Mark Elliott Profile picture
Dec 13 10 tweets 4 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
1. Just catching up with @Policy_Exchange's briefing on the Rwanda Bill. policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/upl…
2. Academics (including, it seems, @AdamJTucker and me) are implicitly accused of being 'wildly irresponsible' by 'invit[ing] the Supreme Court to overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty: Image
3. This appears to be based on @AdamJTucker's very measured @ukcla piece () and a piece I posted on my blog ()ukconstitutionallaw.org/2023/11/22/ada…
publiclawforeveryone.com/2023/12/06/the…
4. In reality, no-one is inviting the Supreme Court to 'overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty or suggesting that it is likely that the Court would take the radical step of disapplying the Rwanda Bill. But the position is more subtle than @Policy_Exchange acknowledges.
5. As @AdamJTucker points out in his piece, dicta that suggest Parliament's legislative authority might be more qualified than hitherto assumed form 'a subtle but pervasive background feature to the contemporary constitution'. Image
6. In making that point, @AdamJTucker draws on a very helpful piece by Se-shauna Wheatle on the residual powers of courts, in which she considers dicta in the AXA and Jackson cases: ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/07/10/se-…
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7. I have argued that the relevant dicta are best understood in the context of a set of expectations that presuppose both Parliament & courts will remain within their respective constitutional spheres, rather than as a bald assertion of judicial authority. publiclawforeveryone.com/2023/12/12/cou…
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8. Finally, it's worth noting that declining to apply a provision in an Act of Parliament may, in some circumstances, be an affirmation rather than a rejection of parliamentary sovereignty, as Laws LJ said in Cart and as I noted here: publiclawforeveryone.com/2023/12/11/cou…
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9/9. All of this seems some distance from academics being 'wildly irresponsible' and 'inviting' the courts to 'overthrow' parliamentary sovereignty.
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More from @ProfMarkElliott

Dec 12
1. The UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights (@HumanRightsCtte) has published a preliminary analysis of the Rwanda Bill. Here's a short thread with some key excerpts. committees.parliament.uk/publications/4…
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2. The Committee notes that if Rwanda remains unsafe, the effect of the Bill would be to permit removals nevertheless and to prevent courts from stopping them, thus breaching Articles 3 and 13 ECHR. Image
3. The JCHR observes, as others have also pointed out, that if the Government was confident that the UK-Rwanda Treaty satisfactorily addressed the Supreme Court's concerns, the Bill would be unnecessary unless the aim was simply to speed up the operationalisation of the policy. Image
Read 10 tweets
Dec 11
1. The 'Star Chamber' has spoken (on the Rwanda Bill). Only a 'partial solution', it concludes. lawyersforbritain.org/wp-content/upl…
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2. Key concern relates to clause 4, which permits challenges on individual grounds (as opposed to on the general ground that Rwanda is an unsafe country). Image
3. Also concerned that clause 5 (Ministers can ignore ECtHR interim measures) may make matters worse (from perspective of those who want maximally restrictive regime). Image
Read 10 tweets
Dec 11
Constitutional lawyers may find suggestions that parliamentary sovereignty is an 'assumption' less surprising, since the suggestion emanates not from four KCs who have just written to a newspaper but from judges themselves. (1)
Indeed, one of the leading theoretical accounts of parliamentary sovereignty, published by Sir William Wade in the Cambridge Law Journal in 1955, insists that the sovereignty of Parliament lies 'in the keeping of the courts'. (2)
cambridge.org/core/journals/…
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More recently, some senior judges have argued that parliamentary sovereignty is not 'absolute'. See, eg, Lord Steyn in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [102]: (3) bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/…
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Read 11 tweets
Dec 9
The Government's ECHR Memo on the Rwanda Bill makes interesting reading. The absence of a s 19 statement of compatibility notwithstanding, the Bill is said to be capable of application compatibly with the ECHR. (1) publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill…
The Government's position, as set out in its ECHR Memo, on clauses 4 and 5 of the Rwanda Bill (dealing with individual circumstances and ECtHR interim measures respectively) seem to me to be particularly strained and/or telling. (2)
It's said that clause 4 is compatible with the ECHR, including the Article 13 right to an effective remedy, because it will be possible for domestic courts to issue suspensive remedies: (3) Image
Read 13 tweets
Sep 22, 2022
A very helpful thread on the Government's statement concerning the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill. I would just add one additional point... /1
The Business Secretary says in his statement that: 'There will no longer be a place for EU law concepts in our statute book.' /2
But that is surely incorrect. As far as I understand it, the Bill addresses only matters concerning 'retained EU Law' within the meaning of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Withdrawal Agreement, and its domestic legal effects, are a separate matter. /3
Read 9 tweets
Sep 2, 2022
I find this opinion on the Johnson Privileges Committee matter very odd. Much of it is concerned with the fact that the Committee's process may not adhere to legal standards that are wholly inapplicable to a political, parliamentary process. /1
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
The opinion notes near its outset that decisions by the Committee are not subject to judicial review, claiming that if they were, a court would find against the Committee. /2
However, this understates matters in crucial respects. The fact that the Committee is not subject to judicial review is no mere happenstance: it is a matter of basic, and sound, constitutional principle that proceedings are not subject to judicial oversight. /3
Read 7 tweets

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