The Rabin-Scott theorem is one of the (philosophically) deepest mathematical results I know. When properly understood, I claim that it can't help but alter your view of reality in a fairly foundational way. Yet its typical textbook presentation obscures much of this depth. (1/8)
Suppose you have a non-deterministic computer (formally, a non-deterministic finite automaton) which can perform a whole tree of possible actions from a given input state, and I have a deterministic one, which can only follow a single path. Clearly yours is better, right? (2/8)
Well, no. The Rabin-Scott theorem says that I can still simulate yours by defining each state of my computation to be a *collection* of possible states of yours. So the state space of my computation is simply the power set (i.e. the set of possible subsets) of yours. (3/8)
My state space is thus exponentially larger (of size 2^n) than yours, but still, the point stands: everything you can compute, I can compute too. Okay, that's cool, but I think there's a much deeper lesson about the nature of (non-)determinism to be extracted here. (4/8)
Most people are familiar with the idea that, if you have a deterministic model of something, you can always make it non-deterministic by deleting some information or coarse-graining over certain degrees of freedom. But far fewer people are familiar with the converse. (5/8)
Namely, if you have a non-deterministic model of something, you can always make an equivalent deterministic model (yielding identical predictions) whose space of states is just the power set of the original. This fact has been (largely) ignored in the philosophy of science. (6/8)
The conclusion? Determinism and non-determinism are not properties of *systems* but properties of *models*. So it simply doesn't make sense to ask "Is the universe deterministic?" or "Is quantum mechanics non-deterministic?" or even "Do humans have free will?" (7/8)
Sometimes it's useful to model these things deterministically, sometimes it's not. But never forget that these notions of determinism and non-determinism are human concepts that *we* have introduced through our choice of models. The universe, fundamentally, doesn't care. (8/8)
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What actually *is* curvature? It's a surprisingly hard question, and one which wasn't satisfactorily answered until the early 20th century, thanks to the work of Tullio Levi-Civita, Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro and other (largely Italian) differential geometers. (1/9)
The (deep) answer?
Curvature is a measure of how much a space fails to be parameterized by a single coordinate system.
The room you're in right now is not (appreciably) curved, meaning that you can describe every point within it uniquely with a set of (x, y, z) coordinates. (2/9)
But what about the surface of a sphere (like the Earth(ish))? We all know that you can describe every point on the surface of the Earth with latitude-longitude coordinates, so surely it can't be curved either?
Well, it (sort of) wouldn't be, were it not for the North Pole… (3/9)
What might spinning black holes be telling us about (the futility of) time travel?
The metric tensor in general relativity has three positive eigenvalues and one negative eigenvalue; geometrically, this means that three coordinate directions yield positive distances... (1/10)
...and one yields negative distances. We interpret the positive directions as space coordinates and the negative direction as time; we have freedom of motion in the positive/space directions, but are "locked" to progress monotonically in the negative/time direction. (2/10)
But inside an uncharged, spinning black hole (described by the Kerr metric), things become a little different. The curvature singularity at the center is ring-shaped, in contrast to the point-like singularity at the core of a non-spinning (Schwarzschild) black hole. (3/10)
Everything we know about fundamental physics may be summarized by the statement:
"Nature doesn't care about coordinate systems."
Indeed, rather remarkably, all of our most foundational theories of physics appear to have (essentially) no content *apart* from this statement. (1/9)
If you start from a smooth, 4-dimensional Lorentzian manifold (spacetime) and want to start "doing physics" on it, it is helpful to define local space and time coordinates at every point. But there is much freedom in how to do this, with many permissible coordinate choices. (2/9)
But these coordinates are mere bookkeeping devices, and the laws of physics (presumably) shouldn't care about something so arbitrary. So we can look at the collection of all such (smoothly-invertible) coordinate transformations, namely the spacetime diffeomorphism group. (3/9)
Indeed, and it's rather beautiful (and leads to some potentially interesting predictions)! First, imagine a multiway system in which a black hole forms on some branches of history but not on others. Because the BH is a relatively "ordered" state... (1/7)
...compared to the "pure" background hypergraph, the branches on which the BH didn't form eventually become entropically dominant over the ones in which it did. This has the effect of reducing the overall amplitude associated with the presence of the BH... (2/7)
...which an observer perceives as evaporation. This calculation agrees with the semiclassical Bekenstein-Hawking formula for subextremal BHs, but also has some interesting deviations due to quantum gravity effects. For my money, the most interesting deviations are:... (3/7)