I'm currently revisiting some of my old literature and cases for a book chapter I'm working on, so I thought I'd share a particularly interesting case involving the Stasi, Swedish intelligence and a double agent with you all.
Thread time!
1/13
The story starts in 1985, when Swedish counterintelligence receives information that a member of the Women's Air Force Volunteers is making regular visits to East Germany.
A closer investigation reveals that the woman has risen quickly in the ranks of the Volunteers.
2/13
Meanwhile, in 1984/1985, she has been teaching Swedish at an East German university, in Greifswald. This particular educational institution was associated with espionage targeting the Nordic countries.
3/13
Swedish counterintelligence manages to obtain extensive information about Greifswald. The whole setup fits with the known Warsaw Pact interest in Swedish military volunteer associations.
Counterintelligence initiates telephone- and postal surveillance.
4/13
By November 1986, suspicions are only getting stronger. The woman has shown particular interest in courses for the volunteers that include classified contents. She has also shown particular interest in Air Force courses in photography.
5/13
In 1968, the woman in question married a former East German citizen, who had already been investigated, suspected of espionage (but the investigation had been closed due to a lack of evidence).
The couple had divorced in February, 1985.
6/13
The ex-husband had apparently been involved with Soviet intelligence, specifically the GRU, rather than the Stasi. In public, he had never missed an opportunity to criticize the Soviets, but nevertheless kept visiting the Soviet Union regularly (a typical M.O.).
7/13
It turns out that the ex-husband, who had escaped to West Germany in 1961, had arrived in Sweden in 1964. In 1973 he obtained Swedish citizenship. Only afterward was it revealed that he knew not only Russian but also Swedish at the time of his arrival.
8/13
The fact that this "refugee" from East Germany was able to visit both East Germany and the Soviet Union regularly is a red flag to Swedish counterintelligence. Also, both his regular residence and his summer cottage are located close to Swedish military installations.
9/13
Counterintelligence continue to focus on the woman, now suspecting that she has been recruited by her ex-husband. The woman is receiving cryptic postcards, another known communications method used by the Stasi.
10/13
Then, suddenly, the prosecutor decides that the investigation is to be closed immediately. Phone surveillance has revealed that the woman is in fact a double agent working for the most secret unit in Swedish military intelligence, SSI.
11/13
Her visit to East Germany in 1986 was in fact a mission for SSI. 84 tapes with recorded phone conversations are destroyed along with 154 pages of notes. All criminal charges are dropped.
Unfortunately, everything else about the case remains classified.
12/13
Nevertheless, the case is an interesting illustration of both the capabilities of Swedish counterintelligence and foreign intelligence in the 1980s, as well as the strict compartmentation which meant that neither part knew what the other was doing.
END
13/13
@LeadingOrderSol National security issues of this caliber are typically kept secret for 70 years, so we can expect to learn more around 2056.
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Most people have some idea what Morse code is, but few people realize that it's still used today. So, here's a thread on why Morse code is still useful, why the Russians use it both for military and clandestine comms, and the link between POTUS and Morse code.
THREAD
(1/23)
First of all, Morse code is named after Samuel Morse, who was actually a painter rather than an engineer (this is a self-portrait). He was also an inventor who made things like a stone-carving machine and a water pump for fire companies (neither of these were successful).
(2/23)
In France in the early 1830s, Morse observed the use of semaphor telegraphs, a kind of visual signalling. He also noted the problems with semaphors, i.e. they're very slow and dependent on daylight and good weather.
(3/23)
Time for a thread on one of my favorite examples of creative intelligence gathering: the time the Soviets built and successfully installed electromechanical keyloggers in IBM Selectric typewriters in the 1970s-1980s.
The story begins in 1983, when a Soviet defector revealed to the French DGSE that the Soviets had bugged the French embassy in Moscow.
The French found the bugs. Shortly after the NSA started to check the office and comms equipment used in the American embassy in Moscow.
The NSA shipped the office equipment from the Soviet Union, as cover for the highly classified operation it was claimed the the embassy was upgrading its equipment. In order to prevent the Soviets from tampering with the new stuff, a number of security measures were employed.
Time for a new thread, this time the topic is: the plans for Swedish chemical weapons!
A suitably sinister topic on a dark January afternoon, and one with more than a passing connection to Lund.
Note: I'm not an expert on the subject, so feel free to correct me.
I went to the library to pick up a book on the Swedish nuclear weapons program (which is a different topic I'll cover another day), but I got stuck reading up about the chemical weapons (also featured in the book), so I figured I'd post a brief summary about it.
As you no doubt know, chemical weapons made their major breakthrough during World War I. Sweden wasn't able to start studying chemical weapons while the war was still going on, but research was initiated in 1920, with defensive/protective goals.
This sure is one hell of an expression. I wonder how my colleagues would react if I start using it in casual conversations at the department?
Most of them probably know me well enough to expect a bit of weirdness from me by now though. One of my favorite moments was about a year ago, when someone pointed at my vintage briefcase, winked and asked "Whatcha got in there? Spy stuff?"
(Cont'd)
As it just happens, I had an SDR dongle and a compact portable dipole antenna in there after a presentation for some LE folks the day before, so I casually pulled the antenna and dongle out and said "Oh, nothing special, just some very basic SIGINT stuff."
New arrests in Sweden this morning, two individuals have been apprehended. One is suspected of gross illicit intelligence collection targeting both Sweden and an unnamed foreign power, the other is suspected of aiding and abetting this.
Two helicopters from the Swedish Armed Forces assisted the Swedish Security Service and national police in making these arrests. The individuals have, according to media sources, been active since January 2013.
According to the Swedish Security Service, there was a need to arrest these two individuals swiftly and to secure compromising equipment. The arrests went according to plan.
For my English-speaking intel/security people, here's a summary thread re. the GRU espionage case in Sweden that is getting significant media coverage here today:
Two brothers, Peyman Kia and Payam Kia, have today been charged with espionage on behalf of a foreign power. The exact charge is "grovt spioneri", meaning that it is a particularly serious form of espionage (in the sense that it can be assumed to have inflicted serious damage).
The older brother, Peyman, has been employed by both the Swedish Security Service (the agency responsible for counterintelligence) as well as military intelligence. According to media sources, Peyman has served in the most sensitive department in military intelligence, KSI.