Thread by @kamilkazani

1. Russia makes more weaponry than its enemies. If nothing is done about its military production, Russia will win this war

2. Establishing the new political rule:

Always bet against the US allies

3. With the absolutely destructive effect on the US policy and standing in Asia

4. The Russian victory in Ukraine will radically devalue the worth of the US alliance in the eyes of the world

5. Yes, America lost asymmetric wars before. But this is the first time, it will be defeated in the symmetric warfare

6. Its standing will be adjusted accordingly

7. Yes, never bet against the US rule will stand for a while (don't declare the war, don't attack the US soil)

8. But now it will be supplemented with always bet against the US allies

9. Promises, guarantees and commitments are not worth much. America is weak -> backs off easily

10. The world is guided not so much by the "rational choice" (abstraction), as by impressions (real thing)

11. Defeats in the asymmetric warfare may have raised a suspicion of weakness

12. But the belief in the US ability to win a symmetric war was never undermined

Now it will be

13. In the post Ukraine war reality, the world will be governed by the new impression:

The US is withdrawing from the symmetric wars, because it cannot win them

13. And the US commitments are not worth much, because the US is simply incapable of fulfilling them

14. Asian countries have every reason to expect the Ukraine scenario in the Pacific:

US give promises they cannot fulfil -> You stand against the invader -> Get steamrolled -> Be left to your fate among ashes and ruins

Why not accept your fate now, skipping ashes & ruins part?

15. Should Ukraine lose, I expect "standing up against China" becoming a politically indefensible position in Taiwan

16. The preventive lowkey surrender will look as the only reasonable & responsible choice

17. With a good degree of certainty, you may consider Taiwan as gone

18. Yes, there are strong reasons for the US to avoid a potential escalation with Russia

19. But most of these reasons apply to the escalation with China, perhaps even to a greater degree

20. Therefore, we can expect the US to be *less* decisive about China than about Russia

21. A defeat in Ukraine will vastly undermine the US political standing in Asia

22. Its allies will be under impression that the US is either uncommitted or incapable to win. Probably, both

23. While China is certainly very committed to win

Only a fool will stand on its way

24. Now an interesting thing is that the US have every chance to win. That is because the supply chain for precision metalworking equipment is controlled by its allies

25. And metalworking is how you make weaponry. No, it's not all about microchips. Production of complex weaponry such as an intercontinental ballistic missile is primarily constrained by the metalworking capacity. And metalworking capacity is mostly precision machining capacity

26. In late 20th c. machining has very quickly went from the manual to computer control. As a result, it became very much more productive. At the same time, machining equipment, parts and consumables became increasingly more difficult to produce

That's how the air defence missiles has changed (Kalinin Plant, Almaz Antey)

Before: manually operated, steel instruments, often domestically produced
Now: computer controlled, carbide instruments, nearly 100% Western import

27. This had a double effect on catching development powers:

a) Allowed them to produce precise parts (-> weaponry) cheaper and more consistently than before
b) Made them almost totally reliant upon the Western import to produce weaponry

(NITI Snegireva)

28. And China is a catching development power itself. It cannot substitute for the Western import, and won't be able for a while. It may produce more lasers than anyone. But when you want a precision laser cutter, you are not gonna buy Chinese

You gonna buy Trumpf (Germany)

29. Western machine tool producers may not be technically breaking sanctions. That is because sanctions are designed not to work. Trumpf for example, continued supporting its laser cutting equipment in Russia well into this war and is almost certainly continuing it now

30. Once again, it's not about Western producers "breaking sanctions". It is about Russian capacity for metalworking (= weaponry production) being almost fully based upon the equipment imported from the US allies between 2003-2023

If you want to make an S300 erector...

... You will need a Tos Varnsdorf (Czechia) machine

Production of metalworking equipment has been outsourced to the West, long, long before this war started

31. How can Russia even continue producing complex weaponry if we don't see the Russian machinery around? Where is Russian machinery?

People with above room temperature IQ have been asking this question for long, long time

32. And if your ruling class has not been asking this question, that is not because it is "dumb", but because it consists of low curiosity people

They are not really low in intelligence. They are just low in curiosity

33. People on top spend half of their life forcing their way to the top and the second half guarding their position

You spend your youth climbing the ladder, and maturity kicking the ladders away

There is no time for curiosity or pursuing any sort of deep personal interest

34. Our social hierarchies select for high ambition low curiosity people. Productive, socially intelligent, people on the top tend to be shockingly narrow minded

They can't think out of the box, because they don't have out of the box knowledge. They never had time to acquire it

35. A life spent in acquiring unobvious knowledge is the life not spent in forcing your way to the top of the hierarchy. And vice versa, a life spent acquiring the knowledge that allows you to even ask the right questions will not lead you to the top of the hierarchy

The end

I will post revised and edited versions in my substack and patreon. Generally speaking, what I post here is more of notes than texts in their own rights