Thread by @danielgoyal

Part 2 of Prof Whitty's testimony to @covidinquiryuk

This concludes Whitty's evidence for Module 2 of the Inquiry (he will be back).

My initial impression of Whitty and the decision-making at the heart of government during 2020...
1/n

2/ The questions to be answered by Whitty in regards to the UK’s delayed response to the pandemic is whether...

a) was his position one of “watch and wait” and he therefore added to the harmful delays?

or

b) did he fail to convey the urgency of the matter to Ministers?

3/ As for point a)... It was apparent that he was at times too slow to act, as Whitty acknowledged himself:

“Now, as we will I'm sure come on to, my view is, with the benefit of hindsight, we went a bit too late on the first wave, and I've been clear about that for some time.”

But did he escalate his concerns at the right time?

KC suggests it should have been raised on 16th of Jan…he should have “raised the alarm”. Whitty says he was taking this seriously, a number of people were acting on it and shortly after this the first SAGE meeting was held…

5/ KC pushes and after detailed answers, the judge intervenes and says:

"I think to be fair, Mr Keith [KC], Sir Chris said that they were to make sure the issue was taken seriously, and he has just said we were taking it seriously.”

She thinks he did.

6/ But KC is quite adamant that by 30th Jan something and certainly by the 4th of Feb someone should have been saying to the govt :

“"There is a massive threat and we are woefully under-prepared for it, and something must be done at the very highest level and with real urgency"

Given the calibre of Govt Ministers, their lack of attention to detail and how easily they are distracted by optics, the KC is ultimately right

A point of reflection must be that in such circumstances with such a Cabinet, being very direct may have sparked the govt into action.

8/ I think the Inquiry produced enough evidence to highlight that Whitty did raise the issue with central government at the right time. He had the expectation that central govt - No 10 & the Cabinet Office - would react appropriately to this i.e. take a leadership role.

9/ In fairness, Hancock and his team were given direction to lead on this and report back (expect a grilling for Hancock here). But ultimately, the proposition put forward by the Inquiry that Whitty should have pushed harder seems to hold.

10/ Yes, Whitty was cautious about raising the alarm and instigating measures and I think then more likely to be inclined to move toward positions that did not require interventions - lack of border controls, failure to cancel large events, and failure to close hospitality sooner

11/ But I do not accept the view that Whitty suggests that directly or indirectly these measures would not have made a material difference to the trajectory or the ultimate number of deaths from the pandemic, even at the late stage they were being considered.

I think Whitty did raise it appropriately with the govt on 4th of Feb, and then, as the Inquiry went on to show, Ministers and officials just simply did not want to fully engage it. They debated for weeks about whether the worst-case scenario would happen…time clearly misspent.

13/ My impression of this time was that the major failure was undoubtably the govt’s. Yes, Whitty could have pushed harder and been more explicit. Indeed, a well-timed media interview at this point may have moved the dial somewhat. But that does not seem in Whitty’s character.

He is clearly brilliant in his fields. His testimony across a wide range of topics from disability to ethnic minorities to devolution demonstrated that. And while his ascension is in part related to not pissing off people in power, I don’t think there is a political animal there.

But that is part of the issue, that he is so averse to criticising others that there is an ineffectualness at certain points...

As we now know about the culture in the Cabinet Office and No 10 at the time, an aggressive posture is needed, even if one wants to simply be heard.

16/ In a sense, perhaps, as much as Whitty was the ideal CMO for this pandemic, perhaps he was not the ideal CMO for this Cabinet.

I think it fairer to say that the Cabinet,much like they did with the NHS, did not utilise him fully as the remarkable resource he is.

17/ He followed his training and broadly acted in accordance with what would be expected. Perhaps he expected that same respect for due process, for understanding the differing roles and attention to detail would carry through to Cabinet and the PM. It most certainly did not.

18/ What is clear though, he was staunchly opposed to any form of herd immunity (without vaccines). And for me, this is really reassuring. To hear this and see the evidence with confidence that the CMO was not advocating herd immunity does provide some solace for me.

19/ The question remains as to where this idea of herd immunity came from. While we hope the Inquiry gets to the bottom of this (although Johnson’s testimony will be obstructive), I think it is important to realise that Johnson likely never let go of this idea of herd immunity.

20/ I think he and several others always had in their minds that the sooner we get through this the sooner life will return to normal. He was aware that this meant massive loss of life and a massive impact on healthcare in the UK, but I think it very likely he simply didn’t care.

Their position became that failing to contain the virus always had the silver lining of moving us one step closer to exiting the pandemic. I must say, even knowing what Johnson has done so far, I think the level of callousness it takes to take this position is truly remarkable.

I think it likely that Johnson and other govt officials were in fact working on herd immunity as a strategy throughout the pandemic and merely managing the Scientists and hiding behind them and the NHS for the consequences of that position (e.g. lockdowns, school closures, etc)

23/ In a sense then, they were in fact working against the scientists. As they sought to suppress, Johnson resisted. As they looked to provide opportunities to enable people to avoid the virus, the chancellor resisted. As they looked to protect the NHS, they resisted.

24/ Whitty didn’t get everything right - he is quite open with most of the things he got wrong. Nor should he have got everything right. It was impossible to. But he certainly gave the Cabinet and Johnson the opportunity to act in a timely manner to this national threat.

25/ It seems a long way around to the conclusion most of us started the Inquiry with… the worst govt at the worst possible time.

But importantly, do the failings of scientists get govt Ministers off the hook? Certainly not so far!