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A few notes on the Israel-Palestine conflict:
1) After the 2006 war against Hezbollah, the IDF learned the lesson to never underestimate that group again. Many Israeli military analysts and officials still use the word “defeat” when talking about this conflict. I traveled to Israel 15-20 times from 2009-19 to work w/IDF personnel on air defense matters, and I found their focus to be almost exclusively on Hezbollah as the primary threat. Everyone I spoke to took it as a given that there would be another war with Hez, and that it would be a fight to the finish this time.
2) However, I found that they generally underestimated Hamas. While Hez was considered a strategic military threat, Hamas was seen as a group that could carry out appalling acts of violence against soft targets, but little more. They had good reason to think that, since Hamas had never demonstrated significant capability to plan, coordinate, or work under fire. In 2014, the IDF paid a price for this. After three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered, Israel made a ground incursion into Gaza. But Hamas was well-prepared. They had learned and adopted tactics Hezbollah employed in 2006 - especially getting up close to mitigate Israel’s air and artillery advantages.
Hamas launched infiltration attacks via tunnel and small boat, and had even prepared the paragliders we’ve seen in recent days (though they didn’t use them). IDF ground forces rolled in expecting Hamas to scatter as they always did, but Hamas was ready to fight. Six “brigades” of 2,500-3,500 fighters each were deployed along the front with Israel, each with its own mix of infantry, anti-armor, mortar, and rocket forces. A complex and robust network of tunnels had been built that allowed Hamas fighters to pop up in ambush, and escape when things got too heavy. Tunnels were booby trapped, and networks of IEDs awaited the Israelis at every turn. They used snipers and mortars in support of their ground forces w/an efficiency they’d never demonstrated before.
As a result, the IDF took real casualties, and the ground assault was stalled before it made significant inroads.
3) In both the 2006 & 2014 wars, the Israelis responded to difficulties on the ground by pulling back and bombarding the fuck out of a wide area with air and artillery strikes. The devastation in southern Lebanon and Gaza was so severe and photogenic that world opinion began to turn against Israel. In 2014, some 2,000-2,500 were killed, and 10,000+ wounded, by the Israeli assault on Gaza, 60-70% of them civilians, and whole areas of the city were leveled. In other words, Israel gave Hamas *exactly* what it was hoping for.
I have to imagine Hamas is hoping for a similar outcome here. They are likely well-prepared for a ground assault, though it’s up in the air whether they’re prepared for the scale of forces israel will bring to bear this time. In any case, it will be difficult for Israel to accomplish anything that will feel like a sufficient response to these atrocities without suffering further propaganda losses internationally (something we might blithely dismiss, but which a state like Israel cannot afford to do).
4) In 2014, Hamas bragged that it had AA heavy machine guns and various types of MANPADS. They never used them, so we’re not sure if they really have AA capability, but if they do, and can places any constraints on Israel’s ability to operate in the air, this operation will be significantly complicated.
5) It’s not muh Zionist propaganda that Hamas puts weapons, fighters, and admin centers in critical civilian areas, including schools, mosques, and hospitals. They do do that, and it creates conditions that guarantee any Israeli assault will kill a lot of civilians. If you think that is propaganda, you don’t understand the jihadist mentality. They write about it in their own documents, the goal to provoke overwhelming reactions that kill Arab civilians. (More later)
1) After the 2006 war against Hezbollah, the IDF learned the lesson to never underestimate that group again. Many Israeli military analysts and officials still use the word “defeat” when talking about this conflict. I traveled to Israel 15-20 times from 2009-19 to work w/IDF personnel on air defense matters, and I found their focus to be almost exclusively on Hezbollah as the primary threat. Everyone I spoke to took it as a given that there would be another war with Hez, and that it would be a fight to the finish this time.
2) However, I found that they generally underestimated Hamas. While Hez was considered a strategic military threat, Hamas was seen as a group that could carry out appalling acts of violence against soft targets, but little more. They had good reason to think that, since Hamas had never demonstrated significant capability to plan, coordinate, or work under fire. In 2014, the IDF paid a price for this. After three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered, Israel made a ground incursion into Gaza. But Hamas was well-prepared. They had learned and adopted tactics Hezbollah employed in 2006 - especially getting up close to mitigate Israel’s air and artillery advantages.
Hamas launched infiltration attacks via tunnel and small boat, and had even prepared the paragliders we’ve seen in recent days (though they didn’t use them). IDF ground forces rolled in expecting Hamas to scatter as they always did, but Hamas was ready to fight. Six “brigades” of 2,500-3,500 fighters each were deployed along the front with Israel, each with its own mix of infantry, anti-armor, mortar, and rocket forces. A complex and robust network of tunnels had been built that allowed Hamas fighters to pop up in ambush, and escape when things got too heavy. Tunnels were booby trapped, and networks of IEDs awaited the Israelis at every turn. They used snipers and mortars in support of their ground forces w/an efficiency they’d never demonstrated before.
As a result, the IDF took real casualties, and the ground assault was stalled before it made significant inroads.
3) In both the 2006 & 2014 wars, the Israelis responded to difficulties on the ground by pulling back and bombarding the fuck out of a wide area with air and artillery strikes. The devastation in southern Lebanon and Gaza was so severe and photogenic that world opinion began to turn against Israel. In 2014, some 2,000-2,500 were killed, and 10,000+ wounded, by the Israeli assault on Gaza, 60-70% of them civilians, and whole areas of the city were leveled. In other words, Israel gave Hamas *exactly* what it was hoping for.
I have to imagine Hamas is hoping for a similar outcome here. They are likely well-prepared for a ground assault, though it’s up in the air whether they’re prepared for the scale of forces israel will bring to bear this time. In any case, it will be difficult for Israel to accomplish anything that will feel like a sufficient response to these atrocities without suffering further propaganda losses internationally (something we might blithely dismiss, but which a state like Israel cannot afford to do).
4) In 2014, Hamas bragged that it had AA heavy machine guns and various types of MANPADS. They never used them, so we’re not sure if they really have AA capability, but if they do, and can places any constraints on Israel’s ability to operate in the air, this operation will be significantly complicated.
5) It’s not muh Zionist propaganda that Hamas puts weapons, fighters, and admin centers in critical civilian areas, including schools, mosques, and hospitals. They do do that, and it creates conditions that guarantee any Israeli assault will kill a lot of civilians. If you think that is propaganda, you don’t understand the jihadist mentality. They write about it in their own documents, the goal to provoke overwhelming reactions that kill Arab civilians. (More later)
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