Thread by @Archer83Able

🇺🇦🇷🇺 | Polish defence analyst Konrad Muzyka shared his impressions regarding the current state of war following his trip to Ukraine. I've translated the thread into English.

1/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157813364600855

Let's start with Zaluzhny's article in The Economist. The word stalmate is used in a quite awkward manner (more on that below). But it emphasizes that the counteroffensive has ended. Ukraine currently does not have the potential to conduct offensive operations.

2/12

Personally, I think that the culmination of the counteroffensive took place in September, when the Ukrainians "broke through" the Russian line of fortifications west of Verbove.

3/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157818750124385?t=h2fbgMyNirK-ovA6IMCCdQ&s=19

I don't expect any major changes here until spring, although I assume that some form of attacks in Zaporizhzhia will be maintained (squad/platoon attacks). This is not Normandy 1944 and no one here is waiting for a magical breakthrough.

4/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157820952182825?t=9vD4smw_1DHHRlsHKD4iQw&s=19

I don't know if Zaluzhny used the word "stalemate" on purpose, but unfortunately it has political implications. I believe that from Zelensky's perspective, a stalemate may lead to a freezing of the front (as in 2015) and a withdrawal of military aid from the West. Hence his immediate comment, countering Z's words.

5/12

Ukraine receives less ammunition than in the summer, which affects the intensity of artillery fire. Ammunition also arrives in Ukraine irregularly, which makes planning operations more difficult.

6/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157826161410477?t=7AqQvkGzJqiuvadOEnsPHQ&s=19

Therefore, I expect that Kyiv will slowly move to the defensive and focus on expanding its fortification systems. This will allow for a reduction in the forces involved in maintaining the front and for the gradual rebuilding of forces and training of units that have so far taken part in the fighting.

7/12

Given the failure to achieve the goals of the counteroffensive, Kyiv must rethink its current theory of victory and concept of using its forces.

8/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157830779408533?t=nQilq4ctgUe3PMjtoQ8SdA&s=19

It seems that 2024 will be a difficult year for Ukraine. There is no equipment in the West, probably no ammunition either. Some of the holes will be patched by drones (hundreds of thousands produced annually from 2024).

9/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157832750690342?t=aYTPbqX8pOzmy9Laa5KPLA&s=19

But to recapture the area, combined operations are needed, air attacks (drones??), artillery, tanks and IFVs. The last three will probably be missing. Besides, I already said half a year ago that the peak of supplies of equipment (contracted) to Ukraine had passed. Nothing has changed in this respect.

10/12

The Russians conduct surveillance of the frontline areas 24/7. A mouse won't slip through, not to mention large amounts of hardware. To put these words in context, we saw what an attempted Russian attack on Ukrainian positions looks like.

11/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157837171462155?t=8FJcUAi3dq963qYYIFCwow&s=19

30 seconds after detection, the Russian group was hit by mortar fire. After another four minutes, artillery cluster ammunition. It's the same with Russians. These are the realities of this war.

12/12

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157839339983175?t=INpJUAUO_-Dq-xvim6Sngw&s=19