To give some context, here are the contents of an initial Snowden leak from September 2013. Cavium was a leading manufacturer of cryptographic co-processors for VPN devices at that time. archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.co…
Just to give a sense of how important these chips are to VPN security (and without making any specific claims about this hardware) here’s the FIPS security policy for Cisco’s ASA crypto module, showing how much crypto the Cavium Nitrox chip implements. csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/pro…
Typically these chips would directly write Diffie-Hellman secret keys into memory using their internal RNG. It would be fascinating to see a detailed reverse-engineering of some of those older co-processors from the time period.
The formal name for this stuff is “algorithm substitution attacks.” Basically, you replace a cryptographic algorithm with a different one that “looks the same” from the outside, but contains a trapdoor for the NSA to exploit.
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I’m just catching up on Web Integrity but it looks really concerning. Basically adds DRM to your browser so only approved browsers can access certain sites.
What worries me about this is that the web is currently one of the only open alternatives to the app stores. Closing it down (even if there are benefits) seems like it will make government control a lot easier.
I feel like in the past this would be the point that a bunch of Chrome engineers come out of the woodwork and tell me I’m wrong, that actually this is great for security and won’t harm the open web at all. So I’ll pause and see what happens.
Too much timing data is available even from encrypted messaging apps, when a passive adversary surveills the network links for a whole country. It might be smart to add some kind of delayed delivery feature. nytimes.com/2023/07/03/tec…
This paper looked at Signal’s Sealed Sender back in ‘21 and showed that you could recover sender/recipient information after seeing a few (encrypted) messages, because of things like delivery receipts. No idea if there’s a fix for this. https://t.co/WJLP2mN3CMndss-symposium.org/wp-content/upl…
Hiding metadata likes message delivery timing is in general very hard: but we seem to live in this threat model, maybe it’s time to think about what apps can do here.
The EU Council is continuing to debate a law that would require communication providers to scan all communications, potentially including end-to-end encrypted conversations. And they are now debating including audio conversations as well.
It’s not clear to me precisely what content scanning for audio conversations would entail, but it seems to involve some kind of AI system routinely listening to your phone conversations.
Just in case you’re not aware, this is a real thing that’s happening right now in the world’s largest set of democracies. And people don’t seem to be paying any attention.
My wife was looking for pictures of our kids on my phone, and found a photo from a topless beach. Which immediately led to a lot of marital awkwardness and worry (on my part) that somehow I took this creepy photo and also maybe that I have Alzheimer’s.
A little investigation revealed the photo was from Spain, circa 2017. I wasn’t in Spain in 2017.
Felt like I had just gotten a death row pardon from the governor.
Anyway: the TL;DR is WhatsApp, which saves random photos to your camera roll. I’ve turned that option off since.
A single friend in Spain must have sent me the photo, so six years later I’m awkwardly trying to explain it to my wife.
So here’s a thread on key transparency, and why this is a big deal. 1/
Most encrypted messaging apps require the user to generate a public/private encryption key. The secret key lives in your device, and the public key gets sent to anyone who wants to message you. In systems like WhatsApp, the distribution of keys is handled by the WhatsApp server.