1. We describe some non-humans as women, e.g. Galadriel, Ahsoka, and Shodan.
2. If so, then women are not adult HUMAN females.
3. So, women are not adult human females.
But premise 2 is false.
To see why, think about STONE LIONS...🧵
Think about a parallel argument concerning stone lions.
We do indeed describe some stone statues as "lions."
Yet it doesn't follow that lions are not biological organisms.
And it doesn't follow that the word "lion" is ambiguous.
Rather, "There's a stone lion" says there's a stone REPRESENTATION of a lion. The statue RESEMBLES a lion.
And by "lion" we really mean the familiar species, Panthera leo.
It's the same reason we call fool's gold "gold": it resembles gold. As "Table Rocks" resemble a table.
We may also speak of an "alien lion." What we'd convey is: there's an alien that RESEMBLES a lion.
Even there, "lion" continues to mean lion, that familiar terrestrial species, Panthera leo.
That there are "alien lions" does not disprove that lions are Panthera leo.
Back to women. The non-humans some call "women" have a commonality: they RESEMBLE women. They look, or at least sound, like women.
Yet there are adult female aliens (& adult female organisms here on Earth) that we are NOT inclined to call "women": those that don't resemble women
For example, some may call Galadriel an "elf woman." And I'm told that GLaDOS, Ahsoka, and Shodan are called "women."
Here's GLaDOS:
Yet we're NOT inclined to call adult female date plants "women."
Or the adult female xenomorph queen from Aliens.
So what's going on here? I think it's like the stone lion case. When we say, "Ahoska is a woman," what we convey is that Ahoska RESEMBLES a woman.
And, there, "woman" is used in its ordinary sense: adult human female.
Similarly, some call the Statue of Liberty, "Lady Liberty." But, of course, the statue is not literally a lady.
It does *look* like a lady, though. One sees the RESEMBLANCE.
So, again, if we say "Ahoska is a woman," what we convey is that Ahoska RESEMBLES a woman.
This may well be what's happening even in the case of GLaDOS, or Amazon's Alexa, when the resemblance is limited to a voice.
If that's right, then premise 2 in the original argument is false: the fact that we call these non-humans "women" does not imply that women are not adult human females...
...any more than the fact that we call some statues "lions" and some aliens "lions" implies that lionhood is not a biological, historical, terrestrial kind.
Rather, we're conveying information about *resemblance*.
In fact, the advocate of W=AHF may turn the tables here, and ask some awkward questions about e.g. the xenomorph queen from Aliens.
She's not a woman, right? (Right.)
In fact, she *could not* be a woman, right? (Riiiight...)
But. What if she IDENTIFIED as a woman?
Any reluctance you feel toward granting that she'd be a woman in that case tells against a self-ID conception of womanhood.
And you do feel some reluctance, don't you?
So, here's a Table-Turning Argument from Aliens
1. The xenomorph queen would not be a woman, even if she sincerely identified as a woman.
2. If so, then identifying as a woman is not sufficient to be a woman.
3. So, identifying as a woman is not sufficient to be a woman.
The general problem is a confusion of appearance and reality
Appearing to be gold doesn't guarantee it's gold.
Appearing to be water doesn't guarantee it's water.
Appearing to be a leaf doesn't guarantee it's a leaf.
Agent Smith appears as a man, but isn't really a man.
@gbspendlove Maybe a way to prove this is to think of a man, disfigured so that he's no longer humanoid.
If that's possible--a non-humanoid man--then "man" doesn't name adult male humanoids. Being an adult male human is enough.
(I think that is possible.)
@gbspendlove So whereas they'd think this is infelicitous,
(A) Yogi and Porky are boars
due to the ambiguity of "boar," they'd think this is fine:
(B) Ahoska and Jill Biden are women.
Because they think those two are "women" in the same sense.
@gbspendlove So, what I'm saying is, you might deny premise 2 in the Alien Woman objection by saying "woman" is ambiguous, like "doe." (Ahoska is a woman in one sense, Jill Biden in a different sense.) But I think your opponents will deny that, and insist that "woman" is univocal here.
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Florence Ashley blocked me a long time ago, but is now posting replies to me and @byrne_a from behind that block.
Some thoughts on those replies:
This was an ironic sequence of tweets. First "boiling down" our paper to a quotation we never said, and then complaining about making up theories and attributing them to one's opponents. Florence! You're doing that thing right now! Better to respond to *actual quotations*.
About Ashley's citational malpractice, we give six (6) examples. Ashley replies to one (1), and pleads not guilty:
Chairs again. With words that developed organically, it's often very difficult to say exactly what that word means, using only other words. True analyses are hard to come by.
Sometimes it's worth trying: 'justice', 'knowledge', 'rational'.
Other times not so much: 'chair'.🧵
Why expect otherwise? Conceptual analysis is like trying to recreate the function of a complex tool, using only other tools. It's rare you can do that. Some functionality's often left out.
Like a cordless screwdriver versus a normal screwdriver plus a wrench. Not quite the same.
Knowledge = Justified true belief
Not quite the same, it turns out. Just like the cordless drill, and the screwdriver with a wrench. Just not equivalent.
Princeton Prof argues that human sex is not binary.
The reason?: "while animal gametes can be described as binary (of two distinct kinds), the physiological systems, behaviors and individuals that produce them are not."
That's like arguing that binary code isn't binary, because the systems, programs, and computers that produce it are not binary. It simply doesn't follow.
The code is binary, even if those _surrounding_ things aren't. And sex may be binary, even if things _surrounding_ it aren't
True, whether a human is male or female does not tell us about the person's "homemaking tendencies."
But those tendencies are at best *associated* with sex. They're no part of sex itself.
Proof: nematodes have sexes, but no homemaking tendencies at all.
PZ Myers objects to my recent argument on his blog.
He denies my premise (3). To show (3) is false, he'd need an example of a thing that predates societies, and yet _that very thing_ is socially constructed.
Myers says that OUR IDEAS about the sexes are social constructs. That may be. But OUR IDEAS about the sexes are not the sexes, as our ideas about the stars are not the stars.
Our ideas about the sexes do NOT predate societies. So, this can't be a counterexample to my premise 3.
Myers also claims that I was being "spectacularly dishonest." I disagree; I think I was being pretty chill. But you can read the thread and decide for yourself, starting around here. (I can't link to Myers' original tweet, since he blocked me.)