2/5 For years Germany protected its manufacturers behind subsidies and an undervalued euro, funded by downward pressure on wage growth.
The result was that Germany's share of global manufacturing expanded relative to that of the US and its EU partners.
3/5 Its huge trade surplus was a measure of the extent to which the competitiveness of German manufacturers was based on policies designed to prevent wages from growing in line with productivity. Workers received too low a share of what they produced to consume most of it.
4/5 Germany's irresponsible trade policies were costly for the US and devastating for the EU, and so it was inevitable that the world turn against a global trading system so ferociously gamed by countries like Germany. Berlin is in no position to complain.
5/5 The good news (for German workers and the middle class, not for German exporters) is that German wages seem finally to be catching up with productivity, and it is this, not US industrial policy or Chinese car subsidies, that is forcing Germany to rebalance its trade.
Several people have asked me for further explanations, some of which you can find here:
1/5 We shouldn't be surprised that measure after measure to stabilize and revive the property market has failed. In a highly speculative market, what drives buying is mainly expectations of continued price appreciation.
2/5 By this definition China's property market has been highly speculative for well over a decade. With rental yields close to 1%, it was always smarter to rent a big apartment than buy a tiny one, but people kept buying because "property prices can only rise".
3/5 That means that the only way to stabilize or revive the property market requires reigniting the property bubble and setting off a new round of ever-rising expectations. Even if that were possible, it is something Beijing clearly doesn't want to do.
1/4 Good article on how trade works: "Chinese EVs are high quality, though their price competitiveness has benefited from a decade of protectionism and government support totalling tens of billions of dollars annually."
2/4 In a beggar-thy-neighbor world, we will no longer even pretend to compete on the basis of higher productivity or superior manufacturing efficiency. We will increasingly choose between either rising subsidies or straight protection.
3/4 That means that without a major (and unlikely) retreat from mercantilist policies among countries that depend most on export competitiveness to keep their manufacturers in business, the world is likely to retreat increasingly behind trade barriers.
1/7 "The yen is so weak — worth 25 per cent less than two years ago — because Japan’s exporters have lost their past competitiveness," the author notes. It will continue weakening, he suggest, until Japanese exporters can regain export competitiveness.
2/7 But there is a price to pay: "A weak yen leaves Japanese consumers with less money to buy products made in the country. As a result, real household spending in 2023 is no higher than it was way back in 2012."
3/7 "The weak yen doesn’t just reflect economic weakness," the author concludes. "It also makes a weak economy even shakier."
This is where the obsession with exports and trade surpluses always seems to lead. It comes at the cost of weak domestic demand.
1/6 One of the least-appreciated aspects of the increase in US investment driven by Biden's industrial policies is how it transforms the structure of the US trade deficit.
2/6 As I argued in my book, as long as the US is the automatic recipient of net capital inflows, it must run the corresponding trade deficits. Because the US for now is unwilling to limit capital inflows, there is nothing it can do about the trade deficit.
3/6 But there are good deficits and bad deficits. When domestic investment is constrained by scarce savings and expensive capital, as was the case during most of the 19th Century, the trade deficit can be balanced by higher domestic investment, which is good for the economy.
1/12
Richard Koo is right to think in terms of balance sheets. Hyman Minsky’s great contribution to modern economics was to argue that economics is not just about the asset side of the national balance sheet but was rather about the interaction between...
2/12
the asset side and the structure of the liability side of the balance sheet. Most economists still don't understand this, and to the extent that Koo also focuses on both sides of the balance sheet, he is right.
But I think Koo makes two really important mistakes.
3/12
First, he sees the fundamental problem as the paying down of debt by the private sector. The paying down of debt is in fact a symptom of the fundamental problem, which is the massive overvaluation of assets on paper, which boosted economic activity and wealth in...
1/11
"China should shift the focus of its stimulus from investment to consumption and further loosen urban residency curbs to boost migrant workers' spending power, Cai Fang, an adviser to the People's Bank of China, said at a business forum."
2/11
He's right of course that China should shift stimulus spending from investment to consumption, and it shows just how widespread this thinking has become in recent years, but focusing on loosening hukou requirements also shows just how difficult this process can be.
3/11
China has taken some steps in loosening hukou restrictions, but they are either very limited (e.g. restricted to highly desirable graduates) or pretty useless: as my friends say, you are now free to live in any city that no one wants to live in.