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Robin Brooks Profile picture
@RobinBrooksIIF
Jul 29 • 9 tweets • 3 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
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Russia's shadow fleet
1. Right after Russia invaded Ukraine, Greek shipping oligarchs used their oil tankers (blue) to help Putin. As the war progressed, they changed strategy, selling their ships to Russia. Putin can't build his shadow fleet without help from these oligarchs... Image
2. These sales of Greek-owned ships to the shadow fleet are likely one reason the share of Greek oil tankers has fallen steadily from its peak in April 2022. There's more money in selling ships to Putin than shipping his oil, especially with all the paperwork around the G7 cap... Image
3. We use a web crawler to find true owners of oil tankers. Increasingly, our web crawler hits a dead end. Example: IMO 9285859. Used to be called "Wonder Bellatrix" with a Cypriot beneficial owner. Since June 2023 sailing under name "Eastern Pearl" with unclear beneficial owner. Image
4. Another example: IMO 9299721. Used to be called "Oberon." Beneficial owner was LL Energy SA out of Piraeus, Greece. Since September 2022 sailing under the name "Cepheus" with unclear beneficial owner. Image
5. Another example: IMO 9290309. Used to be called "Seagrace" and the beneficial owner was Thenamaris Ships Management out of Vouliagmeni, Greece. Since September 2022 this oil tanker goes by the name of "Thea" with a beneficial owner that is unknown. Image
6. When our web crawler hits a dead end, that isn't definitive evidence that a ship is in the shadow fleet. But it's highly suggestive, as it means effort is being made to conceal the true owner. The examples listed here are just the tip of the iceberg. There's many, many more...
7. The EU and G7 should immediately ban the sale of western-owned oil tankers, unless the new beneficial owner is disclosed and is a western owner. Failure to do so quickly allows Putin to build his shadow fleet unchecked and undermines the G7 oil price cap going forward...
8. The Wests big advantage over Putin is that it controls the bulk of oil tanker capacity taking Russian oil to the global market. Greek shipping oligarchs selling their ships to undisclosed owners threatens this advantage and enforcement of the G7 oil price cap going forward...
9. This follows opposition by Greek oligarchs to the G7 oil price cap for all of 2022, on the grounds that the cap would cause retaliatory production cuts by Russia (never happened) and lobbying for a high cap of $60, which the EU followed. The EU needs to stop this kowtowing...

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More from @RobinBrooksIIF

Robin Brooks Profile picture
Jun 24
If Putin falls, what happens to Russian markets?
1. Russia's GDP is stable for two reasons: (i) we help Russia run huge c/a surpluses, so it gets lots of inflows all the time; (ii) ordinary Russians can't take money out, i.e. no outflows. So financial conditions are super easy.
2. This combination - large current account inflows without private capital flight - means liquidity in Russia has been super abundant since the invasion. The GS financial conditions index is back to where it was before the invasion in Feb. 2022. That's great for Russia's GDP...
3. If Putin falls, there'll be chaos, which opens the window for capital flight. Russia in previous crises always had big capital outflows as Russian oligarchs took their money out. In any post-Putin chaos, that'll happen again. G7 can add to that by cutting the G7 oil price cap.
Read 4 tweets
Robin Brooks Profile picture
Jun 11
Greek shipping oligarchs and the EU
1. Russia in H1 '23 exports more oil than ever (blue). That is possible only thanks to Greek-owned tankers (red), who - since Russia invaded Ukraine - stepped in to transport Russian oil big time. Greek ships are 50% of total tanker capacity... Image
2. Greek shipping oligarchs shifted their tankers to help Russia after the invasion. Greek ships were 33% of total tanker capacity out of Russian ports prior to the invasion. Since then, this number is up to 50%. This means Putin's war machine depends critically on Greek ships... Image
3. Russia exports 83% of its shipborne oil out of Black Sea (lhs) and Baltic (rhs) ports. Greek-owned oil tankers make up 75% of tanker capacity out of Black Sea ports and 60% out of Baltic ports (blue). There is NO Russian war machine - no war in Ukraine - without Greek ships... Image
Read 7 tweets
Robin Brooks Profile picture
May 27
ECB PEPP reinvestments need to stop
1. The PEPP program - unlike QE under Draghi - allows ECB to skew bond buying in favor of certain countries. Maybe that was ok at the height of COVID, but it is NOT justified now. PEPP reinvestments that favor certain countries need to stop... Image
2. The country skew in ECB PEPP purchases has gone under the radar, but it shouldn't because it takes ECB bond buying into quasi-fiscal territory. This kind of fiscal skew would have been unthinkable when the ECB was established and is anathema to voters in northern Europe... Image
3. How big is this fiscal skew? Chart calculates the percentage deviation between country weights in PEPP buying and country weights in Euro zone GDP. ECB PEPP buying is 50% above Greece's GDP weight, i.e. the quasi-fiscal subsidy is huge. Meanwhile, northern Europe is penalized. Image
Read 9 tweets
Robin Brooks Profile picture
May 27
The US banking shock
1. The SVB shock is now almost 3 months old. Since then, deposits have stabilized (lhs, red). The more noteworthy development is on lending, which has ground to a halt (rhs, red) vs torrid loan growth in 2022 (rhs, blue). Where's this "sudden stop" happening? Image
2. The "sudden stop" in loan growth is most pronounced for C&I loans, where cumulative loan growth is 0.3% year-to-date versus 7.8% in 2022 (lhs). That's a HUGE slowdown in lending. Same for consumer loans, where cumulative growth is -0.2% year-to-date versus 4.5% in 2022 (rhs). Image
3. Ironically, even though there's a lot of focus on commerical (lhs) and residential (rhs) real estate, both sectors are still seeing positive cumulative loan growth in 2023, although loan growth is also down sharply from its torrid pace in 2022. Image
Read 5 tweets
Robin Brooks Profile picture
May 14
Germany in Crisis: Eurovision 2023
1. To many of us who - like me - love German rock and the fine "Schlager" genre, yesterday's last place finish at Eurovision was a gut punch. Germany faces many challenges, but - the common denominator for all of them - is Germany's music crisis Image
2. Germany last got first place in 2010 with Lena's mega hit "Satellite," a song we all love. Ever since, it's been the musical wilderness, with last place finishes in 2015, 2016, 2022 & now 2023. Germany got next-to-last place in 2021 and 2019 thanks only to the UK placing last. Image
3. In absolute terms, this year's band from Germany - Lord of the Lost - looks quixotic and their song "Blood & Glitter" was terrible. But this needs to be seen in the context of all the other contenders, most of whom were equally awful. On a relative basis, Germany looks fine... Image
Read 4 tweets
Robin Brooks Profile picture
May 14
Euro zone inflation puzzle
1. Back in 2019, we started the Campaign against Nonsense Output Gaps (CANOO), arguing that Euro zone slack is greater than consensus thinks, yet Euro zone core inflation (orange) rose along with everyone else. How can this be? @adam_tooze @heimbergecon Image
2. There's little doubt that Euro zone slack is greater than the US. Trend growth pre-GFC was on par with the US, only to fall behind in the decade following the 2008 crisis. The Euro zone HAS to have come into COVID and Russia's invasion of Ukraine with more slack than the US... Image
3. Europe's economic underperformance after the 2008 crisis reflects the 2011/12 debt crisis and tighter financial conditions after that. More recent Euro zone underperformance reflects Germany, where the growth model is struggling given the energy shock due to to Russia... Image
Read 6 tweets

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