🧵 Operation Postbox was Emilio Lussu’s plan to initiate an anti-fascist insurrection in Sardinia with the support of the Allied forces, which was meant to be the spark for the uprising throughout Italy. It relied on the backing of British intelligence.
Myer Grienspan arrived on the evening of January 23, 1942, from Gibraltar to Barnstaple in the county of Devon with only a light suitcase.
The customs officers had been alerted by the secret organisation Special Operations Executive, nicknamed “The Baker Street Irregulars”, so no questions were asked, and his real name was not revealed.
This is how it all began for Emilio Lussu, an intellectual and politician, founder of Justice and Freedom and the driving force behind the Sardinian Action Party, the Postbox mission.
To trigger a revolt that could turn into a full-scale revolution, Emilio Lussu needed allies. He found them, or at least believed he had found them, among the British. He had established long-standing relationships with them in Lisbon.
After the contacts in Lisbon, Lussu (whom British intelligence called Simon) was sent to Gibraltar with his wife Joyce and from there to Great Britain. They arrived two days apart and reunited at the Cumberland Hotel in London.
The contact for Myer Grienspan and his wife was Mr Montecatini, an unidentified individual from Special Operations.
In the British archives, there is a 12-page file about him. Here is what is written about Simon:
Lussu and his wife “are not actually employed by this organisation, but they are in the immediate future going to work in conjunction with us”.
“Lussu claims that he still has considerable prestige in certain parts of the central and southern Italian mainland, but not much in the north. There is no direct evidence to substantiate or refute this”.
His visit’s main goal “was to discuss the political aspect of his proposed mission. His project is aimed at preparing the ground for procuring a revolt and armed occupation in Sardinia, to be followed at the psychological moment by a spread of the revolt to Italy.
If this succeeds, the country, politically disorganised by revolution, would be unable to resist the territorial or political claims of its neighbours, and might be reduced to a state lover than that of a Balkan country.
The success of his project would hasten Italian withdrawal from active participation in the war and this would be to our benefit. He therefore regards himself as acting in the interests of the allies as well as in what he considers the interests of his own country, and...
... expects some form of political collaboration. In writing from Lisbon he stated that he expected assurances that territorially Italy would not be reduced beyond what it was at the time of the March on Rome. Actually he realises that the Dodecanese will be taken away and...
... possibly also Cyrenaica; but it is not to help his cause if such declarations were to be publicly proclaimed in advance. The army has to be won over at least to the point of not firing on their own people and his vier is that this can only be achieved if the army can...
... be convinced that the action of the people will not injure the country”.
The negotiations would be taken to the highest levels of the Special Operations Executive and then to the ministerial level, although it was not specified which cabinet members.
However, the assurances regarding respect for Italian national borders, as desired by Lussu, and unspecified political considerations slowed down the negotiations.
In June 1942, the Grienspan spouses returned to Gibraltar under Mr and Mrs Dupont. Postbox did not die, but it remained only a hypothesis. A year later, history would completely archive it with the fall of Fascism in Italy.
This is the thirty-third #SpiesInItaly thread of the year (the previous one is below). I am posting one of these stories every Saturday this year. Follow me, and please write for tips.
Il generale Roberto Vannacci è stato addetto militare dell’ambasciata italiana a Mosca fino a metà dello scorso anno 2022.
È rientrato in Italia a seguito delle ritorsioni russe per l’espulsione da parte dell’Italia di 30 diplomatici russi dopo l’invasione russa dell’Ucraina.
Si legge sul sito dell’Istituto Geografico Militare:
“Dal 2020 è impiegato quale Addetto per la Difesa presso la Federazione Russa, con accreditamenti secondari in Bielorussia, Armenia e Turkmenistan. Dichiarato ‘persona non grata’ dalle autorità russe a seguito delle...
vicende belliche tra Russia e Ucraina ha cessato tale incarico nel settembre 2022”. igmi.org/it/chi-siamo/c…
🧵 On Valentine’s Day forty years ago, Italian authorities arrested Azeglio Negrino, 45, a Genoese engineer, and Viktor Pronin, 46, a KGB operative under the cover of a senior executive of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, as they exchanged materials “of great strategic importance”.
Negrino was a partner and executive of Microlito, a company in Recco, near Genoa, which had been awarded a contract to reorganize the microfilm process used by the Italian air force.
The exchange between Negrino and Pronin concerned information about the new Tornado military planes being built for NATO by a consortium of Italian, British, and West German companies.
🧵Soviet espionage in Italy was highly active during the Cold War. Additionally, two other countries from the Warsaw Pact were very active in espionage in Rome: Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
The KGB and the GRU operated in Italy on behalf of the USSR, with the latter interested in both military and technical-industrial espionage.
There was no need for significant activity on the political front, as the relations between the Italian Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party were excellent.
🧵 In 1972, the Italian government deceived the United States and, with a clever and audacious move, supplied Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya with M-113 vehicles produced by Oto Melara in La Spezia under a US license.
As I told you last week, in 1971, Italy had managed to thwart a coup attempt against Gaddafi by blocking a ship loaded with weapons departing from the port of Trieste.
Roberto Jucci, a colonel in Italian intelligence at the time, had contributed to foiling Operation Hilton. The following year, he was sent to Libya by then-Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to strengthen bilateral ties.
🧵 In the spring of 1971, the Italian intelligence thwarted an initiative by Libyan exiles to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. The “Operation Hilton” helped to restore Italian-Libyan relations.
In 1969, after Muammar Gaddafi had seized power in Libya, relations between Italy and its former colony were severely damaged, mainly due to Libya’s stance against Italians in Libya and Italian industries active in various sectors, including the oil industry.
These relations worsened after July 21, 1970: the Council of the Command of the Revolution enacted three laws against the Italian community, which included confiscating all real estate and movable assets of Italians and expulsing all community members.
🧵 In 1971, the Italian intelligence accurately predicted the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the fourth conflict between Arabs and Israelis, and warned their Israeli counterparts of how it would unfold. However, Israeli intelligence did not take heed of their Italian colleagues’ advice.
Last week, I told you about “Operation Venti,” which refers to the collaboration agreement between Italian intelligence and Israeli intelligence dating back to 1975.
In a document dated October 3, 1985 (declassified in April), Admiral Fulvio Marini, then-director of the SISMI (Military Intelligence and Security Service), wrote that in 1975, after the Yom Kippur War, an agreement of collaboration was reached with the Mossad...