Thread by @Maverickmusafir

India-Pakistan delineation teams headed by Lt Gen Premindra Singh Bhagat, PVSM, VC and Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan, SPK, SQA, met at Wagah and Suchetgarh to demarcate the Line of Control of J&K along the entire length on the map, in accordance to the Shimla Agreement.

Pakistani troops laid down their arms and surrendered to India for secession of East Pakistan as the new nation of Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto met in Shimla to wrap up outstanding issues and after a prolonged negotiation, Shimla Agreement was signed in July 1972.+

The Agreement called for the disengagement of troops on either side of the international border to be completed within 30 days of its coming into force. In the case of J&K, Cease Fire Line would henceforth be known as the Line of Control (LOC). The troops would remain on the LOC resulting from the cease fire of 17 December 1971. This being the case, the LOC had actually to be delineated on the ground, detailed maps had to be prepared, conflicting claims resolved.

Despite having an upper hand, India failed in getting a formal sign-off by Bhutto to recognise this as an international border. Nor did we seek a permanent solution to the Kashmir issue.+

A high-powered team was appointed by both sides. Lt Gen P.S. Bhagat, PVSM, VC, was named as the representative of the Chief of Army Staff, India. On the team also were Maj Gen M.R. Rajwade, VSM, MC, his Chief of Staff; Maj Gen I.S. Gill, PVSM,MC, Director of Military Operations, Army Headquarters. All three were veterans of World War II, highly decorated soldiers. The other members were Col C.M. Sahni, Lt Col M.S. Chehal, VSM and Lt Col B.M. Tewari.

The Pakistani team was led by Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan, SPK, SQA with Brig S.M. Abbasi, Col Mahmud Shaukat, Col Syed Refaqat, TQA; Lt Col M.M. Afsal Khan and Lt Col Ahmad Saeed.+

The basic terms of reference were paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Shimla Agreement:

*Para 4: In order to initiate the process of establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that—

•Indian and Pakistani forces shall withdraw to their sides of the international border.

•In J&K, the Line of Control resulting from the Cease Fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual difference and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

•The withdrawal shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed in a period of 30 days thence.+

*Para 5: This agreement will be subject to ratification by both the countries in accordance with the respective constitutional procedures and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Interpretation of the meaning of both paras, and the intention behind them, became the subject of controversy which delayed considerably the delineation of the Line of Control. No political directions were given to the Chief of Army Staff.+

The guidelines given to Lt Gen P.S. Bhagat were in the form of a briefing by the Chief in which general broad directions of giving away the barest minimum territory and the retention of specific areas of interest were highlighted.

The special instructions given were firstly, that there was to be no reference, or mention direct or indirect of the 1949 Cease Fire Line. Secondly, a Line of Control 'through-out' its entire length in J&K was to be delineated.+

The area was divided into three sectors. The guidelines to the Sector Commanders were to approach the problem in a spirit of cooperation and mutual accommodation in the context:

•Where the date of occupation was questioned, Sector commanders would attempt to delineate based on actual position of troops on the ground.

•While delineating, wherever possible, the interests of the civilian population would be borne in mind.

•The reconciliation of claims, where they overlapped or varied, would be done on the basis of the position actually held by both sides. The Line of Control would be approved midway between the two and where possible based on natural features such as nullahs, depressions, saddles and so on. The Sector Commanders were thus required to determine the actual position on the ground. This was to be confirmed by the Senior Military Commanders and then Surveyors were ordered to carry out delineation.+

A total of 12 surveyors carried out this task under the Deputy Director Military Survey.

The first meeting was at Suchetgarh (India) on 10 August, 1972, followed by a series of meetings held on either side of border till the signing of the delineation documents on 11 December 1972. As pointed out earlier, the agreement was worded in such generalities that each side could interpret it to suit its own interests. (Interpretation and intention of both paras became the subject of controversy and delayed the delineation)+

To further discuss the losses and gains, ups and downs, of seemingly irreconcilable opposing stands, I will quote an excerpt from “India’s Wars Since Independence” by Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh:

“Because of this vagueness, the delineation proceedings between the two military commanders got stuck even before they started, necessitating the official level meeting within 20 days of the ratification of the agreement.

Meanwhile, from the time of the ceasefire, there were alleged violations along the line of control with the aim of improving the respective defensive posture of each side and generally to keep the line disturbed.+

There were 10 meetings between Gen Bhagat and Gen Hamid Khan between 10 August and 7 December 1972, when the line of control was finally delineated. The differences which stalled the proceedings for almost four months were broadly of four kinds:

1• They concerned discrepancies in areas claimed to have been lost or gained by either side up to the ceasefire of 17 December, and these could be reconciled easily between the local commanders on the given guideline and did not present much of a problem.

2•There was the question of territories annexed after the ceasefire, like that of the capture of the Kayan posts by Pakistan on 5 May. Pakistan contended that India was also guilty of such acts at various places and the whole question should be dealt with on equitable terms. The issue was resolved by Pakistan’s vacating the posts and parts of the Tarkundi forest in the Rajauri sector, with some adjustments on the Indian side.+

3•Pakistan claimed 12 small pockets of de facto control covering about nine square miles. It argued that although these areas lay on the Indian side of the erstwhile ceasefire line they had been under the administrative control of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir almost from 1949. These areas generally lay in narrow valleys between spurs jutting out of the main ridges held by Indian posts towards Pakistan-occupied territory. The difficult terrain, the lack of accessibility to the Indian rear areas, and the general fear of passing through minefields and forward posts, led the local population to lean on Pakistan for their subsistence.

The delineation embraced the changes brought about as a result of war and did not cater for administrative encroachments. But a verification proved the Pakistan claims to be on the whole correct. As such, de facto control of areas up to six square miles were conceded after a ground survey. +

Finally, there was the vital problem of interpreting the international border as applicable to Jammu district. Pakistan accepted the existing border between the Ravi and the Chenab as this suited its interests since the larger part of the occupied territory in Chicken’s Neck and the Shakargarh bulge lay in the region. But it contested the international border west of the Chenab as part of the ceasefire line. The line of 1949 ran well west of Manawar Tawi till it joined the international border running east to west near Moel village.+

The conflict of 1965 had brought the Pakistani occupation as deep as Jaurian village, but the status quo ante was restored under the Tashkent Agreement. The 1971 conflict resulted in extending the Pakistani occupation right up to Manawar Tawi and the village of Thako Chak lying on the Indian side of the border between the narrow strip covering the confluence of Manawar Tawi and the Chenab. The Pakistan representative insisted that Thako Chak, a hamlet, should be treated as lying across the line of control and not on the basis of the border. +

The question at stake was not the possession of this village but the basic principle of delineation, whether the border west of the Chenab was to be treated differently from that east of the river and why this should be so?

The Indian representative insisted that the sanctity of the border had to be maintained equally on both sides of the Chenab. As a result, the talks were deadlocked and stretched to the first week of December. +

Troop withdrawal, scheduled to be completed by 20 September as agreed at the officials’ meeting, was delayed till the delineation was completed, although supposedly delinked from this process. It was unwise in the first instance not to link the withdrawal of troops with delineation as India had no other bargaining lever to secure its interest. Why this was not done in the first instance is difficult to understand. Despite the restive refugee problem Bhutto was sticking to his guns. He said the question was not who should gain control of a tiny village but whether “we are to give up territory without a consideration. This we can’t do. India is the larger & powerful country. It is up to India to give some territory, or at least compensate us, if we give up something. It has big border. Surely, it can make adjustment.”+

As for the rest of the normalization process, he boasted that China had vetoed the admission of Bangladesh to the UN the previous September at Pakistan’s bidding. Mrs Gandhi, on the other hand, hoped that a special effort would be made in Pakistan to view the problem of delineation “in the larger perspective of the immense benefit which would accrue to our people.” She regretted that Pakistan’s military representative “apparently regard India’s withdrawal from Pakistan’s territories as of lesser consequence than the dispute they have raised.”+

The Army Chief, General Sam Manekshaw, who should have retired in April 1972, had been given an extension of service, to settle matters related to territories captured during the war and the settlement issue of 93,000 POWs.

When the discussions between senior military commanders came to a deadlock it was decided that the two Army Chiefs would meet and sort things out. Gen Manekshaw flew to Lahore accompanied by the DMO, Maj Gen I.S. Gill, his staff officer and MA. He brought along two Pakistani POW Air Force officers to be released as a gesture of goodwill by the Indian Government.+

General Manekshaw was received at Lahore airport by General Tikka Khan, Pakistan’s Army Chief, his son and aide, Captain Khalid Khan and senior Pakistan Army officers. The atmosphere was tense and frosty, and the talks held at Corps HQ on 28 November failed.+

The Shimla Agreement had urged in Paragraph 4 Part (1) withdrawal forces by both countries to “the international border in the interest of durable peace”. The question was that of determining the international border so far as it concerned Jammu and Kashmir.+

The Pakistani toehold of the tiny village of Thako Chak in Jammu district, covering an area of 3.5 square kilometres; could not be treated any differently from the portion of the border between the Ravi and the Chenab. It was a question of principle.

Bhutto insisted that Pakistan would in no circumstances accept the Indian stand that the line separating Jammu from the Punjab province of Pakistan was an international border. He asserted that “India was insisting on acceptance of its stand to undermine the position taken by Pakistan that the whole of Kashmir was disputed territory.”+

It was amazing that while he had conceded the same border as international between the Chenab and the Ravi, since this involved Indian withdrawals from the Pakistani territories of Chicken’s Neck and the Shakargarh bulge, he was not prepared to yield a small village.

After a stalemate of about ten days, the Pakistani side suggested another meeting of the two Chiefs, and this was held at Lahore for the second time on 7 December. The deadlock persisted throughout the day until Manekshaw tabled a proposal. India would abandon its claim to the two villages of Dhum and Ghilkot measuring 1.16 square kilometres. These villages were surrounded on three sides by Pakistan and presented a challenge to hold.+

General Tikka Khan at last accepted the Indian stand that Thako Chak formed part of the international border as determined after 1949 and agreed to forgo their claim. It was agreed that Pakistani troops should withdraw from Thako Chak, in return Indian side compensated for the loss.+

On 11 December 1972, the two military commanders of India and Pakistan, Lt Gen Premindra Singh Bhagat and Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan met for the tenth and last time at Suchetgarh and jointly signed 19 maps delineating the Line of Control from Chhamb to Tartok. Signing maps and their exchange signified completion of this phase of the Simla Agreement.+

This delineation was approved by both governments almost the next day and the stage was now set for withdrawal of troops.+

A period of five days was allotted to complete adjustments along the line of control and formulate the other modalities of withdrawal from Pakistan-occupied territories. On completion of adjustments in the line of control both sides withdrew from the occupied territories to restore the status quo ante on the international border finally on 20 December 1972.+

By 17 December, adjustment of ground positions of both sides along the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir had been completed with the exception of a few positions in the northern areas, where it was held up because of heavy snows.

The adjustment of these positions was to be carried out when the snows melted. These positions were mostly in the Gurais and Tartok sectors. Along the line of control, Pakistani troops withdrew from the Lipa valley, occupied by them after the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. India ceded the villages of Dhum and Ghikot in the Uri sector in return for Thako Chak. Along the international border, we gave up Chicken’s Neck and pulled out of the Shakargarh bulge, where there were 332 villages covering 1380 sq kms.+

Withdrawal of troops on both sides in the Dera Baba Nanak, Arnritsar, Khalra, Khemkaran, Hussainiwala and Fazilka sectors had also been completed on 21 December. In the desert, Indian troops withdrew from some 10,000 square kilometres of occupied territory in Sindh province.+

On 21 December 1972, the Army Chiefs reported to their respective governments that their forces had withdrawn to their sides in conformity with the Shimla Agreement.

(Sources:

•Lt Gen P.S. Bhagat: A Biography, by Mathew Thomas, Jasjit Mansingh
•Born to Dare: The Life of Lt Gen Inderjit Singh Gill, PVSM, MC by S. Muthiah
•India’s Wars Since Independence by Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh
•Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: The Man and His Times by Behram M Panthaki and Zenobia Panthaki
•India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007: A Documentary Study by Avtar Singh Bhasin)