A FEW QUICK THOUGHTS ON THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINION ON MEADOWS.
(1) This is an astonishing defeat for Meadows, on every front. He's not protected because he's a former officer (not a current one), and he's not protected even if CA11 turns out to be wrong on that question.
(2) This is particularly devastating because the ruling against him on whether his activity was under color of law FOR THE PURPOSES OF REMOVAL will do double duty as an opinion on whether he was engaged in official conduct FOR THE PURPOSES OF HIS IMMUNITY DEFENSES.
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Still on (2), this means that state courts have *all the cover in the world* to refuse to recognize an officer immunity they were unlikely to recognize anyways. The only entity that can save Meadows on officer immunity is SCOTUS, and that seems *exceedingly* unlikely.
4/
(3) In every way this is bad for Meadows, it's bad for Trump's defense in GEORGIA. Trump was going to claim Supremacy Clause immunity and Presidential immunity, but CA11's opinion on the scope of official duty means that it's going to be impossible for Trump
5/
to prevail on either defense in the GA proceeding. He's going to be saved there by the jury or by winning the national election, that's it, IMHO.
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(4) This is ALSO devastating to Trump et al. in the other prosecutions, especially in DC. In all of these cases, he's claiming various forms of immunity that turn on the basic idea that he was somehow engaged in good governance, not unlawful electioneering.
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Still on (4), it's *impossible* to overstate the significance of this opinion being written by Chief Judge Pryor, a conservative stalwart and probably the single biggest circuit court ally to Justice Thomas there is.
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Judge Pryor clearly wrote this opinion well in advance of argument. It is an unmistakable signal to R-appointed Justices that the immunity defenses are totally frivolous.
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It offers an energetic rebuttal to a "Take Care Clause" argument that seemed to gain traction in some R-aligned circles. It's really just a worst case scenario for Trump, not to mention Meadows.
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(5) I should add that I'm still quite skeptical of the first holding, that former officers aren't covered under the statute. The holding is a combination of interpretive canons that I find less persuasive under the specific circumstances here.
But,
(6) The holding about whether the agreement at the core of the charge was within the scope of M's and T's official duties is exactly what I've been predicting from the start - maybe even a touch more aggressive than I'd expected.
/e
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Ultra-wealthy Penn Donors toppled University of Pennsylvania President Liz Magill because of what they said was a fetish for free speech that nurtured antisemitism.
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The inflection point was an edited video of congressional testimony, produced by Elise Stefanik’s (R) office, in which Magill said (truthfully) that “it depends” whether “genocidal” speech was a Penn code violation.
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Stefanik misrepresented it as a more abstract equivocation on the moral status of genocidal speech overall. Bill Ackman, a billionaire hedge fund manager and an early financial supporter of Vivek Ramaswamy, blasted the video across twitter, and the rest is history.
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I'm pretty reluctant to weigh in here because of the ecosystemic climate for Jewish identity generally, but it seems like the outrage here is ... probably overdone and *certainly* rewarding bad faith actors.
not about the constitution or her views, but about the status of genocidal speech *under the Penn speech code*. This is the same question that the MIT and Harvard Presidents got. Now actually look at the code. Here's the FAQ on hate speech for Penn:
I confess that I do not understand what answer other than *it depends* is reasonable and can be given in sworn testimony.
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BIG PICTURE COMMENTS ON WILLIS/MEADOWS DISPUTE ON REMOVAL BEFORE CA11 (WONK ALERT):
1) I think Willis wins before a neutral panel, but a neutral panel is unlikely if drawn randomly. So it still nets out close to 50/50 before panel composition is known.
2) I still think the decisive argument is that M's supremacy clause immunity (SCI) defense is insufficient. The DCT didn't rule on that basis, so that would require affirmance on an alternative ground.
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3) Willis does a good job of succinctly explaining why the SCI defense stinks - (a) there's no evidence that M subjectively believed the charged conduct was necessary and proper to his office;
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JEFF CLARK'S REMOVAL REPLY IS ... WHAT YOU'D EXPECT.
I'm sorry I have little patience for these arguments, they are frivolous. Recall that removal requires (1) D is an officer ("O"), (2) prosecuted for something related to O's duty, and (3) a colorable federal defense.
The fight starts on prong (2), where Clark "reminds" the Court that it has to assume the D's "theory of the case." Well, Judge Jones expressly emphasized that very rule in the Meadows order, so it's not a legal error there.
/2
But assuming the removing Officer's "theory of the case" does not mean that the court blindly credits every single factual and legal assertion O makes in the removal papers. (Like, really, that's not what assuming the O's "theory of the case" means.)
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TEXT-BASED REASON WHY FORMER OFFICERS CAN REMOVE (REVISED IN LIGHT OF EXCHANGE WITH @gelbach)
The Eleventh Circuit ordered Meadows and Willis to brief whether 28 USC § 1442(a)(1) permits *former* officers to remove for indicted conduct that occurred when they were officers.
Meadows says yes, Willis says no. The stakes here are extremely high – if the answer is “no”, then any DA in a deep red/blue county can wait until the day a D/R officer leaves their post and indict them for conduct undertaken in the course of the officer’s duty.
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That’s a terrible rule, and would certainly chill the behavior of officers in the undertaking of their official duties. The primary concern here is a comparison of 1442(a)(1) with 1442(b),
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MEADOWS WILL LOSE *MOST OF* THE STAY LITIGATION ALSO
A *stay* will not pause the state court prosecution, and any argument to the contrary misapprehends the difference between a stay and an injunction. 1/
28 USC 1455(b)(4) expressly says that the state prosecution goes forward during the pendency of the removal fight, except that the state court cannot enter a judgment of conviction. (The case can be tried to verdict!) 2/
Normally we don't care about the difference between an injunction and a stay. But here it makes a really big difference. A stay returns to the status quo ante before the district court's dispositive order. Here, the status quo ante is ... 3/