Thread by @Maverickmusafir

Manekshaw’s tenure as Commandant of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington is remembered as much for his significant contribution to development in curriculum, training and infrastructure as for its low ebb of victimisation. Defence Minister Krishna Menon, was looking for an opportunity to settle a score with General Manekshaw.

He disliked Manekshaw after being rebuffed in an attempt to rope him in a bid to isolate the then Indian Army Chief, General K.S. Thimayya, with whom Menon had differences. It happened in 1957 when he was promoted to Major General and posted to Jammu to command 26 Inf Div.+

Menon was on an official visit and casually asked Sam what he thought of General Thimayya. Thimayya was a brilliant officer, professionally competent and morally upright, whom Manekshaw held in high regard.+

He replied, ‘Mr. Minister, I am not allowed to think about him. He is my Chief. Tomorrow you will be asking my Brigadiers and Colonels what they think of me. It’s the surest way to ruin the discipline of the Army. Don’t do it in the future.’

Menon flew into a rage and told Manekshaw to abandon his ‘British ways of thinking’.

‘I can get rid of Thimayya if I want to!’ he thundered. Undeterred, Manekshaw continued that he could, it was his prerogative to do as he wished since he was the Defence Minister, but that would not deter his resolve not to comment on the next appointee. Menon said nothing at the time but he nursed a grudge that would snowball over the years.+

Menon had ingratiated himself with Prime Minister Nehru by promoting Lt Gen B.M. Kaul as Chief of General Staff at Army HQ.

Kaul was all powerful in those days. Contrary to the recommendation of the Army Chief, General Thimayya, he had been promoted Lt Gen. It was on this issue that Thimayya resigned but had later withdrawn his resignation. He would often ignore Thimayya, openly make disparaging remarks about him and sometimes even take liberties with Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister. He could get away with all this because of his close relations with Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister. Kaul was ambitious, he had a hand in almost everything that was happening in the Army.+

Lt Gen S.K. Sinha, PVSM, who was then a young Major, working directly under Kaul writes in his book, ‘A Soldier Recalls’:

“Kaul rang me up to say that Thimayya was retiring within a week and against his wishes he was to relieve Lt Gen L.P. Sen as CGS the following day. CGS was a powerful appointment in itself but Kaul continued to wrest power and slowly but surely marginalised the Army Chief, General P.N. Thapar. The Army Chief is always from a fighting arm. Kaul had not been a combat soldier although he was initially commissioned in the infantry, the Rajputana Rifles. He was soon transferred to the Army Service Corps (ASC), a logistic branch of the Army.

He had not performed any combat duties nor had he been concerned with combat training, yet he aspired to become the Army Chief by eliminating all those who posed a threat to his ambition with his influence.+

Manekshaw and Kaul were not on good terms. When Sam was GOC 26 Inf Div, Kaul was GOC 4 Inf Div. Since both divisions were under 15 Corps, during a sand model exercise they were pitted against each other.

Kaul was designated ‘enemy commander’ and Sam was the ‘attacking division commander’. The narrative of the exercise portrayed the enemy commander as belonging to a non-fighting arm, professionally inept and deploying his troops to build accommodation at the expense of training.

The description fitted Kaul perfectly and he was not too pleased with this characterisation. Sam as the attacking divisional commander dominated the exercise and routed the ‘enemy’.+

At a dinner that followed, Kaul, smarting from defeat and seething with anger, pointed his baton at the slight bulge (During WWII, a Japanese soldier emptied nine bullets into his stomach which left a permanent bulge) in Sam's stomach and within earshot of junior officers joked, ‘What have you got there?’

‘Guts’, said Sam, and the officers had a good laugh. Kaul was left with a shattered ego.+

It was during Manekshaw’s next appointment as a Commandant of the DSSC that Menon and Kaul colluded to launch a smear campaign to sully his reputation.

Lt Gen S.K. Sinha,PVSM, who was then a young Major, working directly under Kaul in his book, A Soldier Recalls, writes:

“Kaul called me to his new office and said: ‘I have been very happy with all the work that you have been doing for me. When you had first come to my staff last year, I had told you that if you work well. I will give you a reward. I am doing so now. I have selected you to go for a course at the Joint Services Staff College in UK. I want you to do well there and I have ordered that you do some attachments in India before leaving for UK!’+

I was taken by surprise. JSSC was a prestigious post graduate staff college course to which we sent one officer by rotation every year from the three Services. Generally, Staff College graduates in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Brigadier and their equivalent from the Navy or the Air Force, were sent on this course. I was only a Major and exception had been made for me.

I had done my Army Staff College at Wellington nearly 10 years earlier. It was decided that I do a week's attachment each at Naval and Air Headquarters and a fortnight's attachment at Staff College, Wellington with Naval and Air Wings before proceeding to UK.+

This was for the first time that such attachments prior to the course had been arranged. When I arrived in Wellington for my attachment, I found the atmosphere a little hostile to me. There was a feeling that I was a Kaul man who had been shown an unusual favour.

Manekshaw was then the Commandant at Wellington. I had served under him when he was a Lieutenant Colonel in Military Operations Directorate at Delhi and later also at Mhow when he was a Brigadier and was our Commandant. Manekshaw had always been kind and indulgent towards me.+

I was surprised that he was now so cold and aloof. He completely ignored me. Manekshaw had perhaps changed his attitude towards me because he thought that I was a Kaul man who had been sent to spy at Wellington, on the pretext of a training attachment.

While I was at Wellington staying in the mess, I was asked one night to see Lieutenant Colonel Sanjeeva Rao, then staying at a hotel in Conoor. I had known Sanjeeva in Burma. We had served in the same brigade. He was now on the staff of Kaul.

He told me that he had come to Wellington on a secret mission to collect evidence of Manekshaw's anti-national activities. He wanted me to help him in doing so. I found his conspiratorial approach revolting. I told him that I knew nothing and I did not want to get involved in any such thing. Sanjeeva talked of patriotism and national interest. I was not impressed and I stuck to my stand. He then told me that he would get Kaul to talk to me on the telephone and tried to book a call to Delhi. Luckily, the line was down and the call did not get through.+

I came away from the hotel feeling thoroughly disgusted. Later I learnt that two senior officers at Wellington had agreed to cooperate and agreed to give evidence. I returned to Delhi after my attachment. Kaul sent for me and asked me why I was not prepared to give evidence about Manekshaw's activities. I told him that I was an outsider there and I had not seen or heard anything.

Kaul was not happy with my reply. He told me that I should not think that my going to UK was certain. He could get it cancelled. I told him that I owed my selection entirely to him and fully realised that if he so wanted he could get my selection for the course immediately cancelled. However, as I knew nothing nor had I seen anything, I was in no position to give any evidence against Manekshaw.

Kaul looked at me rather sternly and just said: ‘Think it over again. You can go now. I saluted him and came out of his office in the firm belief that my going to UK would now get cancelled. That was the last time I was to meet Kaul.”+

Brigadier Behram Panthaki, in his book, ‘Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: The Man And His Times’ writes:

“Menon alleged that Maj Gen Sam Manekshaw was too pro-western in his outlook and mannerisms and, therefore, by implication, anti-Indian. His restoration and display of the portraits of eminent British officers like Robert Clive and Warren Hastings in his office,was hyped to condemn him as an unashamed Anglophile.He was alleged to have made a brash statement that he would have no DS at the Staff College whose wife looked like an Ayah (maidservant).

After a number of such frivolous charges had been brought against him and the canard spread and repeated, Kaul went for the jugular and initiated a court of inquiry against the commandant. Instructors were approached to provide evidence against Sam.+

A few officers succumbed to inducements and provided specious evidence but the majority stood by their commandant. It was an acrimonious and unpleasant affair that dragged on for over a year. Outwardly Sam maintained his composure, but it wasn't an easy time.

The thought of being sent home at the age of forty-eight was demoralising. Luckily for Sam, Lt Gen Daulat Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, the presiding officer of the court of inquiry, was a man of integrity. He is believed to have given some of the witnesses a hard time, asking one, a cavalry officer, how he thought that the Staff College was in any way more western in its outlook than his cavalry regiment. Another witness was told that any honourable officer whose evidence was so devoid of substance should shoot himself in shame!+

Sam came out unscathed, exonerated of all charges. In spite of this Krishna Menon was unrelenting and hoped to get Sam dismissed from the army. He drafted a letter expressing his severe displeasure with the commandant and directed Army Headquarters to put it on Sam's official service record.

A copy of this letter was sent to Sam. ‘Beroze, he said to me, if you ever work in MS Branch, look up my dossier. You will see my response and what I told Menon to do with his letter!’+

Soon thereafter, nemesis caught up with Menon and Kaul in what is alluded to by military historians as the ‘Great Himalayan Blunder’. After his tenure as CGS, Kaul was posted to Tezpur, in NEFA, to command IV Corps. In October 1962 the Chinese broke through our defences and captured vast tracts of Indian territory. Our soldiers were left facing an overpowering enemy with obsolete weapons and equipment. They were fighting at heights of 15,000 feet without winter clothing, in canvas shoes. Logistical support was non-existent since there were no roads to maintain the supply chain. Forward posts had to be maintained by airdrops that went awry as troops retreated and their ground positions could not be located because of poor communications.+

Within a short time the Corps was in total disarray. Soldiers succumbed to the adverse effects of high altitude because of rapid deployment without adequate acclimatisation. After taking a large number of prisoners, China declared a ceasefire.

With the smoking gun pointing at the corps commander, the chickens finally came home to roost. Kaul was relieved of his command for lack of leadership, tactical acumen and strategic vision. The Army Chief, General Thapar and Commander of IV Corps, Lt Gen Kaul submitted their resignation and Menon was sacked.+

Sam had been cleared to become a Lieutenant General but his promotion had been held in abeyance for eighteen months pending the outcome of the court of inquiry. Officers junior to him had picked up their rank. Sam went to Delhi and sought an interview with Prime Minister Nehru.

‘General,’ replied a dejected Nehru, ‘what can I tell you about your future when I can barely predict my own’.

Nehru realised a bit too late that he had been naive in his assessment of the Chinese. On November 19, 1962 General J.N. Chaudhuri was appointed as the COAS and on December 2, Sam was promoted to Lieutenant General and asked to take over IV Corps from Kaul. ‘It was the Chinese who came to my rescue,’ he quipped.+

What Sam inherited from Kaul was a demoralised force. His first address to his staff officers had the Manekshaw stamp of brevity and flamboyance, ‘Gentlemen, I have arrived. There will be no more withdrawals in IV Corps. Thank you’.

His ‘Order of the Day’ to the Corps was equally cogent, ‘From now onwards there will be no withdrawals except on my personal orders which will not be given. We shall stand and fight where we dig in. Remember, we are all expendable; the reputation of the army is not, nor is the honour of the country.’+

Sam set about, pulling chestnuts out of the fire. Operational plans were revised, forward defences re-sited and strengthened, artillery guns redeployed, ammunition and logistical dumps created,field medical hospitals established, intelligence collection plans refined and procedures for close air support revised. Sam never broke stride, and within a year IV Corps was well on its way to making its defences impregnable.”+

In a lecture at Defence Services Staff College, Wellington on Leadership and Discipline; 11th November, 1998, Field Marshal Manekshaw speaks on his role in 1962 war and was he in a position to do something about the situation?

“In the 1962 war, I was in disgrace. I was a Commandant of this Institution. Mr. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, disliked me intensely. General Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff at the time, and the budding man for the next higher appointment, disliked me intensely.

So, I was in disgrace at the Staff College. There were charges against me I will enumerate some of them-all engineered by Mr. Krishna Menon. I do not know if you remember that in 1961 or 1960, General Thimayya was the Army Chief.+

He had fallen out with Mr. Krishna Menon and had sent him his resignation. The Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, persuaded General Thimayya to withdraw his resignation. The members of Parliament also disliked Mr. Krishna Menon, and they went hammer and tongs for the Prime Minister in Parliament.

The Prime Minister made the following statement, “I cannot understand why General Thimayya is saying that the Defence Ministry interferes with the working of the Army. Take the case of General Manekshaw. The Selection Board has approved his promotion to Lieutenant General over the heads of 23 other officers. The Government has accepted that.”

I was the Commandant of the Staff College. I had been approved for promotion to Lieutenant General.+

Instead of making me the Lieutenant General, Mr. Krishna Menon levied charges against me. There were ten charges. I will enumerate only one or two of them that I am more loyal to the Queen of England than to the President of India, that I am more British than Indian. That I have been alleged to have said that I will have no instructor in the Staff college whose wife looks like an ayah. These were the sort of charges against me.

For eighteen months my promotion was held back. An enquiry was made.+

Three Lieutenant Generals, including an Army Commander, sat at that enquiry. I was exonerated on every charge.

The file went up to the Prime Minister who sent it up to the Cabinet Secretary, who wrote on the file, “If anything happens to General Manekshaw, this case will go down as the Dreyfus case”. So the file came back to the Prime Minister. He wrote on it, “Orders may now issue,” meaning I will now become a Lieutenant General. Instead of that, ladies and gentleman, I received a letter from the Adjutant General saying the Defence Minister, Mr. Krishna Menon, has sent his severe displeasure to General Manekshaw, to be recorded. I had it in the office where the Commandant now sits. I sent that letter back to the Adjutant General saying what Mr. Krishna Menon could do with his displeasure, very vulgarly stated. It is still in my dossier.+

Then the Chinese came to my help. Krishna Menon was sacked, Kaul was sacked and Nehru sent for me. He said, “General, I have a vigorous enemy. I find out that you are a vigorous General. Will you go and take over?”

I said, “I’ve been waiting eighteen months for this opportunity,” I went and took over.

What part did I play in 1962, none whatsoever, none whatsoever.

I was here for eighteen months, persecuted, inquisitions against me but we survived, I rather like the Chinese.

(Sources:
A Soldier Recalls by Lt Gen S.K. Sinha, PVSM
Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: The Man And His Times by Brig Behram Panthaki)