There's more plants than herbivores, more herbivores than carnivores etc. The lower trophic levels weigh more. And "more" means few orders of magnitude more
Perhaps, we need to introduce an idea of a technology chain pyramid 🧵
Consumer goods would constitute the lowest trophic level. Which means, the largest level by far. There's just way more of them compared all the upper levels combined
This is also the only level of the technology chain visible to the general audience
"Everything produced in China" means "everything I buy is produced in China". And everything I buy means consumer goods
1. We see only the lowest trophic level of the technology chain 2. We notice it is dominated by the Chinese production 3. Voila, China produces everything
Data seems to support this idea. Indeed, Chinese manufacturing output may exceed the output of Europe + next few major industrial powers combined
That is because the upper trophic levels are just as invisible to the statistics as they are to the human eye
They are just small
Metalworking tools constitute principal industrial equipment for any manufacturing industry. Japan is the world's second largest exporter, almost on pair with Germany. And yet, machine tool industry makes for less than 2% of its manufacturing output
The upper levels are small
That makes the upper levels of the production chain completely invisible in the aggregate data. They're just very much smaller than the lower levels they feed off
Market of spoons > market of spoon producing machines
for the same reason there's more phyto- than zooplankton
Aggregation makes the upper levels of economy invisible for the same reason it makes invisible the upper levels of the trophic pyramid. There is way more grass than rabbits, there's way more frying pans than turning machines
Aggregation -> The structure lost
Now the thing with the upper levels is that they tend to be not only quantitatively smaller than the lower levels (-> hence invisibility), but also qualitatively different
More knowledge intensive
More tacit knowledge (craftsmanship) intensive
Harder to pick up
The bottleneck
Let's zoom in to something bottleneckish. The pressing die production could be a good example
Here is an Audi. What is interesting about the Audi is that it may have been one of the top metalworkers on the world
How do you make its car body elements? Most probably, you will:
1. Take a sheet of metal and feed it into a pressing machine 2. Machine it with a mill etc. to give it precise form and dimensions 3. Assemble it all
1, 2 and even 3 may be automatable
Pressing is automatable. You feed a sheet of metal into a CNC press and, kaboom, it is formed into the shape
Machining is automatable. Your CNC machine tool cuts off the excess metal from a workpiece giving it precise form and dimensions
Now what is un-automatable? Production of a pressing die
This is a bottleneck of a bottleneck. Each pressing die gives its impression to thousands of doors, etc. Every die error will be scaled up thousandfold
Dies are fixed manually, with fingers. That is semi-artisanal labor
Craftsman expertise like this cannot be bought. You can only grow it, in the process of one on one mentorship, taking years
Can you do without it? You can. You will probably end up with the lower quality dies -> lower quality product
Lots of defects, same on every car
So what did we learn? We dived in into the production of some of the most sophisticated consumer goods there are. We observed a bottleneck in this process (pressing die)
And in this bottleneck we found the manual, craftsman labor based on a semi-artisanal expertise
Now you may ask:
But is it really necessary to have all this artisanal expertise to produce a car? 🤔
Of course, not. The skills you may observe here are vastly excessive compared with the bare minimum necessary to produce a car that drives (and that you can sell at a profit)
And that is exactly the thing with Western Europe
It is excessive
It is excessive architecturally. You may notice it when visiting old European towns. There's just lots of stuff out there that has magically survived through all the political turmoils
Very un-optimized
It is excessive intellectually, excessive in terms of skills and craftsmanship. Carrying the uninterrupted tradition since the earliest days of Industrial Revolution, it is the largest reservoir of niche and unobvious manufacturing competences by far
Again, very un-optimized
I have been long puzzled by how widespread is contempt to Europe in the United States. I used to find this attitude exaggerated and almost performative
Now I tend to explain it with the un-optimized character of the European industry and economy in general
Excessive rather than optimised, driven by the craftsman more than entrepreneurial spirit, accumulating a great deal of obscure, niche knowledge, European industry may not be very efficient in terms of money making
You won't sell that much, if you insist on producing on your own terms
But
If a foreign martial state aims to produce something niche and unobvious
(like and intercontinental ballistic missile)
then it will have little choice but to outsource much of the production chain
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture