For weeks not the PBOC has held the line at 7.3 for weeks through the fix, intervention, and rate rises, but it is not working. Pressure is mounting for a more substantial FX move, likely on par with the stress seen in '15/16.
For the first time since that period we are starting to indications of selling of dollars to prop up the FX. The FX settlement numbers (good proxy for direct and indirect intervention by state banks) shows the first large scale activity in Sept since 16. @Brad_Setser
Facing these mounting pressures the PBOC is doing everything in its power to keep a lid on downward pressures. First, setting the fix at a level significantly above the actual value.
They have also let rates on the short-end rise 40bps in recent weeks despite the fact that the domestic conditions in the economy would likely call for easier policy instead.
Typically a central bank would not be increasing rates on the short end if their stock market was experiencing relatively sharp declines.
These dynamics are much more closely aligned with a BoP style crisis dynamic where FX stability takes precedence over domestic conditions.
Many think that there is no way that China could experience a BoP crisis style dynamic because it also has a trade surplus.
But capital moves much faster than trade to drive an FX. And China has become more reliant on foreign capital in recent years which is now leaving:
Chinese household and corporations also have the ability to move capital offshore given their so much income is generated abroad.
Sometimes this can even be 'passive' in the sense of just leaving in a foreign bank. But active flows are also back to '16 levels:
Tactical downward pressures like this can often be managed if the more secular dynamics are in good shape, but increasingly the structural Chinese global edge is weakening:
And this is likely to persist given secular decline in the JPY relative to the CNY in recent years.
So far it looks like the actions to prop up the fx are not causing pressure on the global asset markets as the PBOC can use cash/bills/fwds and other short-term assets to fund the interventions.
But persistent pressure could have global ramifications:
China's currency difficulties are picking up steam. For now the downward impact remains relatively isolated to Chinese assets, but as we saw in '15, these sorts of dynamics can quickly escalate causing significant global implications causing a shock few had expected.
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The ECB and BoE pauses with short rates below core inflation are big bets that *significant* economic weakness will come to bring inflation down to their targets.
But its not happening fast enough and risk further entrenchment. PMIs today reinforce slow, but not slow enough:
Services are the most important since those are the areas that are now driving most of the inflation. While these have moved to 'contraction' territory, its still not all that weak.
The same is true for Eurozone as well, which is stabilizing at soft, but not soft enough levels:
The question for these central banks is not is the economy slowing / or is soft. Is whether it is *soft enough* to bring inflation pressures down.
For a place like the UK that inflation is very high vs. target and still above the rates.
With the most recent leg down, this US bond selloff is on par with the largest ever in history.
As shown next, it's also in line the largest falls for major countries that didn't lose a world war or have hyperinflation. Some perspective from my friend @abcampbell on the selloff:
To put this US selloff into a broader perspective highlights that the ~30% drop in US bonds is on par with the largest historical declines in the UK.
Notable also that the UK bond selloff so far is also on par with those declines:
Some larger declines have happened in history, but have been very rare and mostly been caused by hyperinflation / domestic revolution.
And as @abcampbell reminds us, these are in local currency, so losses in purchasing power / global currency / gold terms were much larger.
The UK has an inflation problem and the short end isn’t pricing what is necessary to deal with it.
Todays inflation report was bad on most fronts, with core inflation above expectations, running 0.5pct on a m/m basis, and still above 6pct on an annualized basis:
On a monthly basis there had been some more promising signs of moderation, but this month showed a notable undesirable reacceleration.
There has been a lot of cheering about headline inflation coming down, but it too remains above 6% and further downward progress has stalled over the last couple months.
There are increasing signs that the US consumer is rolling over.
Spending was soft in Sept after a weak Aug. Confidence measures are rolling over. BEA card data shows it well, a leg down in Mar and again in Aug/Sept in spending vs. trend:
These data are consistent with the Chase data which suggests a soft Sept following a weak Aug (confirmed by the census numbers). The Oct data represents only a week of data (which can be pretty choppy) so wouldn't read too much into it.
Really squinting. BAC daily data suggests we had a small pop in the first couple days of Oct which has since reversed so wouldn't put too much weight on that last JPM datapoint yet.
The inflation challenge ahead is that it remains modestly too high (say 3-4%), which makes the Fed cautious delivering cuts in response weakening growth.
Equity and 60/40 holders are particularly at risk since this will deny any proactive easing and increase tail risk.
I wont go into all the nuances of the report, other than to highlight that the picture here in @jasonfurman's monthly table is mixed.
Progress made for sure, but there are still clear concerning areas (oil, svcs ex-shelter, shelter).
And in perspective it is clear that progress has been made, but this is not a clear return to the type of persistent 2% inflation which is consistent with pre-covid or the Fed's mandate.