1/15
Very interesting Economist piece on Chinese consumption, if a little one-sided. The article argues that the way the data are presented in China systematically underestimates consumption.
2/15
It would have been much more accurate to say that Chinese data are very complex and underestimate some forms of consumption while overestimating others. For example among the fastest-growing "consumption " components in the past decade have been gold/jewelry, or while...
3/15
goods, but there is good reason to believe that much of this represented investment more than consumption. In fact more generally in an economy with restricted capital accounts and a highly managed financial system, there are always questions about classification.
4/15
That's why what really matters is how consumption impacts the economy, and there should be little doubt that Chinese consumption, as most Chinese economists now recognize, is extraordinarily low. We can see this just by looking at the balance of payments.
5/15
Chinese investment, at 42-44% of GDP, is one-third higher than that of even the highest-investing economies of the world, who rarely invest above 30-34% of their GDPs. This is extraordinarily high – only China itself, 5-10 years ago, has exceeded this level.
6/15
Because a country's current account balance is the gap between domestic savings and investment, this should imply that China runs a large deficit. And yet China runs a large surplus, which is another way of saying that as extraordinarily high as its investment share, its...
7/15
savings share is even higher. And because savings is simply the obverse of consumption, this just means that its consumption share of GDP is extraordinarily low. If we want to understand the weaknesses in the Chinese economy, this is what we need to focus on.
8/15
The Economist also argues while household income in China is relatively low, it is in line with that of other low income countries. There are a lot of problems with this argument, as this thread by Adam Wolfe suggests.
9/15
Wolfe argues that "the biggest factor behind China’s low consumption rate is its tax policy and its under-developed safety net," but of course the social safety net is just one of the ways in which households receive income.
10/15
That's why I prefer to look at "revealed" behavior. If Chinese households consume a very low share of what they produce, it must either be because Chinese households aren't interested in raising their living standards or because ordinary households...
11/15
are not receiving, either directly or through their evaluation of expected social safety benefits, enough income to justify higher consumption. If the former, they should stop working. If the latter, they should receive a higher share of what they produce.
12/15
By the way some argue that because household savings are disproportionately high in China because of worries about future social benefits, the best way to raise consumption is by putting more resources into pension and unemployment benefits, hospitalization, and so on.
13/15
The reasoning is that this will boost consumption by reducing savings.
This sounds more logical at first than it really is. Directly boosting income by some amount immediately increases the perceptions of income by that amount, and will cause higher spending.
14/15
Boosting the social safety net by the same amount will increase perceptions of income only to the extent that the former is credible. It could take years, even decades, to learn how much credibility to place in their future benefits. This reduces the impact on consumption.
15/15
The fact is that consumption in China is extraordinarily low, and that Chinese households do not believe they have enough income to allow them to spend more on consumption. The solution must be to increase their income directly.
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1/7 Yes, the drop in property-sector investment is pretty impressive, Adam, although perhaps less so when you consider how long, and how far, property-sector "exuberance" had gone before it was finally turned around.
2/7 My worry is that even if they are able to stabilize property prices (which I doubt), the consequences for other parts of the economy, most worryingly the financial sector, are becoming more apparent, and this will likely spread.
3/7 So far Beijing has been able to counter the contraction in property investment by expanding investment in infrastructure, SOEs, and favored private sector manufacturers. Some argue that this shift helps "resolve" the problem of non-productive investment, but I suspect it...
1/8 Very interesting – and perhaps pessimistic – Caixin interview of Lou Jiwei. I found this to be especially interesting: "China’s urbanization rate approached 65.2% at the end of 2022. But if we exclude those who live in urban areas but do not have...
2/8 the same privileges as their urban peers, the rate was only 45.4%, based on the 2020 census. If we remove hukou restrictions and can raise the rate to over 60%, this would increase final consumption expenditure by 30% as we will start to see newly urbanized residents...
3/8 replace their rural homes with urban apartments."
This, he explain, is because by removing hukou restrictions, migrant workers will have access to the same rights and services as hukou residents. This will be the equivalent of a substantial boost in their incomes.
2/9 The main problem with China's private sector isn't that it has recently been "leashed" by Beijing, but rather than it faces very weak domestic demand that is, ironically, the flip side of the many direct and indirect subsidies it has received over the past two decades.
3/9 Real "market-based" reforms would include reducing financial repression and moral hazard in the banking system, eliminating the hukou, cancelling direct subsidies to manufacturing, paring back the massive over-investment in logistics and infrastructure, and so on.
1/7 Yes, Adam, there has indeed been a huge and very interesting shift in the direction of credit. Total credit has expanded even faster than I had expected (the debt/GDP ratio will probably rise 9-10 ppts in 2023) even as property sector credit has contracted sharply.
2/7 The debt/GDP ratio matters because when debt funds productive activity, it won't up in a rising debt/GDP ratio. Part of this additional credit is obviously going to local-government infrastructure spending, and part of it (included in "industrial sector") is...
3/7 going to SOEs and manufacturers in favored sectors. Given already-extensive overcapacity in these manufacturing sectors, along with China's huge trade surpluses, I think this is still part of the shift from the hard-budget constrained parts of the economy to the soft.
1/6 Yu Yongding translated by Pekingnology. He argues that China should maintain its high investment share of GDP, with Beijing perhaps "guiding funds more towards high-end manufacturing and technology services" from property investment.
2/6 He is not worried by overcapacity, and in fact seems to argue, confusingly, that overcapacity is largely the result of contractionary policies aimed at reducing overcapacity. He thinks slowing economic activity is a bigger problem than rising debt and overinvestment.
3/6 He thinks Beijing should more aggressively use its relatively clean balance sheet to fund further infrastructure investment and he thinks one way to address the real estate crisis is to provide aggressive new lending (he argues that there might not be a real estate bubble).
1/4 This article makes an important point that is not often enough recognized: manufacturers moving out of China's coastal manufacturing strongholds in order to lower costs are far more likely to move elsewhere in China than to move abroad.
2/4 China delivers a profusion of direct subsidies to domestic manufacturers as well as indirect ones, such as a highly controlled banking system, an undervalued currency, weak labor laws, massive overspending on transportation infrastructure and logistics, and so on.
3/4 This is why manufacturing in China is so competitive internationally and, because these subsidies generally come at the direct or indirect expense of households, it is also why domestic consumption is so low and why China's manufacturing sector must run trade surpluses.