The Russian military doctrine is missile-centric. Serving as the principal means of WMD delivery, long range missiles secure Russian capacity to execute nuclear blackmail. Their production ongoing despite the sanctions regime implies that the targeting of sanctions is incorrect🧵
With this investigation, we propose a new look into the Russian missile industry’s chokepoints, specifically in its industrial equipment and processes. As Russia lost the Soviet machinery sector, its military producers have outsourced production of industrial equipment abroad
The power of OSINT is underestimated. Operating under the regime of secrecy, strategic missile industry appears to be impenetrable. And yet, we have built a representative picture of its manufacturing base, with its chokepoints, based exclusively on the publicly available sources
In this introductory material we demonstrate our method on example of a single Russian strategic missiles producer: the Votkinsk Plant. As a part of Roscosmos defence corporation, it is the only producer of solid-propellant ICBMs/SLBMs and SRBMs in Russia
The Votkinsk Plant is the single manufacturer of long-range solid-propellant ballistic missiles in Russia, including:
The Votkinsk Plant is one of the most secret military producers in Russia. Nevertheless, secrecy considerations come into conflict with other rationales that require the missile producers, their counteragents, and the state to disclose sensitive information rather than to hide it
This is the visual evidence we have collected on this one single production facility (the Votkinsk Plant) based on official propaganda. As the authorities need to project an image of well-equipped military industry, they must demonstrate visuals
Most are identifiable
We are starting with a relatively fresh video. This is the movie "Votkinsk Plant" of September 2022. It was published on the official page of this strategic missiles producer in Vkontakte (Russian social media)
5:34 For the first time, we can see the Russian-produced equipment. This is the pressing machine by the Voronezh-located Tyazhmehpress (Тяжмехпресс)
Whenever they can demonstrate the Russian equipment, the narrator always specifies it is Russian
5:41 The "ТМП" abbreviation meaning "Тяжмехпресс" (Tyazhmehpress) allows us to identify its producer
5:45 An operator is sitting behind the screen. The "Danielli Automation" (Italy) label in the upper left angle allows us to plausibly identify this equipment
Most probably it is the forging press by the Danieli Breda, part of the Danieli Group (Italy)
Consider this visual posted on the Votkinsk Plant official page . We can see the same blue label in the upper left corner of the screen vk.com/wall-199960779…
In 2016, the Votkinsk Plant announced a nearly $100 million capital investment program which included construction of a new 100,000 sq m forging facility. In June 2017, it ordered a 10-MN mono-frame forging press from the Italian company Danieli Breda
While the purchase of forging press Danieli Breda cannot be verified based on the public procurements data, purchases of *spare parts* allow us to verify it with certainty
This is a very common pattern:
Purchase of equipment - classified
Purchase of spare parts - transparent
We have finished with the first video. Now, we will review the Votkinsk Plant official page in Vkontakte social media
This is the location of equipment you will see below
0:29 The first photo of the robotic equipment
0:32 The Swedish-Swiss robotic equipment producer ABB is a major supplier for the Russian military industry. It has an extensive network of distributors and maintenance centres in Russia
On the right we see MAZAK label. It is probably a MAZAK H-22- 80 tools Horizontal machining center
If our identification is correct, the Votkinsk Plant is still exploiting one of the earliest mass produced CNC machine models in the world machtechnica.com/en/metalworkin…
0:06 Finally, we come to the neat part. You may have noticed that most labels in this (and other) videos are not blurred. This one is an exception. The labels both on machine itself and on the CNC panel are blurred, supposedly making it harder to identify
Most probably, the management told the video production team to blur the labels. And yet, the team had not idea what exactly to blur. Specifically, they forgot to blur the «Ecoline» and the "DMG Mori" labels, allowing us to identify the producer
It is the DMG Mori AG
Why would the DMG MORI machine be the only one with the blurred labels? The most plausible explanation is that the military industrial management sees *this* information as the most sensitive. Why?
Because this machine may be Russian-made
The DMG Mori AG-built Ulyanovsk machine tool building plant (USZ) is the only new machine tool plant created in Russian since the fall of USSR, 1991. This has been the most serious attempt to indigenise the Western high end production
We will cover this case later
Let's summarise. The visual evidence on this single Russian strategic missiles producer indicates:
1. The wide use of Western European to a lesser degree East Asian production 2. Almost no Russia-produced equipment 3. The total invisibility of China
How could that be?
Wait for our upcoming report:
"How does Russia make missiles?"
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"Votkinsk Plant: How to make an Iskander? Case study of a Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles producer"
Today we are releasing our first OSINT collection "Roscosmos". As the only producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles in Russia, Roscosmos plays a central role in maintaining the Russian WMD delivery capabilities.
Let's have a look at how they produce missiles.
It is two companies within Roscosmos that are primarily responsible for the missile production. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) makes solid-propellant missiles, Makeyev Design Bureau – liquid propellant ones.
Our investigation is covering both.
Our sample includes both primary ICBM/SLBM producers in Russia: Votkinsk and Krasnoyarsk, a major producer of launchers Titan-Barrikady, as well as smaller, less important plants of Zlatoust and Miass.
It is a nearly exhaustive sample of ICBM producing facilities in Russia.
Long range cruise missiles play a major role in the Russian war in Ukraine. They serve as a means of nuclear blackmail, of conventional strikes and of terror against the civilian infrastructure
Let's revise what one needs to produce them
The Rostec-associated "ODK Saturn" makes engines for all the longest range cruise missiles in Russia including Kh-101, Kh-555 and the Kalibr family. This is one of the most strategically important and technologically advanced weaponry producers in Russia
Despite being a secretive military producer, Saturn produces lots of informative documentation. And much of it is available online. Consider their "Technological policy" (2017)
It has a *full list of manufacturing equipment* mentioned in their internal technical documentation
Titan-Barrikady is the Russian producer of Iskander launchers. In 2021, its Chief Technologist Ingemansson A.R. defended a doctoral dissertation on "securing consistency of the machining processes"
It were the HAAS milling and turning machines that his research was based upon
"Turning was conducted on the SL-40L CNC lathe, milling - on the horizontal drilling-milling-boring EC-1600 machining center (all production of "Haas Automation", USA)"
"Machining operations have been carried out on the existing production site, under the regular conditions"
On Monday, we presented selected visuals on the Votkinsk, the Roscosmos enterprise producing ballistic missiles for the "Iskander" complex. Today, we will do the Titan-Barrikady that is producing the "Iskander" missile launchers
Let us take an excursion to their factory floor🧵
We will start with this video broadcasted on the regional TV channel AhtubaTV: "Governor Bozhenov met with the workers of the Central Design Bureau "Titan" (2012).
0:14 On this photo of a Titan-Barrikady workshop you can see at least two HAAS machines