On the implications of the Vatican document on blessings for same-sex couples, a brief thread. 1/X
In the pontificate's 1st stage I worried about Francis pushing the church over a "precipice" w/attempts at doctrinal change. But in the 2nd stage, after the family synods, there was a retreat to a strategy of ambiguous liberalization that avoided sharp doctrinal confrontation.
This still seemed to me to inevitably exacerbate tensions in the long run, widening gaps between liberal and conservative practice, encouraging liberals to always push further - a "slow road" to schism. nytimes.com/2019/09/14/opi…
My initial take on Vatican permission for (a kind of) SSM blessings has been that it's more of the same, a move that claims to preserve doctrine as against the dramatic changes demanded by progressives; contradiction-heightening but not crisis-creating: nytimes.com/2023/11/29/opi…
Following the reaction though I want to caveat that "more of the same" take, bc the core question raised by the document is what it asks/requires of priests. Is this a permission to offer blessings of the (ambiguous) kind envisioned, or a requirement?
If "permission" then the document essentially encourages the increasing separation of practice between different Catholic parishes, dioceses and countries. Again, in keeping with the larger pattern of (ambiguous) papal permissions for (partial) liberalization.
If it's a "requirement" for such blessings, OTOH, the document sets up a situation where conservative practice becomes disobedience, where a form of liberalization can be effectively demanded and not just embraced where it's desired.
The latter situation much more likely to lead to an explicit crisis of authority. Which is no doubt why the document declines to clarify: "no further responses should be expected about possible ways to regulate details or practicalities regarding blessings of this type."
That line seeks to immunize Rome from demands from more liberal Catholics for some kind of enforcement mechanism against conservative priests and bishops. But the rest of the document makes such liberal demands seem entirely plausible.
So the document is not a full departure from the "slow road" situation -- but only because Rome does not want to exercise enforcement powers. But it is a shift, insofar as the document legitimizes demands that, if answered, could push things closer to a breaking point. /fin
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Pretty strong stuff in there: Not just alien crafts in US government hands, but alien bodies, malevolent aliens, private-contractor research, a coverup dating back to an alleged UFO recovery in Mussolini's Italy, and more.
To pick up the argument I made here, it's not just a cultural accident that current-era progressivism tends toward a catastrophizing, depressive mood; some of that unhappiness was baked in by the triumph of social liberalism that preceded the current era: nytimes.com/2023/02/18/opi…
Social liberalism favors self-invention and damns "normativity"; it's not formally against religion but in practice it's a secularizing force. "Create yourself in an uncreated world" is the message; that's a big lift for anyone but esp for teens set loose in a virtual reality:
e.g., these two case studies in how A.I. could "perfect" an existing process (holiday shopping, writing an advertising script or thinkpiece) sound like recipes for "perfection" at the expense of weirdness, randomness, serendipity, real creativity:
Michael Gerson, RIP. A good man and a beautiful writer whose support for PEPFAR contributed to some of the most actually-effective altruism ever carried out by the US government. Here he is writing on his cancer, ten years ago: washingtonpost.com/opinions/2013/…
Gerson on sending your kids to college (I can attest that contemplating sending one to middle school is hard enough): washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…
No need to choose a single scapegoat, Republicans can have simultaneous problems (a polycrisis?) with: 1) Trump's toxicity 2) base's preference for unelectable candidates 3) unpopularity of full pro-life position post-Dobbs 4) lack of middle-friendly economic agenda
The impact of each then varies by region/candidates -- e.g. economic disconnect maybe looms larger in Fetterman-Oz -
- abortion in MI/WI where pre-Roe laws are on books, Trump wherever stop-the-steal candidates are running, etc.
Solving 1.5 of these problems maybe gets the GOP the wins it wanted in this cycle; a durable governing majority (of the kind US politics doesn't produce anymore, yes) would require solving more of them.
With so much focus on Trump, a short thread on other explainers for GOP underperformance. First, here's @SohrabAhmari in our pages arguing that the GOP still doesn't have a "worker's agenda" to fit its working-class base: nytimes.com/2022/11/10/opi…
I'm more skeptical than Sohrab that Republicans can hope to gain much ground with the post-grad precariat, but he's broadly right about the problem, and crucially even though inflation helped the GOP it also creates problems for would-be populists by making deficits matter again.