a significant impact on UA mil operations. The Khakovka dam is at least 100 miles from where much of the activity might take place at its closest point.
A Ukrainian cross-river operation in southern Kherson, below the dam, was always a risky and therefore low-probability prospect. There is no evidence that such an operation was under way, or would have necessarily been a part of the UA offensive plans.
Destroying the dam does not substantially shorten Russian lines, or make defense much easier, although it does make a UA cross-river operation exceedingly difficult in that area. But, the flood will likely also destroy the initial line of Russian entrenchments along the river.
Highly recommend this article. Objective insights based on in country experience. It’s very useful to have other researchers, trainers, and those doing field work compare their observations. warontherocks.com/2023/06/what-t…
The way to read this is not as a list of problems or challenges, but as an honest portrayal of a force in transition that’s done remarkably well on the battlefield and continues to evolve. UA is managing attrition, and reconstitution many modern militaries have not experienced.
Like any large force UA has areas of excellence, areas where it is looking to improve, and problems to manage. Even a well funded peacetime force is often uneven. Under these conditions it should be expected. And UA mil is still dealing with a host of Soviet legacy issues.
I want to highlight this important article from @EvansRyan202. Presently, US policy is optimized to not learn, or to learn the wrong lessons from this war. Missing access & information that could best inform objective analysis and lessons learned. 1/ warontherocks.com/2023/04/bind-u…
Over a year into this war there seems to be little to no institutionalized effort. No observer groups. Folks go on self-initiative to study, observe, learn the history and gain access in a personal or informal capacity. There is very little support. 2/
In my view a fair amount of what we think we know about this war is probably wrong or will require major revisions. Missing observations, lack of data beyond anecdotes, poor causal inference, baseless claims, etc. few efforts to put together a composite picture. 3/
A few thoughts on the current course of the war, Russia’s winter offensive, battle of Bakhmut, and how this phase might affect the coming months. Also check out the WOTR podcast episode below that covers some of this. Thread. 1/ warontherocks.com/2023/04/russia…
The Russian offensive in the Donbas has not yet ended, but it has weakened in pace of operations and intensity. Having achieved little, Russian forces are probably preparing to shift to a defensive posture in anticipation of a Ukrainian offensive. 2/
At Vuhledar Russian forces fed the better parts of two brigades into UA minefields and ATGMs, then eventually switched to Avdiivka. There they created a partial encirclement, but UA may have stabilized the situation at this point (its unclear). 3/
A few thoughts on the Russian winter offensive, which began 3+ weeks ago, and has so far yielded little progress for RU forces. Poor force quality, loss of junior officers, ammunition, and equipment constraints limit Russian offensive potential. Thread. 1/
The RU offensive consists of about 5-6 axes of attack focused on the Donbas. Rather than a major push along one part of the front, it is instead a series of distributed battles running north-south from Luhansk, to Bakhmut, and southern Donetsk. 2/
Russian forces are attacking at Vuhledar, Marinka, Adviivka, Bakhmut (and Bilohorivka), Kreminna -> Lyman, with attempts to advance near Kupyansk. The offensive began in the last week of January with a Russian assault on Vuhledar. 3/