Thread by @Maverickmusafir

This year marks the 126th year of the Battle of Saragarhi.

At 0900 hours on the 12th of September 1897, 8000 tribals launched an attack on Saragarhi, a small fortress manned by 22 valiant men of 36th Sikhs, under the command of Havaldar Ishar Singh. Despite knowing that death was imminent, the garrison bravely held its ground for 6 hours 45 minutes killing 200 tribals and wounding another 600. While Battle Honours are Battalion specific, this battle stands as a Battle Honour for all of the 26 Battalions of the Sikh Regiment.

(Saragarhi on 14th September 1897, two days after the battle)

In 1893, the border was demarcated between British India and Afghanistan in the form of the Durand Line. It was 1,510 miles long, and split the Pashtun ethnic group so that roughly half was in Afghanistan and half in India. It was, in part, drawn up to weaken the Pashtun power in the hope they would be absorbed by the Raj. That, however, did not happen.+

This ethnic division laid the ground for permanent conflict—a fact which was played up by the local mullahs, in particular, one Pashtun Fakir Saidullah, known to the British as the ‘Mad Mullah’. In addition, there was the Hadda Mullah in the Mohmand area, the Mastana Mullah in Sawat, and Mullah Said Akbar Aka Khel in Khyber. Rumblings could be heard all over the Frontier and, before long, an uprising had started.+

The first act of aggression was the attack and occupation of the Khyber forts. This would then be followed by attacks led by Pathan tribesman at forts of Samana, Malakand and Chakdhara.

The Government of India responded by raising a force under Lt General Sir WSA Lockhart to deal with this uprising, when more than 60,000 troops were put into the field by the British. This would go down in history as the Tirah Campaign, to be fought between 1897 and 1898.+

To cover the Afghan history, three Afghan wars, Tribes, British and Soviet interests, The Great Game and Tirah campaign (of which Saragarhi was a part) in one thread would be impossible. I will try to centre myself on the events of the Battle of Saragarhi. I am summarising from a book and I highly recommend that you read it “Saragrahi and The Defence of Samana Forts” written by Capt Amarinder Singh.+

SAMANA DEFENCES

As part of the British defensive posture, a series of forts were built along a thirty-mile long stretch, through Orakzai and Afridi territory, from Kohat to Hangu and along the Samana Ridge.

The two main forts on the crest of the range were Fort Lockhart (earlier known as Mastan, now renamed as Fort Samana), located 8 miles from Hangu and Fort Gulistan (earlier known as Fort Cavagnari)-3 miles to the West of Fort Lockhart.

Lockhart was the first fort West of Hangu, from where Samana Range started. Hangu, in turn, was 25 miles West of Kohat. The distance between the two forts of Lockhart and Gulistan was about three miles. Between the two, as both were out of line of sight, a small communication post, called Fort Saraghari, had been established. This was on high ground- a spur jutting out towards the South, between them.

To the North of the range lay Khanki Valley, and to the South was the Miranzai Valley. To the East of Lockhart were the four small forts of Dhar, Sartop, Sangar and Crag. These were there for a dual purpose--they were the eyes and ears of the two main forts, covering the line of communication between Hangu and Lockhart, and in what we would call today, also played a covering troops role.+

Both Lockhart and Gulistan had been built after the Miranzai expedition of Sir William Lockhart in 1881. Both these forts were rectangular in shape with 12 to 15 ft high stone walls. To each was attached a hornwork. Fort Lockhart could hold about 300 men and Gulistan could hold 200. Saragarhi, similarly protected, was about a mile and a half from Lockhart, and a mile and three quarters from Gulistan. The four small garrisons at Dhar, Sartop, Crag and Sangar could hold 25 to 50 men.+

Fort Lockhart and Fort Gulistan were not inter-visible but were connected for communications by a heliograph operated from a tower in the small fort of Saragarhi. There was also a system of communicating with flags, the semaphor.+

Fort Saragarhi was the highest of the three forts at about 6000 feet with Fort Lockhart standing at 5000 feet and Fort Gulistan to the West also at about 5000 feet. Fort Lockhart was situated on the lower slopes of a feature below the small Fort Sartop, whereas Fort Gulistan was in a saddle or col dominated by observation from the right shoulder, with Samana Suk to the west and Saragarhi to the east. As the last ridge to the plains and Kurram Valley to the south, the Samana Ridge was the last defensive line between marauding Pashtun tribes and peaceful people of the plains. Conversely, it was also the firm base or the jump off ridge north into Tirah District making it a necessary defensive line to occupy when required for either of the two purposes.+

In examining the battles along Samana Ridge in 1897, it is prudent to view these three forts together- Fort Lockhart, the main fort; Fort Saragarhi, the little heliograph fort; and Fort Gulistan, a smaller fort than Fort Lockhart. The defensive power of both larger forts lay in the strength of the greater troops they contained, a defensive wall and in the case of Fort Lockhart, a couple of ‘Screw Guns’. Both these forts lacked an ideal situation as they were dominated by observation from high ground; Fort Lockhart form Sartop and Saragarhi and Fort Gulistan from both sides of its saddle. Both forts should have occupied higher ground; their unfavourable situation was due to problems of logistics rather than best tactics. Saragarhi was critically important to the larger forts for without it they would have no way of communicating with each other than with patrols.+

Fort Saragarhi was located very suitably on top of the highest feature in that area that had four spurs emanating from it. The East Spur- a broad ridge descended gradually towards Fort Lockhart; the West Spur- a relatively narrow ridge dropped sharply down and which then eased into the saddle of Fort Gulistan; the North-West Spur which left the Saragarhi top with a cliff like descent but broadened into an elephants foot and the North Spur- another broad ridge initially sloped steeply down and which then flattened into Khanki Valley. The West Spur and North West Spur enclosed a cliff four hundred yards long in the shape of a horseshoe and the fort sat atop the centre of this cliff with its additional twelve-foot-high wall. The East, North and North West Spur merged a little north of Saragarhi. Although the wall of the fort atop the cliff did not have loop holes to effect rifle fire however the other three sides of the fort walls had embrasures or rifle ports that were useful to fire from. They however restricted visibility and were targets for opposing volley or sniper fire. As the top of the feature was bare, fields of fire were clear but for several outcrops of limestone rocks that could shield attackers. Range cards with appropriately measured ranges to these danger spots would of course have been made but the onset of darkness would present greater danger.+

For an attacker, the North, East and West Spurs gave suitable approaches to Saragarhi and perhaps the best being from the broad East Spur. The disadvantages of an attacker approaching Saragarhi from the East Spur however were a likely intervention by a patrol from Fort Lockhart and the fact that most of the firing ports would be facing the most obvious approach. An approach from the West Spur had the disadvantages of interference from Fort Gulistan and the fort would would have to be taken in stages from room to room from south to north.

From the North Spur there was no fear of intervention from either of the larger forts but again the fort would have to be taken room by room from north to south. From the cliff the only hope was to clamber up the cliff and then scale the wall, a difficult choice especially if faced by an alert sentry. The North-West Spur had the least potential for a launching a massed attack. The East, North and North West Spurs provided the attacker with the potential of concentration of force and if there were a very large body of attackers stuffed up to their eyeballs with religious fanaticism, it was possible to attack the fort through all feasible approaches in a rush while taking the precaution to position snipers to discourage intervention from Fort Lockhart or Fort Gulistan.

Such a fanatical "opium and religion" inspired impulse would entail large casualties and its success would break communications between the larger forts, enabling domination by observation over them and at leisure, allow an assault on either one or both. It is obvious that the key to the defence of Samana Ridge in this area of the three forts was the capture of Saragarhi and the wily Pathan horde, seemingly with a loose federated leadership, was to turn the key. They were masters at skirmishing and mountain warfare and knew that the capture of important high ground would lead to success.+

36th SIKHS

The 36th Regiment (Sikhs) was raised at its Depot at Jalandhar, comprising Jat Sikhs from the Trans Sutlej, under a Special Army Order dated 23rd March 1887. From then to now, it has remained on active service as first, the 36th Sikhs, then in the reorganisation of 1922 as the 4th battalion of the 11th Sikh regiment, and finally to its present designation in 1950, as the 4 battalion of The Sikh Regiment.

The nucleus of the regiment came from 20 regiments, comprising 1 Subedar, 9 Jamedars, 25 Havaldars, 26 Naiks and 164 Sepoys- totalling 226 men. The 14th Sikhs contributed the most to this raising, with 1 Subedar, 1 Jemadar (today called a Naib Subedar), 5 Havaldars, 4 Naiks and 44 sepoys, totalling 55. The subsequent recruitment drive started on 1st May 1887, and was carried out by seven officers in Amritsar, Ferozpur, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar, Lahore, Ludhiana, Nabha and Patiala. This drive resulted in the enlistment of 685 men from the period 1st May 1887 to 1st January 1888. Of these 462 were from the region south of the river Sutlej, and 223 were from the Trans Sutlej area. The maximum number of these -177 in number- came from Ludhiana, with Patiala at 152. Seven officers were a a saengli or the regiment: The Commandant Lt Col J. Cook, Major T.J. Thornson, Captains H.R.L. Holmes and J.F Worlledge, along with 3 Lieutenants, W.D. Gordon, C.E. Johnson and C.E.H. Erskine.+

Having completed its raising to its full establishment of 952 (all ranks), and having successfully completed its training, the 36th moved to Delhi, reaching there in March 1891 to relieve the 33 BNI. Soon after its arrival, it was ordered to Manipur to deal with trouble that had arisen there. After successfully completing its task, it returned to Delhi where, on the retirement of Lt Col Cook on 25 June 1894, the 42- year-old Lt Colonel John Haughton, with 23 years of service under his belt, assumed command of the 36 Sikhs. The regiment was then ordered to Bannu in the NWFP, from where they were sent to Peshawar, reaching there in April 1895. From Peshawar, the regiment was ordered to Kohat, reaching there on 19 December 1895, where they remained till 30th December 1895.

The regiment was now divided in two. On 31st December 1896, the HQs and the Right Wing, comprising of 5 companies reached Fort Lockhart (Mastan) and on 2nd January 1897 detachments were sent to piquets at Daar, Sangar, Crag, Sartope, Saragarhi and to Fort Gulistan (Cavagnari). The Left Wing of 3 companies under Capt. W.B. Gordon arrived at Perachmar on 8th January 1897, leaving detachments at That and Sadda.

The division of the Right Wing, which was sent to various forts and piquets along the crest of the Samana ridge line, comprising 6 officers, 7 Indian officers, and 500 NCOs and men, was as follows:

a. Fort Gulistan: 4 officers including the RMO Major Des Voex, 2/Lt Pratt, Surgeon Capt Prall and Lt Blair, 2 Indian officers, Subedar Diwan Singh and Jemadar Jwala Singh, both of whom had come from the 15th Sikhs, having taken part with the 15th in the Afghanistan campaign in 1878-79, and in the battles of Ali Masjid, Tofrek and at Suakin in 1885. There were 150 NCOs and men.

b. Fort Lockhart: 2 British officers - the CO Lt Col John Haughton and his Adjutant Lt Munn, plus 2 attached British officers-Lt. Lillie of The Royal Irish Rifles and Lt. Haslam of the Royal Engineers, and 168 NCOs and men.

c. Crag: 1 NCO and 20 men.
d. Sartope: 1 NCO and 20 men
e. Saragarhi: 1 NCO, 20 men and 1 NCE
f. Sangar: 1 NCO and 44 men
g. Daar: 1 Indian Officer, and 37 NCOs and men

In addition to these seven forts and posts held by the 36th, there were four posts-Lakka, Tsalai, Gogra and Saifuldarra—held by the tribal border police. All these 11 forts were on the ridge line of Samana Range, except for Saifuldara, which was close to the right bank of the Khanki River. From January to August 1897, the regiment settled down to regular garrison life with regular patrolling.+

The Build-Up to the Battle of Samana

On 25th August 1897, information came that the Orakzais were concentrating near the tri-junction of the Chagru, Sampagha and Khanki valleys. The numbers were in the region of 12,000 men. On 27th August 1897, this force made a general attack along the entire ridge and the police posts at Lakka and Saifuldara were captured and destroyed. The lashkar then invaded Fort Gulistan. Before that could happen, however, Colonel Haughton left Lockhart with two officers and 132 men to reinforce Gulistan. In the meantime, l Maj Des Voeux moved out of Gulistan with his force, in a reconnaissance towards Samana Suk. On reaching and seeing the large numbers arrayed against him, he fell back on Gulistan. To check this force, the Colonel sent Lieutenants Munn, Blair and half a company to 'piquet hill, which was about three to four hundred yards west of Gulistan. The object was to engage and delay the lashkar till the reinforcements expected from Hangu arrived, with the Gulistan defences getting further strengthened in the meantime. While holding the enemy, Lt Blair was shot in the chest after which the force was recalled to the fort. Lt Blair survived his wound.+

By this time, the Colonel had received news of an attack on the Eastern end of the range. He immediately sent half the troops he had brought with him that morning back to Lockhart. Later in the evening when the lashkar withdrew he once again reconnoitered to Samana Suk, which was now clear, but he could see that the enemy had occupied Chagru Kotal. On the morning of 28th August 1897, Colonel Haughton returned to Lockhart were he was informed that the remaining two forts with the tribal Khyber police-Gogra and Tsalai- had been abandoned by the defenders.+

On 28th August 1897, the Sangar and Daar piquets were also threatened by the Orakzais. All was quiet until 3rd September 1897, although the Orakzais kept milling around in the general area. On the 3rd, an Afridi Jirga had assembled at Bagh, where a decision was taken to support the Orakzais in their attack on the Samana forts. Gulistan was once again attacked on this day. Advance news of the impending attack reached Lockhart, and the Colonel once again took a small reinforcement to strengthen the garrison there.

On arrival, he found that the Orakzais had established a considerable force. He came under fire, but reached the safety of the fort unscathed. On the way, he noticed that the enemy had established position from an area between 200 to 400 yards from the fort walls, and was told that the enemy had on three occasions, set fire to the grass, shrub and thorn abattis (cut thorn bushes laid on a stone wall to prevent easy entry, much like barbed wire used today), which had been built around the fort. Each time this happened, a sortie of the garrison had to go out under protective fire to extinguish them. Two unarmed sepoys, Sunder Singh and Harnam Singh, particularly distinguished themselves, putting out the flames while being themselves under fire from close quarters, miraculously escaping death or injury. Expecting an attack that night, Major Des Voeux called for volunteers to set fire to a large pile of wood a hundred yards from the fort, which had been previously established to light up the frontage. Sepoys Wariam Singh and Gulab Singh volunteered, leaped over the wall while under fire, and managed to light the pile on their way back, without being hit--the second miracle of the day.+

After having put the fort in the line of fire all night from the upper reaches of the ridge, the Orakzais withdrew at the dawn of 4th September 1897. Colonel Haughton now returned to Lockhart. The same night, Gulistan again came under fire, wounding many of the garrison, including men who were hit when they went out to douse a fire set by the Orakzais by lighting a surrounding hedge in a clear attempt to burn down the fort.

The forts of Gulistan, Daar and Sangar continued to be molested, particularly when water parties went out. At Sangar, a Bhisti (water carrier) who had gone out on his own to get water for the post, was ambushed. When a patrol went out later to look for him, they found him badly tortured, mutilated and burnt to death. Similarly, two cooks from Gulistan who had gone out without an escort to gather wood for their fires were found dead, also having been badly mutilated and burnt.+

On 7th September 1897, Maj Gen Yeatman-Biggs collected a force at Hangu of 2,500 troops to carry supplies to the Samana forts which had by now been reduced to half the required rations. He reached Lockhart on 8th September 1897 and camped there, sending his sappers (engineers, in those days refered to as sappers and miners) to Gulistan to repair and strengthen its defences. On 9th September 1897, a reconnaissance was undertaken up to Samana Suk, and it was found that a strong force of Orakzais and Afridis had combined and assembled near Khangarbur, at the junction of the Sampagha and Khanki valleys. Twenty nine standards were counted and the lashkar was estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000 tribesman.

On 10th September 1897, more contingents of Afridis arrived. On the evening of the 10th, the engineers, having completed their work at Gulistan, rejoined their contingent at Lockhart. On 11th September 1897, information reached the General, that a large lashkar was moving eastward down Khanki Valley. Apprehending an attack on the Kohat-Hangu road, he marched his column eastward along the Samana crest. After fighting a rear- guard action in the evening, he was forced to return to Hangu that night as his water supply had run out. The return of the General's column to Hangu gave the tribesman heart and they returned to their task of reducing the Samana forts. The General remained at Hangu on 12th and 13th September, ready to move in any required direction. Finally, on 12th September 1897, the forts of Gulistan, Saraghari, Sangar and Daar were attacked by a combined force of Afridi and Orakazai lashkars.

The story of the attack and defence of the Samana forts must now be told.+

Saragarhi— The Lay of the Land, and the Fort

While General Yeatman-Biggs continued to be in readiness at Hangu, a most gallant action came to be fought at Saragarhi, the small communication post on Samana Ridge, between forts Lockhart and Gulistan. But first, we must understand the lay of the land and the defences of this small but now historic post.

Saragarhi, as seen in the only photograph that exists of it and taken from Fort Lockhart before the action, is built at the edge of a spur, which drops sharply into Kurram Valley 3,000 feet below, and through which Miranzai River flows. This is to the South. To the West, though there are cliffs, there exists an open approach to the post complex, extending to about 30 yards, which can be reached over broken ground from the North-West direction. Towards the North lay the main block, which housed the troops. The entrance to the complex was in the East wall and comprised of a thin wooden door, strengthened with iron strips and bolts. The main approach adopted by any attacking force to the complex would be from the North; however, both the Western and Eastern walls could also be attacked in a flanking move.+

The ground favoured the attacker as it was undulating and there was sufficient broken ground for a covered approach. The terrain had a gentle slope downward from the North, till it reached the main block house, and as explained earlier, it provided a covered approach to the piquet. There was a maximum of a 30 yard clear field of fire available to the defenders. The terrain was covered with small shrub and dry grass. It was now autumn, and with the Samana Range being out of the monsoon belt coupled with the scanty rain during this period, the grass had ripened early and was already dry.+

The original plan of the block house, the living quarters of the garrison, exists today with the Pakhtunkhwa authorities, a copy of which was brought back by late Lt Gen KS Randhawa during one of his two visits to Saraghari. His first visit was on the 100th year of the battle in 1997, and the second visit in 1998. The plan shows the interior layout of the main block house, with the door opening towards the West; it was subsequently however modified to the door opening to the East, with a latrine building, a cook house and a water storage tank behind it. To the East of the complex, but within it, lay a solitary tree on this spur. Loopholes were built in on all three sides, four feet above the firing steps. The loopholes were large enough to permit a rifle to fire through it, but with a restricted vision. The reason was obvious--the pathans were superb marksmen and a larger loophole would have made the defender an easy target. On the flip side, however, this restricted the view of the defender. The height of the wall was about 14 feet and the fortress had a capacity to house one officer and 30 men.+

The Men of Saragarhi

Having gone over the general outline of the defence of Saragarhi, it would be more appropriate now to discuss, in greater detail, the gallant men who were responsible for building and maintaining the defence.

The Commander of this post was Havaldar Ishar Singh. A 42-year-old soldier, he probably came to the 36th in the year 1887, when the regiment was raised from the 14th Sikhs. In a pencil sketch, he is seen wearing a single black ‘Chakri’ on the front of his turban, which was the badge worn only by the 14th and 15th Sikhs when in field dress. In fact, the 15th (2 Sikh) wears it to this day. It is also recorded that the 15th had not sent any of its NCOs to join the 36th on its raising, while the 14th had sent 1 Subedar, 5 Havaldars and 4 Naik. Havaldar Ishar Singh was, therefore, probably, from the 14th.+

Usually when such postings are made the unit sending men to new raisings either send NCOs who they feel would stand a better chance of promotion to Indian officers than in their own unit because of stagnation, or simply to get rid of dead wood. It was common occurrence to find that the slow move up the ladder of the command in units caused outstanding junior command material to fall by the wayside, which is perhaps why Havladar Ishar Singh ended up in the 36th. Even after 10 years of service in the 36th, Ishar Singh had been passed over for promotion and being already 42 years old, would have retired soon. Though his personal service record is not available, he was probably an NCO who had the requisite leadership quality to be given the independent command of such an essential post- especially considering that war was imminent. While he will always be remembered for his gallant conduct at Saragarhi, within the regiment they will also rue the loss of their best illicit liquor producer and a man who ‘borrowed’ meat on hoof for his men, when short of rations, from a neighbouring unit without asking them! Maj Gen James Lunt of the British Army, in his narrative of Saraghari, sums up Ishar Singh as follows:

“His subsequent career in the 36th Sikhs had not been one of unqualified success, because Ishar Singh was a somewhat turbulent character whose independent nature had brought him more than once into conflict with his military superiors. Thus Ishar Singh- in camp a nuisance, in the field magnificent.”+

His second-in-command, Naik Lal Singh, was three years older than him. The other men under his command were all young soldiers in their upper teens or early twenties. Only four were married. Naik Lal Singh had a daughter who had died young, while Ishar Singh had no children. Two of the men, Sepoys Jiwan Singh and Hira Singh, had a son and daughter respectively. One interesting facet of the regiment was that at a time when most soldiers were illiterate there was one literate solider- 23-year-old Sepoy Gurmukh Singh, who was on attachment from the regiment's signals platoon. The only NCE (Non-Combatant Enrolled) with them was “Sep/Swpr” Dad. He may have been recruited as a sweeper in an existing vacancy, but was more likely a cook, as someone had to cook for the garrison. Water was stored in a large tank, and therefore a ‘Bhisti’ was not required. The latrine on the edge of the cliff would have had an inbuilt shute, as no deep trench latrines could be dug in that rocky terrain, which, in turn, scored out the need for a sweeper.+

The Battle of Saragarhi

12 September 1897 started off as a glorious day. The weather was clear and the morning was crisp. The autumn sun was out in its full glory. The men at Saragarhi having finished their breakfast were cleaning their weapons and carrying out the dozens of odd tasks a small garrison would be required to do. It is difficult to put together a minute-by-minute account of the battle, which lasted 6 hours and 45 minutes, and left no survivors. To piece together the details of the battle, I have relied on the regular communication recorded in various accounts between signaller Gurmukh Singh and Fort Lockhart, although, sadly today the battalion (4th Sikhs) has neither the original nor a copy of this signals log. The final moments have been put together from Afridi and Orakzai sources, who were questioned after the peace treaty was concluded with them in January of 1898.+

At around 8 a.m on the fateful day, the sentry on duty reported that a large lashkar of tribals under around a dozen flags was marching towards the fort from the North. (This is how the tribal numbers were assumed in various accounts--anywhere between 8,000 and 14,000. However, as the strength was assumed at a thousand per standard, these lashkars could be anywhere from 30 to a thousand in number. The standards did not represent strength, but participation by the various tribes or sub tribes in that battle. The 36th Sikh Digest of Service puts the strength at 8,000).+

Ishar Singh ordered the garrison to ‘stand to’ at their loopholed positions on top of the main block. The sentry was withdrawn and the door locked. Ishar Singh ordered Gurmukh Singh to report the situation to Fort Lockhart with a request for instructions. Col Haughton’s response was a cryptic ‘hold your position’. Within an hour, the fortress had been surrounded from the three open sides and an Orakzai emissary approached the fort under a white flag. He called out that they had no cause to harm them, their fight was with the British, and that they would give them unmolested passage to leave. As Major General James Lunt of the British Army, in his narrative of the battle, says:

“At first the chiefs came forward to offer surrender on easy terms. Ishar Singh’s reply delivered in Pushtu, the language of the frontier was as uncompromising as it was obscene.”

This curt reply caused offence in the Orakzai ranks and the emissary was ordered to immediately return. The tribals took up position in the broken ground or behind rocks, and opened fire at around 9 a.m. Ishar Singh ordered his platoon to take position and to return the fire. Gurmukh Singh remained in the signaling tower, relaying the battle to Lockhart. The carrier of these to and fro messages was Sep/Swpr Dad.+

The platoon was armed with the Martini Henry single shot breach loading .303 rifles and each man had 400 rounds - 100 in his pouches and 300 in the platoon reserve. As any soldier knows, a 30 yard field of fire is very limited, but with excessive fire power at their disposal, which would have been a boon, it became a very effective killing ground. However, with thousands of pathans aiming at their loopholes with just 21 rifles, they were soon out-gunned and had to resort to snap shooting to avoid being hit through them. Nevertheless, their training and resilience came to the fore and very soon the pathans felt the heat as the Sikh fire continued unabated. They had, in the first few minutes, lost 60 men, while the platoon, by 11 a.m. had lost one Sepoy Bhagwan Singh with Naik Lal Singh being seriously injured.+

A northerly wind then came to the Pathans’ aid. They set the grass on fire and saw the flames sweeping towards the forward block house where the men were manning their loopholes. Under the cover of this smoke screen, the Pathans rushed the fortress, only to be stopped in their tracks by a continuous volley fire, forcing them to pull back. In the meantime, Sikh casualties continued to mount losing Sepoy Boota Singh and then soon after, Sepoy Sunder Singh.+

Signaller Gurmukh Singh, who was constantly in communication with Col Haughton, informed him that the Pathans were forming up for another attack and that their ammunition was running low. The Colonel’s answer was to control their fire to conserve ammunition and that he would try to get reinforcements and ammunition through to them. By 12 noon, when the Pathans made the second assault the burning grass which earlier provided them cover with its smoke, had disappeared. However, the Pathans resorted to tying bundles of grass (brought up from their rear), lighting them, and throwing them forward to provide the requisite smoke. The second attack was also beaten back by determined volley fire.+

At Lockhart, Col Haughton, aware of the predicament his men were in first organised a fire support group of the Royal Irish Rifles. These were men from the RIR who were ill, and had been left behind in the Lockhart hospital by their regiment when it moved. An officer, Lt Lillie, was also left behind to look after them. The RIR group, about 13 in all, made their way forward, but soon realised that with the numbers they had in front of them, even volley fire at a thousand yards had no impact. Any closer, and the Pathan snipers would have dealt with them by firing from their long barreled Jezails and the stolen Lee Metfords. The support party soon returned to the Fort.+

While this was going on, two Pathans managed to work their way towards the right forward corner of the main block. This was dead ground with the narrow loop holes facing forward on the main block, and the left corner loop holes on the right wall. Taking out their curved sharp knives, they began to remove the mud mortar between the lower stones from the base of the wall. Up to the plinth, cement had been used (visible to this day), while above it was mud mortar. Major Des Voeux, commanding Fort Gulistan, saw what was happening and tried to signal Saragarhi to inform them of the development. However, Gurmukh Singh, intent on his communication with Fort Lockhart, did not see these signals, which were further obscured by the smoke laid by the Pathans.+

In the meantime, Ishar Singh, on being informed of the sound of the demolition attempt being resorted to by the Pathans ordered four of his men to move down into the main hall of the block house, while he continued to control his fire on top. Soon, the lower rocks in the wall came free. Part of the corner wall above this initial dislodgement collapsed, creating a seven-foot breach in the corner. This was dutifully conveyed to Lockhart, even as three of the Sepoys posted with Lance Naik Chand Singh in the main block were killed. They were identified as Sahib Singh, Jiwan Singh and Daya Singh. With the Lance Naik left alone, Ishar Singh and the remaining members of the garrison decided to leave their loop-holded defences to join him in the main block house. They were ordered to fix bayonets, and any Pathan entering the breach was shot or bayoneted. With the men no longer at their loop holes, the Pathans rushed both sides of the complex, put up scaling ladders, and soon surrounded it. The battle in the block house is now a matter of conjecture, because Gurmukh Singh had sent a final signal informing the Colonel of their predicament--the collapse of the wall, the burning of the door, and of Ishar Singh’s action. Despite the thousands of Pathans milling around in the vicinity of Saragarhi, the Colonel moved 78 soldiers from his 36th to assist his men by firing from a distance closer than the RIR had done. While just 500 yards away from the fort, he saw the Pathans scaling the walls and the wooden door on fire. He knew then that Saragahri had fallen.+

(Saragarhi on 14th September 1897, two days after the battle, showing the door in the left wall and the collapsed left corner, through which the tribals entered the fort.)

By this time, Gurmukh Singh had sent his last message--that the Pathans were in the main block--and asked for permission to stop signaling and pick up his rifle. The Colonel sent him his last message too, permitting him to do so. Calmly, Gurmukh Singh dismantled and packed his helio, and placed it in the corner of his signaling tower (it was later found charred but in the corner as he had left it).

He picked up his rifle and joined his platoon in the main hall. Casualties had since mounted. Ishar Singh and most of the garrison were dead. So were dozens of pathans, whose bodies could be seen strewn in the breach, within the block house, in the burnt entrance door, as well as in the administrative area behind them. Naik Lal Singh, though severely injured, was lying on his bed. Although unable to move, he was conscious and able to fire his weapon, and is reported to have kept up a steady fire, killing more Pathans, as did Gurmukh Singh and Sep/Swpr Dad.+

Prohibited from taking up arms, (as NCEs in the Indian Army were not permitted to do so until after the Bangladesh war of 1971- though an NCE of this very battalion was awarded an IDSM during World War 2), Dad earlier looked after the wounded, besides carrying messages to and from the signaller, in addition to breaking open ammunition boxes, and taking the ammunition up to the troops who were at their loop holes. Now that the end was near, he picked up a rifle and is reported to have effectively used it to shoot and bayonet five Pathans before falling. The last we are told is that one man, possibly Gurmukh Singh, who is supposed to have withdrawn into the rear sleeping quarters, took up position there, killing 20 men. To avoid further casualties, the Pathans set on fire the building, which had wooden rafters. The last of the 36th at Saragarhi, it seemed, preferred death by fire rather than surrender. The rafters holding up the roof soon caught fire, and the Saragarhi fortress main block ceased to exist.+

On 14th September, the 9th Mountain Battery from Kohat arrived, and the Pathans who were still around Saragarhi were shelled. The ridge was then cleared by the infantry, and the fortress retaken. Naik Lal Singh, who was last seen firing from his sick bed, was found dead and badly mutilated, as had been the other bodies, including that of Dad. This was perhaps the Pathan venting his frustration. The Pathan sources put their Saragarhi casualty figures at 180-200 dead and around 600 wounded. The whole attack had been visible to the garrisons at forts Lockhart and Gulistan, but the enemy were in such overwhelming numbers that it was quite impossible to do anything to save the situation.+