1/8 Good article. It cites prominent labor economist Cai Fang as arguing that further reform to the hukou system could unleash more than 2 trillion yuan in consumption. "Even without an increase of incomes," he notes, "it would raise...
2/8 migrant workers’ spending power by 30 per cent because of improvements to their social safety net."
He's certainly right that reforming (i.e. eliminating) the hukou system would boost consumption, but this is also why it is so difficult to do.
3/8 It would boost consumption, he notes, because it would mean an improvement in the social safety nets for tens of millions of migrant workers.
But this improvement isn't free. It would be the obverse of a huge increase in social spending by the major cities.
4/8 If that increase in spending is funded by transfers from other households, it's net impact on consumption would be minimal. If it is funded by transfers from businesses, it would mean reducing their subsidies and so undermining their international competitiveness.
5/8 Finally if it is funded by governments, it would require the liquidation and transfer of local-government assets which, in turn, implies a fairly major transformation of the institutions around which local political, business and financial elites have formed.
6/8 The point is that there's no secret to boosting the role of consumption. It requires direct and indirect transfers that raise the share of GDP retained by households which, in turn, requires reducing the share retained by businesses and/or governments.
7/8 But to the extent that China's economic, political, financial and legal institutions, along with its manufacturing competitiveness, were structured around 3-4 decades of transfers from households to businesses and governments, reversing these transfers is easy enough to...
8/8 propose, but it cannot be done without structural adjustments that, among other things, will result in a very different economy, a reduced reliance on manufacturing, and a redistribution of political power away from local governments and towards households and Beijing.
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1/8 Zhang Jun argues here that worries about a Chinese slowdown are exaggerated. He notes that "China’s government is expected urgently to reduce the share of investment in GDP and support household consumption, such as through...
2/8 income transfers and stronger welfare programs (which would enable households to reduce precautionary savings)." He also notes that "China is grappling with issues like large debts, misallocation of capital, severe pollution, and a troubled property sector."
3/8 "But," he says, "China’s government has been clearly aware of these problems – and committed to addressing them – for a decade."
He's right that these problems have been obvious for over a decade, but that is exactly why we should worry.
1/6 I just finished Diana Henriques' very interesting book on FDR's attempts to rein in the excesses of Wall Street in the 1930s. She shows how the major New York banks fought ferociously (and often unfairly) against every proposed measure to...
@dianabhenriques
2/6 force better disclosure, to segregate productive financial activity from speculative activity, to limit monopolizing tendencies, and otherwise to reduce disruptive behavior by the major banks and Wall Street players.
3/6 In many cases the banks warned that even the least of these measures threatened the eventual collapse of the US financial system and the US economy, even when they consisted of obvious measures that resulted in a real strengthening of the financial system.
1/4 Important point by the FT: China's "targeted lending differs from broad western-style monetary easing, according to the central bank, by channelling cheap credit into strategic areas to boost the economy without stoking inflation."
2/4 This is why I disagree so strongly with the widespread perception that low inflation in China creates more room for monetary expansion. On the contrary, low inflation in China is evidence of excessive monetary expansion mainly because monetary expansion is driven by what...
3/4 in 1980s Japan was referred to as "window guidance". The purpose of monetary expansion, in Japan then and China today, is not to boost market-based demand but rather to boost supply in targeted sectors. Monetary expansion is disinflationary, rather than inflationary.
1/5 In December China's factory activity contracted for a third consecutive month, with the manufacturing PMI dropping to 49.0 in December from 49.4 in November. This was well below already weak expectations.
2/5 China has replaced a large part of the recent decline in property-sector investment with increased investment in manufacturing, and while some analysts saw this as a good thing, it seemed to me that it was simply shifting from one kind of over-investment into another.
3/5 That's because the biggest constraint on the manufacturing sector hasn't been access to capital but rather weak demand, so that expanding manufacturing investment mostly means expanding excess capacity. The latest data suggests this continues to be the case.
1/7 This Yicai article discusses a very interesting statement by prominent economist Teng Tai. Like a rising number of Chinese economists, Teng calls for transferring resources out of investment and into household income.
2/7 But he proposes it at a higher scale than others. The key, he says, "is to save around CNY20 trillion to CNY30 trillion of inefficient, ineffective, and excess investment each year, and convert it into disposable incomes and subsequently into consumption."
3/7 China currently invests around RMB 50-55 trillion every year. Teng seems to be suggesting that well over a third of this is "inefficient, ineffective, and excess investment", or substantially more than half of the aggregate investment in property and infrastructure.
1/9 The Guardian's editors write about the US dollar, but it's not clear they understand how the dollar works. "Today," they say, "the dollar’s exorbitant privilege comes with a heavy burden of duty."
2/9 But then they say: "US consumers and businesses get benefits in exchange for Washington providing a security guarantee and being the lender of last resort to the world. If Washington rejected these costs, it would erode demand for its currency, and so its leadership role."
3/9 That's not quite true. While US consumers do benefit from dollar dominance, the real burden is not from US security commitments. The burden is the economic cost. US dollar dominance is bad for American workers, farmers and businesses, because it undermines US competitiveness.