Thread by @michaeldweiss

New "Karl" thread, as told to @holger_r and myself. Covers the counteroffensive, Black Sea developments, and also a bit on the emerging Israel-Hamas war:

"It is clear that there will not be a big breakthrough this year. Smaller tactical breakthroughs are still possible. The maximum that I see is that Ukraine can still advance towards Tokmak. Capturing Tokmak inside this year would mark a significant achievement."

"Ukraine is moderately calm about it. There is just so much of Russian defence facilities, lines and equipment that it wasn’t possible to destroy all of it during the summer. Kyiv has been systemic in destroying it..."

"They can continue with it during the winter to prepare ground for continued offensive push in spring."

"Elsewhere on the frontline Ukraine has been mildly successful at Bakhmut. Russia is desperate to hold ground there but they’ve had large losses. Russia tries to push an offensive in the north at the Oskil river. They’ve had minimal success. Maybe a couple of hundred meters."

"In general there is little news from the frontlines. In mid-September Ukraine was advancing faster. They broke through one line and are now working on widening the area primarily near Verbove and Robotyne. They can’t advance deeper before they widen the flanks."

"Russia has started to use more air forces in close proximity to the frontline in the south. This is an indication that the situation is hard for them. Otherwise they wouldn’t bring fighter jets so close. They’ve downed 2-3 of their own planes."

"Ukraine breached the second defense line near Robotyne, which was the most heavily fortified. But Russia is trying to build an additional line on the go. It is much difficult for them than it was a year ago because now Russia is under strong pressure by Ukrainian forces."

"Ukraine will need to continue destroying Russia’s artillery systems, air defense, rear support, communication and logistics lines with Crimea to the south and Russia to the east. Russia has been losing some tanks near Kupyansk where they've tried to go on offensive themselves."

"Senior Ukrainian military officials are very calm about Kupyansk. They don’t think Russia has enough forces there. They do have a high number of troops but many are still going through training and units are frequently redirected to stretches on the frontline where RU has gaps."

"They are also estimating that Russia is losing more weapons and equipment than they can produce in all categories but two. The exceptions are ammunition and drones. The number of drones that they are using has gone significantly up since September."

"Ukraine must keep Russia under pressure in other parts of the frontline. If Russia has units that are free to operate, of course they will try to take them on to Kupyansk. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is satisfied with the current situation."

"Russia’s minimum target is still to fully capture Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and then Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. It is hard to imagine they could in any way attempt to cross the Dnipro river anymore."

"Russia is storing missiles for the winter. Here are 2 important factors. 1) UA has a much better air defense than a year ago. 2) UA’s energy infrastructure is not as strong as it was last autumn. It is more vulnerable to attacks..."

"It is certain that RU will attempt to destroy energy facilities this winter as well."

"A critical loss for Russia is that their navy has been pushed out of half of the Black Sea. They have very limited operating capabilities west of Sevastopol. This means it is difficult to block grain shipments there."

"A Turkish cargo ship hit a mine this week and in theory Russia could try to mine the trade corridor but I think this would be going too far because it would affect not only Ukraine but also Turkey-Romania and Turkey-Bulgaria trade routes."

"Moving the navy more to the east will also affect missile strikes. The Kalibr range will still be enough but Ukrainian air defense will have more time to detect and prepare."

"In a larger scope, so much will depend on U.S. elections and what the U.S. policy will be after that. If the U.S. stays on board supporting UA, I can’t see Europe backing away. If the U.S. support falls, the danger of discontinued Western support is great."

"We can’t 100% conclude that Trump winning would equal a catastrophe to UA but it would mean a lot of unpredictability and uncertainty. It was during Trump’s first term that the U.S. started delivering lethal aid to UA. Obama refused to do it."

"POL-UA relations will calm down after elections in Poland next week. The fight is due to the PiS party needing to compete with the [far-right] Confederation party and paint themselves as extreme nationalists."

"Slovakian elections don’t play a role in a wider frame. The extent of delivering aid to UA through Slovakia has been much smaller than through Poland and Romania. Fico wouldn’t kill the commercial deals under which Slovakian factories are working for UA."

"Hamas and Russia share the same supporter - Iran. But I would be careful when assessing the degree of Russia's supporting Hamas. Russia has been trying to keep good relations with Israel. Putin and Netanyahu have got along even too well."

"I’m hesitant to say that Russia would have a significant role in the current conflict. But Russia sees it as beneficial because this will take U.S. attention away from Europe...."

"The tone of Russian propagandists has not been uniform: some are publicly pro-Hamas but ones closer to power are more careful and neutral."

"They’re not criticizing Israel directly but they say the U.S. hasn’t done anything to find a solution in the Middle East. But they also show no condemnation of Hamas. Hopefully ISR will notice this and will be more supportive of UA and critical about RU in the future."

"Israel's support to Ukraine is like China’s support to Russia. It hasn't sent any meaningful weapons aid, at least not until mid-summer this year."

"Israel made a too-easy decision in 2015 when Russia entered Syria. They deemed that Russia would be better than other potential neighbors and it would make sense to get along well. ISR hasn’t grasped that RU’s influence in Syria has decreased and Iran’s has grown."

"How much the events will affect the war in UA depends how long and how serious the war in ISR will be. If it passes in a matter of weeks, there won’t be much impact. If it lasts longer, the U.S. will have two choices."

"Either it will decide to support both countries as much as it possibly can or it will say it can’t deal with both of them and start to distance itself from one. It will depend on the next U.S. administration."

"I’m not of the opinion the war will be very long. ISR has all capabilities to destroy Hamas structures in Gaza. Especially so when they use their ground forces, as it now looks like they will."

"It also seems that Hezbollah will not go into complete war. They would be militarily a much more serious opponent than Hamas. Today’s firing across the border was more a display of solidarity."

"It also wouldn’t make sense for Hezbollah to wait with a decision to join the war. ISR has been at its weakest during the first days of the attacks but from here on out they will only be stronger."

"What happened was a total failure of ISR military intelligence and that of internal service Shin Bet. Mossad can breathe a little easier because Palestine is not under their responsibilities. Such an operation was prepared for months, hundreds of people were aware of it."

"It wasn’t only a military operation but propagandists were included. They had professional and forceful videos. It was surprising that ISR totally lacked defense on the borders." /END