Hello! How are you? Hope you’re doing ok.
I’ve built a thread to look at Namer, a heavy armoured personnel carrier (APC) that is in service with the IDF. You might have heard of it recently as 11 IDF personnel were reportedly killed in one when an ATGM hit their vehicle.
I have some thoughts on this at the end. If you don’t want to read that far; these things can happen to even the best-protected vehicles, a lot depends on the munition that hit it, and what was inside the vehicle.
Development: Maj Gen Tal, who oversaw development of the Merkava, decided that a heavy APC was needed in the 1980s, he had observed during Israel’s wars that infantry needed more protection than tanks. Interesting, right?
His reasoning was that a tank could use the range of its main armament to keep enemies at bay. Whereas infantry have no choice but to get close, therefore they need greater protection. The IDF agreed and development started, spurred on by the 1982 war with Lebanon.
The result was Achzarit, a heavy APC based on T-55s captured in 1967 and 1973. They were modified in several ways and entered service in 1987. They provided protection for a crew of 3 and 7 dismounts. Fully loaded they weight 44t – compare this with the 36t of a T-55 with turret!
Armour was added to the sides and roof and the diesel fuel tanks at the rear of the dismount compartment provide additional protection – as does the engine on the other side. Achzarits were observed operating in groups of 3 by Jane’s reporters.
They would assume mutually supporting positions and approach objectives from random angles, dispensing infantry like sticks of paratroopers as they went. Achzarits struggled to keep up with Merkavas, which had greater power-to-weight ratio.
They were revised, but development had started on the Namer and the first prototype produced in 2004 using a modified Merkava Mk 1. It was field tested in Gaza and then refined, but the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah pushed it across the line.
The IDF’s infantry had shown a preference for advancing on foot in that conflict as they felt their vehicles attracted ATGM fire.
The first Namer based on a Merkava Mk 4 was released in 2008, and it entered service with the IDF the following year.
However, procurement slowed down because of budgetary constraints and shifting geopolitical realities. Then, in 2014 and Op Protective Edge, an M113 carrying 7 soldiers and explosives was hit by an ATGM. Interest in the Namer picked up and by 2021 270 had been delivered.
Still here? Cool. Here’s some bits about its protection, I won’t dig into anything else for the sake of brevity.
The powerpack is at the front of the hull with the driver to the left, the commander behind the driver and the gunner to the right of the commander. It has space for 8 dismounts seated on two rows facing each other.
The belly plate is bent (as opposed to welded) into a shallow v-shape to disperse explosive energy beneath the vehicle and increase blast resistance.
It carries a hefty suite of passive composite armour, which is distributed according to ‘battlefield findings;’
i.e., it is more evenly distributed around the sides, roof and rear instead of being disproportionately loaded on the front 60*. The roof armour is also thicker than standard, and the roof hatches kept to a minimum. You can sort of see how the armour is arranged here.
Active protection is provided by Trophy – you probably know about that right? If not, here's a video:
The total weight of a Namer is 62t, compare this with the 65t of a Merkava Mk 4 and you get a sense of how much armour it’s carrying.
The big difference is the more even distribution around the vehicle. During Protective Edge, a Namer was engaged with a 500kg offset IED, it drove away with scratched paintwork. The type also survived several ATGM and RPG strikes.
So, how does an ATGM defeat such a heavily armoured vehicle? There’s a lot that isn’t known right now, so I’ll keep this general. ATGMs or RPGs used shaped charges are a wicked problem for any AFV. Have a look at these threads: and
The behind armour effects can be horrific if penetration is achieved. Spalling is bad, especially if no spall liner is present, which can lead to several casualties at once. There is also the risk of the jet striking something like explosives, as happened with the M113 in 2014.
Can we say what happened to the Namer and its unfortunate crew? Not from where I am. But we know that no vehicle is invincible, and that generally speaking, lethality always has had an edge over survivability. A strike with a high casualty rate was therefore always a possibility.
We can say that a large warhead, as is common on ATGMs, would create a large and powerful jet. If it hit the sides or rear of the vehicle, even with greater armour there than is normal, it would have been hard pushed for any vehicle to prevent penetration.
Thanks for reading this far - feel free to ask any questions.
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A few notes from a @RUSI_org report by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, I've mentioned a lot of this before, but they've added some good stats:
"Tactical UAVs have significant limitations. Between 60 and 80% of Ukrainian FPVs fail to reach their target, depending on the part of the front and the skill of the operators. Of those that do strike their targets, a majority fail to destroy the target system when striking armoured vehicles."
"The success rate in wounding infantry is high. Furthermore, there are long periods where either EW or the weather significantly degrades UAV operations. With FPVs that are remotely piloted by radio frequency, it is also difficult to concentrate multiple drones in time and space because they can interfere with one another’s guidance systems"
"Despite these limitations, tactical UAVs currently account for 60–70% of damaged and destroyed Russian systems. The above figure must be read in the appropriate context." The next bit is important:
Hello! Good morning. If your timeline is like mine, you might be seeing the Telegram post from the image below today.
Why? Well, in short, the poster claims to have seen intercepted Russian FPV footage that shows the drone using AI for terminal guidance.
He states that the operator flies the drone to the area and selects the target with AI assistance. It then flies into the target. This isn't the first use of AI in this application, there is good evidence that Lancet can do it too. The new Iz-53 variant is more autonomous.
The original poster (OP), later said he had watched two more videos.
The Russians have been talking about this for a while. The Gadfly reportedly carried this capability in August 23: #AI vk.com/wall-35660695_…
Hello! How are you? I'm good, thanks for asking. It's nearly Christmas and if you're winding down like me, you might enjoy a little technical thread on the T-90M.
Images are from @RecoMonkey, those guys do good work! The source? My book (JAFV21), and some desk research.
T-90M is the most technically capable tank in Russian service. It started life in 1999 as a way to improve on the T-90. It had entered trials by 2017 (rapid) and in 2018 there was talk of orders and deliveries. Vedomosti reported 160 T-90Ms under contract in 2020.
10 rebuilds, 50 T-90A conversions, and the rest presumably new builds. First deliveries followed later that year to the Taman Guards Div, part of the 1st Guards Tank Army. This image shows that fateful day.
Hello again, it’s Friday, how has your week been? Would you like to know more about the Trophy active protection system (APS)? Awesome, have a glance at the following. It's used by the IDF and others to protect armoured vehicles from anti-tank weapons like RPGs and ATGMs.
If you’re not keen on reading, the BLUF is that Trophy is a good system and well-proven, but it is not and never was perfect. Any losses we see are also half the picture and should not lead to knee jerk reactions or analysis on Trophy’s suitability.
Development:
The IDF started looking at Trophy in 1987, it was a team effort led by the Israeli MoD, its Directorate of Research and Development, Rafael, and Elta. They weren’t the first, the Soviets had developed the Drozd APS in the late 70s, and even sent some to Afghanistan.
These are some images of Ukrainian BTR-4s from back in March. I came across them doing some research on wheeled mobility and thought I would use them to illustrate some elements of terramechanics.
In 2000 Ogorkiewicz wrote about the Vehicle Cone Limiting Index, a measure developed in the UK at the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) to determine the go/no-go strength of a soil for wheeled AFVs of certain weights.
The VCLI is used with the cone index of the soil type in question to indicate whether a vehicle can pass it. Different soils have different CIs, wet soils like clay are weaker than hard soils low in moisture and will allow heavier vehicles to pass.
Lots of good stuff coming from the @RUSI_org Land Warfare Conference today a few things following:
Oleksandr Danylyuk: The west and Russia made some assessments that were poor.
Russia's military demonstrations throughout 21 were designed to get Ukraine to accept Russia's view
The Russians thought this had worked and the West believed Russia would succeed in a matter of days.
Despite Western aid, it was Ukrainian heavy weapons that created the initial Russian reverses.
Failure to decapitate Ukr's political and mil control meant its goals failed.
Even after sanctions, Russia is in a much better position than Ukraine. But Ukr's successes have created misconceptions about Ru's capabilities and delayed heavy weapon deliveries.
Ukr had 200 Smerch and Uragan on 24th Feb, inability to replenish ammo has degraded their power.