Thread by @danielgoyal

Whitty's testimony didn't come with the headline-grabbing revelations of other testimonies but it was one of the most illuminating of the Inquiry so far.

Particularly in terms of timeline and where the govt properly failed.

Here's my impression of it and some key moments...
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2/ The first thing to note is just how qualified Whitty is -Epidemiologist, Consultant Physician, Infectious Disease Consultant, and expert in Tropical Medicine. Really, you couldn't ask for a better-qualified CMO to handle a pandemic.

3/ The next, is just how well he handled himself on the stand. As mild-mannered and (a fault I have long attributed to him) passive as he seems, he is sharp and clearly boardroom savvy too. He thought on his feet and pushed back on the KC quite firmly at times.

4/ Sadly, Whitty used up too much capital protecting Ministers and other Advisers. Whereas, those advisers who left their posts have been a lot more critical (or honest) about govt officials, Whitty is still putting up barriers and this seems borderline obstructive.

5/ He might though have got away with it to some degree.

Certainly, my first impression of Whitty through the first two years of the pandemic was that he was a bit of a nodding dog, too passive, and probably was complicit in the impotent govt response. Now, I am not so sure.

6/ The KC's premise seemed to be that Whitty should have escalated sooner and should have been more forceful with Ministers. The latter point is probably right, although one suspects with a good PM and Cabinet he wouldn't have needed to be pushy

7/ But as to whether Whitty should have done more sooner? I am not convinced.

He actually reacted very early at the start of January with a most impressive email to his colleagues at the DHSE and Public Health England.

He did then, as was his remit, delegate to PHE.

8/ KC didn't fully buy this and seemed quite set that Whitty should have escalated this to Cabinet level by around 15th Jan

Whitty disagrees, adamantly. His argument was that even though there was person-to-person transmission, pandemics can still petter out - like SARS1 & Zika.

9/ I will post the video of this at the bottom. It is worth seeing as Whitty demonstrates he can stand up for himself

Effectively the KC sees that the moment Covid moved to another country we should have known it was coming here. Whitty disagrees. I think Whitty is right here.

10/ 28th of Jan is when it gets really illuminating. Whitty clearly decides this needs escalating to the central govt level. He says it was at this point he viewed the threat to the overall country (not just health) as substantial. It needed cross-govt action.

11/ Now, at this point, Whitty begins briefing No 10, the Cabinet Office, and the treasury, as these are the ONLY bodies that can act across government.

The threat to the UK economy and security is significant so it needs central govt to take charge.

12/ And the crucial point (that most of MSM have breezed over), on the 28th of Jan the central govt did not take charge. There was no leadership. Despite what was a clear warning - Whitty was briefing them which was unusual - no one took the reigns.

13/ What is also remarkable (particularly for those of us involved at the time), Whitty did actually advocate for maximal suppression at that time. He spoke of needing to contact and trace and isolate all cases...Again, the govt wasn't interested.

14/ SAGE also advised on the next day 29th Jan, that "HMG needed to change approach".

By the 5th of Feb it was very clear that Whitty and SAGE were united in calling for central co-ordinated action...it failed to materialise.

15/ Again, MSM seems to have missed this. A serving CMO clearly states that the govt failed to shift up a gear "or two" at this point. Even the judge pressed him on it. This was clearly the moment the pandemic could and should have been seized.

16/ The KC looks at possible mitigating factors for govt Ministers and officials. 'They didn't understand exponential growth' or probabilities and points out Whitty is still using the terms "if" the pandemic spread. KC suggests he failed to convey the facts to Minsters properly.

17/ But really, this doesn't wash (Judge didn't seem to buy it either). By this time there were dozens of meetings and Whitty/Valance were briefing Ministers, news was of a pandemic,...it is inconceivable they didn't know it was serious.

He had pushed for containment, it seems.

18/ And this brings us to the issue of containment. Had Ministers acted on the 5th of Feb (when there were only a few cases) and green-lighted the use of isolation, then it could have made a massive difference. Whitty argues this was the window for proper containment.

19/ By the time the actual plan came out (it was delayed as it needed ministerial approval), the notion of containment similar to that of Australia, NZ, East Asia, had, Whitty says, passed. The opportunity to achieve effectively near zero Covid in the UK had passed.

20/ It is difficult to convey just how critical this point in time was in the pandemic. Had central govt (Cabinet or No 10) taken the reigns as they had been asked to, moved to contain the virus, then our entire pandemic may well have looked very different.

21/ Yes, we will hear tomorrow about Johnson's failure to act on the 15th of March that probably led to losing 10's of thousands of lives. But this point in 5th Feb to 15th Feb was the point at which we lost the opportunity to avoid lockdowns and save perhaps over 100,000 lives

22/ And I have to say, the govt had everything it needed to act at that time.

What again was most revealing but not picked up by MSM, was the admission that Whitty getting any "containment" in the plan was a "negotiation"...

The govt did not want to contain it.

23/ Where this advice was coming from remains unclear. Who was advising the govt that "natural herd immunity" was a possible way through just isn't clear. But it has come from somewhere...I do hope the @covidinquiryuk asks Johnson where this idea came from.

24/ As @chrischirp points out, Whitty seems to brush over the utility of maximal suppression until vaccines. This was the right strategy and one presumably still open to us even at the time of action in March. Yes, we may have missed the opportunity to be a Japan, or NZ, but.?

25/ We still have part 2 tomorrow covering lockdown decisions, Eat out to Help Out, and the killer blow for govt Ministers: the second lockdown delays. It will be interesting to see if Whitty can keep protecting his bosses then.
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