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12,000 jobs are at risk after Wilko became the latest high-street chain to collapse into administration last Thursday.
But why are 93 years of history possibly coming to an end?
And what can you learn from this to avoid the same for your business?
The woeful story of Wilko👇🏾
But why are 93 years of history possibly coming to an end?
And what can you learn from this to avoid the same for your business?
The woeful story of Wilko👇🏾
In 1930, James Kemsey Wilkinson and his fiance Mary Cooper opened a store at 151 Charnwood Street in Leicester.
Over the next several years, more stores spring up around Leicester, and by the end of the decade, six stores are bearing the founder's name.
Over the next several years, more stores spring up around Leicester, and by the end of the decade, six stores are bearing the founder's name.
'Wilkinson Hardware Stores' even manage to stay open throughout World War II.
Three stores did close in the aftermath of the first air raid in Leicester.
However, they're back open and trading again before the war ends in 1945.
Three stores did close in the aftermath of the first air raid in Leicester.
However, they're back open and trading again before the war ends in 1945.
Expansion continues through the years boosted by the rise of the handyman and DIY in the 50s.
JK's son Tony takes over as Chairman in 1972 and the first ever own-brand product is launched in 1973: Vinyl Emulsion paint.
By the end of the 1980s Wilko has grown to 78 stores.
JK's son Tony takes over as Chairman in 1972 and the first ever own-brand product is launched in 1973: Vinyl Emulsion paint.
By the end of the 1980s Wilko has grown to 78 stores.
A transformational hire is made in 1991.
A former engineer called Gordon Brown is invited to the role of Managing Director by Tony Wilkinson.
Gordon saw that Wilko was a solid company driven by its focus on customers, but held back by its logistics, costings and IT systems.
A former engineer called Gordon Brown is invited to the role of Managing Director by Tony Wilkinson.
Gordon saw that Wilko was a solid company driven by its focus on customers, but held back by its logistics, costings and IT systems.
After three years studying best practices across European and UK firms, Gordon bets the house on logistics.
He pushes the creation of a distribution centre in Worksop, Nottinghamshire.
The 650k sq ft premises costs £35M, at a time when the entire business is only worth £20M...
He pushes the creation of a distribution centre in Worksop, Nottinghamshire.
The 650k sq ft premises costs £35M, at a time when the entire business is only worth £20M...
But the bet massively pays off:
When it opens late-1994 it expands Wilko's reach, allowing them to deliver where they couldn't have before.
In interviews after his 2007 retirement, Gordan describes it as "my legacy to the business".
Another one is built in South Wales in 1999.
When it opens late-1994 it expands Wilko's reach, allowing them to deliver where they couldn't have before.
In interviews after his 2007 retirement, Gordan describes it as "my legacy to the business".
Another one is built in South Wales in 1999.
It's not just logistics Gordon revolutionises.
He implements an IT system upgrade that includes a stock prediction programme for 52 weeks of the year that sees Wilko significantly outstrip competitors in weekly sales.
He implements an IT system upgrade that includes a stock prediction programme for 52 weeks of the year that sees Wilko significantly outstrip competitors in weekly sales.
Simultaneously, Wilko cashes in on the trend of supermarkets moving from prime centre sites to out-of-town retail parks by snapping up the empty units - further boosting its profile in the 90s and 2000s.
This location strategy grows them to 152 stores by the end of the 90s.
This location strategy grows them to 152 stores by the end of the 90s.
Under Gordon's steady hand & sharp retail instincts- expanding beyond DIY products- Wilko averages a massive 20% growth/yr through the 90s & 2000s
It seems nothing can slow them down
However, unbeknownst to the Wilkinson family, on one day in 2004 everything changed...
It seems nothing can slow them down
However, unbeknownst to the Wilkinson family, on one day in 2004 everything changed...
The two men pictured below are brothers Bobby and Simon Arora.
Simon studied Law at Cambridge and traversed the corporate world with stints at McKinsey, 3i and Barclays.
By contrast, Bobby went into the family cash & carry business at 18.
Simon studied Law at Cambridge and traversed the corporate world with stints at McKinsey, 3i and Barclays.
By contrast, Bobby went into the family cash & carry business at 18.
This chalk-and-cheese pairing decided to set up Orient Sourcing in 1995; a wholesaler supplying retail chains with cheap homewares sourced from Asia.
The business supplied retailers including BHS, Primark, and Argos and they impressively sold it for £30M in the year 2000.
The business supplied retailers including BHS, Primark, and Argos and they impressively sold it for £30M in the year 2000.
After a few years on the Orient Sourcing board, the brothers bought B&M Bargains, an ailing Blackpool grocery chain in December 2004.
They couldn't have known at the time, but this purchase set in motion a chain of events that eventually contributed to Wilko's downfall.
They couldn't have known at the time, but this purchase set in motion a chain of events that eventually contributed to Wilko's downfall.
In 2005 Wilko are launching one of the UK's first online stores, but more crucially, there's a changing of the guard at the top.
Tony retires as Chairman, appointing his daughter Lucy Wilkinson & niece Karin Swann as co-Chairwomen.
With sales of £1.1BN things are looking good.
Tony retires as Chairman, appointing his daughter Lucy Wilkinson & niece Karin Swann as co-Chairwomen.
With sales of £1.1BN things are looking good.
The collapse of Woolworths in 2009 meant Wilko seized the crown as the high street’s No 1 discounter.
The 2008 financial crisis & crippling debts saw Woolies tumble into administration.
By contrast, Wilko recorded its best-ever annual sales: £1.45BN in their 2008/9 accounts.
The 2008 financial crisis & crippling debts saw Woolies tumble into administration.
By contrast, Wilko recorded its best-ever annual sales: £1.45BN in their 2008/9 accounts.
With a major competitor out of the picture and Wilko capitalising on the consumer's flight to value in the recession, the firm reports another record-breaking year.
2009/10 profits DOUBLE from £29.5M to £65M while sales jump 7% to £1.6BN.
2009/10 profits DOUBLE from £29.5M to £65M while sales jump 7% to £1.6BN.
However, while Wilko was riding waves of success in the 2000s like a speedboat, B&M was taking off like a rocket ship.
B&M went from 21 stores in 2004 to 149 by the end of 2009.
Revenues surged from £256M to £427M while profits almost TRIPLED from £14M to £34M.
B&M went from 21 stores in 2004 to 149 by the end of 2009.
Revenues surged from £256M to £427M while profits almost TRIPLED from £14M to £34M.
B&M achieved in half a decade what Wilko had achieved in half a century.
Like Wilko, B&M opened a second 620k sq ft distribution centre in Liverpool in 2010.
In the same year B&M launched a home store format (challenging Wilko) and began pushing into more retail park locations.
Like Wilko, B&M opened a second 620k sq ft distribution centre in Liverpool in 2010.
In the same year B&M launched a home store format (challenging Wilko) and began pushing into more retail park locations.
The exploits of the UK's fastest-growing Top 100 retailer did not go unnoticed.
A mega-deal is struck in 2013 that throws petrol on the raging fire that is B&M's growth:
US private equity firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice snaps up a 60% stake at a reported £965M valuation.
A mega-deal is struck in 2013 that throws petrol on the raging fire that is B&M's growth:
US private equity firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice snaps up a 60% stake at a reported £965M valuation.
The Arora brothers share a ~£600M payday.
Not bad for 9 years work.
But still retaining 40% B&M ownership, they do not rest on their laurels.
Instead they stay on board at the company to double down on ambitious international expansion plans.
Not bad for 9 years work.
But still retaining 40% B&M ownership, they do not rest on their laurels.
Instead they stay on board at the company to double down on ambitious international expansion plans.
Former Tesco boss and retailing legend Sir Terry Leahy is installed as Chairman to round out the B&M dream team as Simon and Bobby stay in place as Chief Executive and Trading Director respectively.
After nearly a decade of straight crushing it, B&M sets its sights on an IPO.
After nearly a decade of straight crushing it, B&M sets its sights on an IPO.
While B&M was heading for the moon, cracks were starting to show at Wilko.
After ok numbers in 2010, profits halve from £60M to £23M in 2011 with "investment in stores and systems" cited.
Chief executive Stuart Mitchell quits a year later but there's more drama on the horizon.
After ok numbers in 2010, profits halve from £60M to £23M in 2011 with "investment in stores and systems" cited.
Chief executive Stuart Mitchell quits a year later but there's more drama on the horizon.
A major bombshell drops in 2014 when the Wilkinson family split after 84 years in retail.
One half of the family sells their 50% shareholding to the other, with former co-chairwoman Karin Swann quitting the board and selling her stake to her cousin Lisa Wilkinson.
One half of the family sells their 50% shareholding to the other, with former co-chairwoman Karin Swann quitting the board and selling her stake to her cousin Lisa Wilkinson.
This leaves Lisa as the sole Chairwoman.
The company publically insisted the split was amicable, stating Swann was “pursuing other business interests”.
However, company sources suggested there was more to the story...
The company publically insisted the split was amicable, stating Swann was “pursuing other business interests”.
However, company sources suggested there was more to the story...
According to reporting by The Times, a former employee who worked at Wilko for 16 years said:
“When I used to work in one of the branches, JK Wilkinson used to come in and visit all the time. That man knew how to run a business."
“When I used to work in one of the branches, JK Wilkinson used to come in and visit all the time. That man knew how to run a business."
"Wilko was a brilliant place to work, but it was ruined by management when Tony Wilkinson handed over the reins to his daughters [sic], who took the company in totally the wrong direction.”
(JK had 2 children: Tony & Barbara. Tony’s daughter is Lisa, Barbara’s daughter is Karin)
(JK had 2 children: Tony & Barbara. Tony’s daughter is Lisa, Barbara’s daughter is Karin)
Wilko was valued in excess of £500M when Karin Swann sold her interest for a reported £63M in 2014.
The firm also announced a restructuring of the business, but still did not hire a replacement for the Chief Executive that had left 2 years earlier.
The firm also announced a restructuring of the business, but still did not hire a replacement for the Chief Executive that had left 2 years earlier.
With Wilko ownership now solely with Tony Wilkinson, his wife Christine, and his daughter Lisa, performance continued to slip.
In 2014/15, despite spending big on a flashy marketing campaign, Wilko's sales dipped again to £1.4BN while profits tanked 80% to just £5.5M.
In 2014/15, despite spending big on a flashy marketing campaign, Wilko's sales dipped again to £1.4BN while profits tanked 80% to just £5.5M.
Conversely, B&M continued its meteoric rise, floating on the London Stock Exchange in 2014 at a £2.8BN valuation.
The IPO nets the Arora brothers another crazy payday.
This time worth over £1BN as they sell down their ownership from 40% to ~15%.
The IPO nets the Arora brothers another crazy payday.
This time worth over £1BN as they sell down their ownership from 40% to ~15%.
Despite their corporate restructuring, things go from bad to worse for Wilko when in 2015 Chief Financial Officer Ian Ellis defects to The Co-Op as their new CFO.
He was an experienced senior executive who had been with Wilko since April 2008.
He was an experienced senior executive who had been with Wilko since April 2008.
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Back to the story 👇🏾
Profits pick up for Wilko in 2015/16 but then immediately crater again in 2016/17 driven by currency contract losses caused by the pound's devaluation after the Brexit referendum.
What's worse, Wilko's market share is being attacked on two fronts:
Profits pick up for Wilko in 2015/16 but then immediately crater again in 2016/17 driven by currency contract losses caused by the pound's devaluation after the Brexit referendum.
What's worse, Wilko's market share is being attacked on two fronts:
On one side by popular value supermarkets Lidl and Aldi expanding into Wilko's non-food market.
And on the other side by the incredible growth of both B&M and single-price variety retailers like Poundland.
And on the other side by the incredible growth of both B&M and single-price variety retailers like Poundland.
Suddenly, Wilko's sprawling estate of town center stores flips from an advantage to an expensive millstone around their neck, as online retail slowly kills the high-street.
Conversely, out-of-town retail park destinations populated by the likes of B&M grow in popularity.
Conversely, out-of-town retail park destinations populated by the likes of B&M grow in popularity.
Rather than adapting to these trends, Wilko is caught wrong-footed as it commits to growing its store estate across London and the South East.
The financial consequences force Wilko into deeper cost-cutting, making 1,000 staff redundant in October 2017 (~5% of the workforce).
The financial consequences force Wilko into deeper cost-cutting, making 1,000 staff redundant in October 2017 (~5% of the workforce).
Wilko are stuck paying millions to close unprofitable stores while paying millions to open expensive city center stores.
Unsurprisingly the 2017/18 results are an absolute disaster, with LOSSES of £65M even though revenues increase to £1.62BN.
The CFO resigns as a result.
Unsurprisingly the 2017/18 results are an absolute disaster, with LOSSES of £65M even though revenues increase to £1.62BN.
The CFO resigns as a result.
In a bid to reverse its decline, Wilko essentially freezes store growth for the first time in its 88 year history.
It ends the 2018/19 financial year with 416 stores compared to 415 a year earlier.
It ends the 2018/19 financial year with 416 stores compared to 415 a year earlier.
While 2018 was certainly a year to forget for Wilko, you may be wondering how B&M are doing.
They're doing fantastically well- opening their 600th store in Tonbridge, Kent.
Group revenues jumped 17% to £3.5BN in 2018/19 while profits swelled 10% to £250M.
They're doing fantastically well- opening their 600th store in Tonbridge, Kent.
Group revenues jumped 17% to £3.5BN in 2018/19 while profits swelled 10% to £250M.
The fortunes of the two firms could not have gone more differently:
Roughly a decade prior Wilko was the giant, with £1.6BN in sales across 337 stores, compared to B&M's £427M in sales across 149 stores
In the subsequent years, Wilko simply hadn't handled the fierce competition
Roughly a decade prior Wilko was the giant, with £1.6BN in sales across 337 stores, compared to B&M's £427M in sales across 149 stores
In the subsequent years, Wilko simply hadn't handled the fierce competition
Things had to change and in 2019 there's a mgmt reshuffle with the resignations of the COO and Digital Director.
However, rather than hiring a replacement COO, Wilko makes the unorthodox move of splitting COO responsibilities between the CFO and Chief Commercial Officer roles.
However, rather than hiring a replacement COO, Wilko makes the unorthodox move of splitting COO responsibilities between the CFO and Chief Commercial Officer roles.
In Feb 2020, Wilko internally promotes Jerome Saint-Marc to the role of Chief Executive.
This is the first time anyone has held the CEO role at Wilko since 2012.
Sadly, Jerome isn't able to calmly settle into his new role...
This is the first time anyone has held the CEO role at Wilko since 2012.
Sadly, Jerome isn't able to calmly settle into his new role...
Because less than a month later, Wilko CFO Alex Russo is poached by a major competitor.
None other than - you guessed it - B&M.
Not only are B&M out-competing Wilko in the market, they're also stealing critical leadership talent.
None other than - you guessed it - B&M.
Not only are B&M out-competing Wilko in the market, they're also stealing critical leadership talent.
On top of that, the Covid pandemic begins to wreak havoc as lockdowns begin in March 2020.
However, both Wilko and B&M are deemed essential and stay open.
However, both Wilko and B&M are deemed essential and stay open.
Even before the pandemic though, results were dire with 2019/20 profits falling 70% to £6.3M.
Days before the first lockdown at the end of March, Wilko's "family" ethos is questioned when they cut sick pay for 18,000 workers but *NOT* management.
Days before the first lockdown at the end of March, Wilko's "family" ethos is questioned when they cut sick pay for 18,000 workers but *NOT* management.
They deny the decision is related to Covid, but face a massive backlash since retail & warehouse staff (99% of the workforce) who are forced to isolate with Covid will now only get 1 day's sick pay.
After a year of dispute, unions threaten industrial action In Mar 2021.
After a year of dispute, unions threaten industrial action In Mar 2021.
Wilko trades throughout the lockdowns, and against the backdrop of significant Covid supply chain issues, Wilko actually manages ok, with 2020/21 profits only down to £5.5M from £6.3M.
However, things for Wilko only got worse from here...
However, things for Wilko only got worse from here...
Unfortunately, the financial performance for the 12 mths to 29 Jan 2022 was cataclysmic.
Two lockdowns, the spread of the Omicron variant, and significant global supply issues result in a £38.7M LOSS.
As a result, cash halved from £107M to £57M and things get really scary...
Two lockdowns, the spread of the Omicron variant, and significant global supply issues result in a £38.7M LOSS.
As a result, cash halved from £107M to £57M and things get really scary...
In an attempt to shore up their cash position, Wilko announces plans to close 15 stores in January 2002.
In September, the fight to survive becomes existential as Wilko tells landlords they are unilaterally switching from quarterly to monthly rent payments to save cash.
In September, the fight to survive becomes existential as Wilko tells landlords they are unilaterally switching from quarterly to monthly rent payments to save cash.
Days later they tell suppliers that payments due between September 11 and October 8 will be delayed until the following month.
One desperate attempt does come good in November as Wilko sell the jewel-in-the-crown Worksop distribution centre to DHL to raise £48M in cash.
One desperate attempt does come good in November as Wilko sell the jewel-in-the-crown Worksop distribution centre to DHL to raise £48M in cash.
Separately, Wilko works with debt experts on a refinancing of a £37.5M revolving credit facility, but this falls through due to the Truss / Kwarteng-induced interest rate hikes.
In November it emerges they are in talks with lenders to secure an emergency £30M cash injection.
In November it emerges they are in talks with lenders to secure an emergency £30M cash injection.
Eyebrows are raised when amidst all this financial turmoil, it's revealed that the Wilkinson family still opted to extract £3.75M in dividends between Feb 2021 and Mar 2022.
Even after holding onto Covid business rates relief, which many essential retailers chose to give back.
Even after holding onto Covid business rates relief, which many essential retailers chose to give back.
The pressure increases from all sides and in December 2022 Chief Executive Jerome Saint-Marc is replaced by Mark Jackson with immediate effect.
Just weeks after showing Jerome the door, Lisa Wilkinson steps down as Chairwoman in January 2023 to be replaced by Chris Howell.
Just weeks after showing Jerome the door, Lisa Wilkinson steps down as Chairwoman in January 2023 to be replaced by Chris Howell.
Wilko is handed a lifeline later in January as Hilco, the restructuring and investment company, agrees to provide a £40M two-year revolving credit facility.
The new Chairman and Chief Executive waste no time and announce a restructuring plan in February to cut 400 jobs.
The new Chairman and Chief Executive waste no time and announce a restructuring plan in February to cut 400 jobs.
By May, Wilko is seeking to slash its rent bill for up to 250 of its 400 stores as part of a restructuring process known as a CVA.
Sources close to the process say Wilko will soon run out of cash and go into administration if a CVA is not agreed.
Sources close to the process say Wilko will soon run out of cash and go into administration if a CVA is not agreed.
There's a last ditch attempt in July to secure additional funding, but when that fails existing lenders Hilco lend a further £5M to keep Wilko afloat while it searches for a buyer.
No buyers step forward as it's reported in early August any buyer would need to inject £70M.
No buyers step forward as it's reported in early August any buyer would need to inject £70M.
On Thursday 10 August 2023, Wilko formally announced it will go into administration after no suitable rescue deal materialises.
It emerged yesterday that a number of retailers are interested in buying parts of Wilko, including-
you guessed it - B&M...
https://t.co/NCgJqw25t5thesun.co.uk/money/23491487…
It emerged yesterday that a number of retailers are interested in buying parts of Wilko, including-
you guessed it - B&M...
https://t.co/NCgJqw25t5thesun.co.uk/money/23491487…
How did it all go so wrong for Wilko?
And what can you learn from their mistakes to avoid your business going bust?
There are several reasons things went wrong, but five main things stand out as the most impactful:
And what can you learn from their mistakes to avoid your business going bust?
There are several reasons things went wrong, but five main things stand out as the most impactful:
1/ Challenging retail environment
Wilko made A LOT of mistakes.
But there's no denying that the last few years have been brutal for retail.
The supply chain disruptions caused by Covid, and the rising energy costs caused by the conflict in Ukraine have battered the industry.
Wilko made A LOT of mistakes.
But there's no denying that the last few years have been brutal for retail.
The supply chain disruptions caused by Covid, and the rising energy costs caused by the conflict in Ukraine have battered the industry.
Those supply chain issues left Wilko struggling to get stock into stores, depriving it of the cash needed to pay suppliers and sending it into a vicious downward spiral.
In a tough environment your business must conserve cash and adapt as best you can.
In a tough environment your business must conserve cash and adapt as best you can.
https://twitter.com/afroliftdotcom/status/1665401029465178113?s=20
2/ Poor reaction to competition
Wilko faced intense competition from the expansion of value retailers like B&M, Home Bargains, Poundland and others, who have all upped their market share.
As you can see below, Wilko is the only retailer to lose market share in this period.
Wilko faced intense competition from the expansion of value retailers like B&M, Home Bargains, Poundland and others, who have all upped their market share.
As you can see below, Wilko is the only retailer to lose market share in this period.
They simply didn't change quickly enough in response to the competition. At the very least Wilko should have mimicked some of what was working at B&M.
If you don't study what your competitors do better than your business, you could be in big trouble.
If you don't study what your competitors do better than your business, you could be in big trouble.
https://twitter.com/afroliftdotcom/status/1669345540629471234?s=20
3/ Store location strategy
Having too many large stores in expensive high street locations was a killer.
While handy for shoppers who do not have a car, selling cut-price goods with low profit margins in sites where rent is relatively high was always going to be tough.
Having too many large stores in expensive high street locations was a killer.
While handy for shoppers who do not have a car, selling cut-price goods with low profit margins in sites where rent is relatively high was always going to be tough.
Conversely, many of Wilko’s rivals traded at out-of-town sites.
Here it's cheaper to trade and shoppers can park their cars to easily take away large purchases or stock up on household goods.
During lockdowns, footfall dropped 40% at high street sites but less at retail parks.
Here it's cheaper to trade and shoppers can park their cars to easily take away large purchases or stock up on household goods.
During lockdowns, footfall dropped 40% at high street sites but less at retail parks.
Wilko suffered from over-spaced stores in dead high streets, and and been paying rents ~50% over market rates, equivalent to an extra cost of £35M-£40M/yr.
Maintaining a physical store is tough, try to bake in as much flexibility as possible if your business does take one on.
Maintaining a physical store is tough, try to bake in as much flexibility as possible if your business does take one on.
4/ Product selection
Related to the location point, Wilko were selling a lot of stuff ill-suited to high streets.
They failed to edit their ranges to take out slow-moving items such as furniture, which meant cash was not flowing through the business fast enough to pay bills.
Related to the location point, Wilko were selling a lot of stuff ill-suited to high streets.
They failed to edit their ranges to take out slow-moving items such as furniture, which meant cash was not flowing through the business fast enough to pay bills.
Also, with such a wide range of products on sale, Wilko found it hard to keep its shelves filled when the supply chain issues hit.
Empty shelves aren't appealing to shoppers and trigger a vicious cycle where shoppers stop coming as they doubt the store will have what they need.
Empty shelves aren't appealing to shoppers and trigger a vicious cycle where shoppers stop coming as they doubt the store will have what they need.
To avoid this in your business, keep a close eye on what's selling and what isn't.
This is a very complicated topic related to working capital so I'll leave it to the excellent @SecretCFO to explain.
The bottom line is: edit your product lines if needed
This is a very complicated topic related to working capital so I'll leave it to the excellent @SecretCFO to explain.
The bottom line is: edit your product lines if needed
https://twitter.com/SecretCFO/status/1680572456489082882?s=20
5/ Management disarray
I think the most glaring error was Wilko's mismanagement.
A lot of blame lies at the Lisa Wilkinson's door.
Wilko was a reasonably strong brand but she made a catalogue of bad appointments and the churn in the mgmt team spiked once she took the reins.
I think the most glaring error was Wilko's mismanagement.
A lot of blame lies at the Lisa Wilkinson's door.
Wilko was a reasonably strong brand but she made a catalogue of bad appointments and the churn in the mgmt team spiked once she took the reins.
Running a £1BN+ business for 8 YEARS without a CEO? Not a great idea.
Splitting COO responsibilities between 2 heads of different areas in a logistics-critical business? Not a great idea.
According to an industry source “In the north, there's a saying about family businesses...
Splitting COO responsibilities between 2 heads of different areas in a logistics-critical business? Not a great idea.
According to an industry source “In the north, there's a saying about family businesses...
‘Clogs to clogs in three generations’.
The first generation starts it, the second generation makes it and the third generation loses it.
That is exactly what has happened with the Wilkinson family.”
The first generation starts it, the second generation makes it and the third generation loses it.
That is exactly what has happened with the Wilkinson family.”
The key learning here is that management of a business is hard.
As a founder / owner you need to recognise your own strengths and weaknesses, figure out where you need help and then hire or outsource to the expertise required for success.
As a founder / owner you need to recognise your own strengths and weaknesses, figure out where you need help and then hire or outsource to the expertise required for success.
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https://twitter.com/afroliftdotcom/status/1691759538460832128?s=20
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