Thread by @InaHPKvam

A couple objections to this article’s commentary. While considerable uncertainty still reigns, neither trawlers nor dragging anchors as claimed here are of course capable of inflicting damage to the degree hitherto reported on the Balticonnector pipeline.
vg.no/nyheter/utenri…

As opposed to submarine communication and electricity cables, which are smaller in size and of more fragile composition, undersea pipelines are naturally constructed with more solid structures to enable safe and stable flows of petroleum offshore.

Pipelines also vary depending on human/physical geography and industrial demands. Reflecting significant differences in capacity, the Balticconnector pipeline is for example half the size of Nord Stream in diameter and lacks the former’s 60-110 mm concrete coating

To ensure stability and prevent damage from maritime activity or ice gauging, trenching and seabed sediment cover instead particularly exposed areas near landfalls and in coastal or shallower sections – in total more than 80 percent of the Balticonnector pipeline length.

Reports of nil or close to nil seismic signal detections in the time period surrounding the leaks are therefore less surprising when considering the possibility of actual sabotage. The resulting shocks from potential use of lesser payloads may even have been "muffled" by weather

While the potential use of explosives in a similar manner to Nord Stream remain speculative at this point, officials rather describing the damage as “mechanical” also appear to rule out normal maritime activity, such as clumsy trawlers or flyaway anchors, at fault

Regardless of means and methods used by a potential saboteur, damaging a fully operational petroleum pipe with a steady flow of natural gas is risky business – and in this case constitute a significant escalation in tactics compared to closed off and depressurized Nord Stream.

For reference, this is what happens when gas ignites on the ocean surface. Here, an unintended gas leak in the Gulf of Mexico was ignited by electrical shocks from a surrounding storm.
edition.cnn.com/2021/07/03/ame…

In general, the Kremlin in is no lack of sufficiently specialised sabotage forces to successfully pull off such a high risk operation while keeping it "unattributable" and subthreshold. In Russian military strategy, seabed warfare has been a longstanding niche for decades.

Several GRU and GUGI units operate in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. The latter is also a hub for subsea technology development, with several institutes manufacturing various ROV, UUVs and the like – several of which possess the range to deploy unseen from the shore.

In other words - given the many possible how’s of a potential Balticconnect sabotage, the respective security services investigating the incident moving forward are the most equipped to draw future conclusions as to which scenarios appear more valid than others.

The why’s, however, appear rather obvious. Moscow’s rationale for establishing a credible and continuous threat against critical infrastructure beyond the borders of Ukraine has been well established since September last year.

In turn, several pieces of the remaining logical puzzle are less evident. Why would Moscow in this case draw NATO's attention so close to home, risking enviro disaster or worse in the very inlet to a strategic port where RUS access is already constricted and rather bottlenecked?