The vast qualitative gap in the machine tool production is of major strategic significance. First, catching development producers produce subpar equipment. Second, supply chain for their production starts in Western Europe or Japan for the lack of alternatives
See Russia (2015)
In 2015, the Russian gov saw itself as absolutely dependent upon the import of machine parts from the Western Europe and Japan. In no single category did it see a chance of substituting the European and the Japanese critical components with the Chinese production
No alternative
China is progressing rapidly, largely due to the Western European and Japanese producers localising their manufacture and doing technology transfer. But catching up will take years. At this point it can't substitute the European and Japanese supplies in too many categories
2023
Whenever the Russian military producers can, they secure Western European and Japanese supplies
When they can't, they do Taiwan and South Korean
China is the last choice option. In too many categories the option of choosing Chinese does not exist and will not for a while
NB: this does not mean China is not a significant supplier for the Russian military industry. Of course it is. The European and the Japanese manufacturers localised in China plays a disproportionate role here, compared with Chinese brands
Which explains a somewhat puzzling pattern of Chinese brands having almost no representation in the Russian military industry before Feb 2022. Like seriously, you could easier see a Turkish rather than a Chinese machine there
(there could an element of conscious exclusion, too)
I don't want to underrate Chinese progress. It is real and it is fast. But assuming China can catch up with the old industrial powers of Europe and Japan anytime soon is just wrong
If there's an alternative it's not China. It's Taiwan and South Korea. They're far more advanced
Once again, the focus of the Ukrainian government & associated is wrong
They (e.g @McFaul @AndriyYermak) are doing it wrong
They won't be able to achieve any significant result in undermining the Russian war production continuing to do what they are doing
What to do:
Supply chain for the Russian military/dual use industry usually works like this:
It's usually very simple and straightforward. Nobody hides as there's no need to hide
The first thing to do is to carpet bomb the (b). There's a list. Taken them all and sanction them all + their CEOs, too. It's businessmen doing business -> they react to incentives
Stop sanctioning "corrupt officials"
Sanction war enablers -> (b) link of the supply chain
Of course, there are variations. There are even examples of suppliers who actually hide and were trying to hide their links with the military industry even before 2022. E.g. the DMG Mori AG
Most don't. Carpet bomb them & their executives with sanctions. Again, there's a list
Once you bombed the (b) link -> introduced a financial disincentive for supplying the military production, the system of incentive changes -> economic actors change their behaviour accordingly. Including the *new* actors who come instead of the bombed
To sum up, the first thing you should do is to take the list of the Russia-based suppliers (=intermediaries) of production equipment for the military industry and to sanction them and their executives, too. It's easy to do, they're all all Russian companies -> easy to sanction
The end
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Soviet military doctrine was shaped by the WWII experience
Russian military doctrine was shaped by the Gulf War impression
The former felt the need to build a strong land army. The latter felt no need to. Very large missile forces + small expeditionary corps was deemed enough
The Russian military doctrine was built upon assumption that a small expeditionary corps will be enough to crush any rival on the post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, large missile forces will disincentivize external players from interfering
Strategic missiles were heavily prioritised
As a result, the Russian army was heavily lopsided. Very strong missiles, very weak land army. The former would compensate for the weakness of the latter
Much of what is usually referred to as "expertise" (believe the experts) is just infallibility ex cathedra ideology. It is based on a social convention and not on the objective reality. In contrast, the craftsman expertise is real, very difficult to pick and impossible to fake
One of the most destructive effects of the post-Soviet collapse on the Russian military production was the loss of craftsmanship -> tacit knowledge. Sometimes you can reverse engineer the technology later. Sometimes you can't. Anyway, much of it has been lost irreversibly
Russian capacity for the production of weaponry is critically dependent upon the uninterrupted supply of the machine tools and parts by the U.S. allies
Why? For the lack of alternatives. China is not an alternative people think it is, esp. when it comes to parts
Sanctions are inefficient in undermining the Russian weaponry production capacities, as they do not adequately target its main chokepoint - production base. More specifically, machining equipment which is necessary to produce precise components and, therefore, weaponry
To be fair, China *is* advancing. Compare the Russian import structure in the 2000s vs 2010s. But it is not anywhere as advanced as laymen believe (yet)
FYI: The advance of China is largely due to localisation of Europ/Jap/Taiw producers, JVs with them and technology transfer
The media and the academia are obsessed with the unimportant. Once you interiorise this principle, their obsession with "Putin's philosopher" Dugin becomes almost forgivable
There's no philosopher at the Putin's court
The king doesn't need a philosopher
He needs a jester🧵
As I said, obsession with the (supposed) "philosopher behind the Putin's plan" is almost forgivable, considering that the dominant Western discourse in Russia is mostly a projection of Western intellectuals. They project their fears, of course. But also their hopes and dreams
Being the King's Philosopher, a brain behind the tyrant, has been a wet dream of intellectuals at least since the days of Plato. It almost always ended the same. After all these millennia, intellectuals could have learned a basic truth:
1. Kornilov putsch fails 2. Purges against its real or imaginary supporters follow 3. Two months later the Bolsheviks come to power
Focusing on whether the putsch was orchestrated by the government (it probably was) is missing the point. Staged or not, its consequences are real
There is often an implicit assumption that the "serious" ventures have serious consequences, while the "non-serious" (stage, orchestrated, just a show) ones don't
This assumption is completely and fundamentally wrong. It is usually the other way around
As a general rule, anything serious and long lasting can commence only non-seriously
Consequently, what had been started seriously will most probably lead nowhere