Behind Russia GDP’s 3.5% expansion in 2023 are uncontrolled growth of expenditures, high inflation, distortions in the labor market. Problems will only multiply in the future, as I argue in a @ForeignAffairs piece. THREAD 1/
2/ Putin faces an impossible trilemma. He must fund the war against Ukraine, maintain the Russian populace’s living standards, and safeguard macroeconomic stability. Achieving all three goals is impossible
3/ For now, high oil&gas revenues, competent financial management by the Russian authorities, and laxed enforcement of Western sanctions play to the Kremlin’s advantage, but they mask growing imbalances in the economy 👇
4/Military spending eclipsed social spending—less than 5% of GDP—for the first time in history. $18b state investment to 4 annexed regions of 🇺🇦 ↗️ interregional inequality. 🇷🇺 manufacturing has been transformed, with civilian industries dwarfed by the military-industrial complex
5/ Defense enterprises operate at fever pitch now. Any surge in demand will likely force prices to rise due to the sector’s inability to increase supply. This pushes up wages. For the time being this allows the Kremlin to maintain a pretense of normalcy, but with high inflation
6/The interplay between mil spending, labor shortages& rising wages has created an illusion of prosperity that is unlikely to last. ↗️ wages and state payments => consumption. Putin’s directive to secure availability of consumer goods => imports, discouraging domestic production
7/ The Kremlin’s way to fuel growth by subsidized loans to people and businesses undermine macroeconomic stability. The amount of such loans has exceeded $130 bln (7% of GDP). The mortgage sector is the main liability, as 70% of new credit accounts for soft-loans programs
8/ 🇷🇺 have also become unsustainably reliant on war-related payments. If the war is to end, it will become difficult for many people to service their loans, especially in the face of rising prices. See @WSJ dispatch by @chelseydulaney @georgikantchev
9/ The interest rate in Russia is 16% now. Businesses and households still continue to borrow, indicating high inflation expectations. @bank_of_russia is unlikely to return the rate to single digits any time soon
10/ Beyond the near-prohibitive cost of borrowing, for the Kremlin, high interest rates constitute an image problem, undermining Putin’s narrative about the stability of the Russian economy. A healthy economy, after all, does not need a double-digit key rate
11/ Volatility of the ruble is also a problem. Left at the mercy of trade flows, the ruble has oscillated between 50 and 100 RUR/$ over just 2 years. A three-digit $ exchange rate not only stokes inflation; it triggers public concern
12/ The authorities cannot remove the main reason for the ruble’s weakening, as they heavily rely on imports. What the Kremlin can do is control over capital flows and manual regulation of prices, triggering cascade of negative effect if the Kremlin uses these tools
13/ Control of prices works here and now, but they do not help against inflation and have negative effects in the long term. Any restriction of supply distorts market mechanisms and signals. More on that in this @FT piece by @NastyaStognei @courtney_ft
14/ So far, the situation looks stable in the short term:
gold and yuan reserves allow to finance ext.debt;
🇷🇺low prewar debt-to-GDP means the debt is unlikely to become a risk in upcoming years; turning to domestic market to finance the war is still an option
15/ Still, the war has already taken a toll on pillars of policy crucial for macro stability, including the budget rule, freedom of capital flows, and—to some extent—the independence of the central bank. Most of wounds cannot be healed without ending the war and the sanctions
17/ With the war unlikely to end soon, the financial and economic costs will mount and are likely to bite Russia several years from now. My detailed account in @ForeignAffairs: foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa…
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1/ Russia's wartime budget (source: leak to @business ) key takeaways:
- Putin prepares for the long war
- Guns above the butter (military spending exceeds social)
- all the cows that can still give milk in Russia's economy will be milked to death
(more in 🧵👇)
2/ - first time in history war expenditures exceeded 6% GDP
- with social spending and national security it's more than RUB 20 trln
- Somehow government wants to collect from economy RUB 35 tln revenues amid sanctions (19,4% GDP)
- deficit in '24 - RUB 1,6 tln
3/The revenue forecast appears overstated and unrealistic. Spending on the national economy is slightly reduced: less development, more weapons. Demand in the economy is supported by military spending, inflated social benefits and subsidized loans Inflation&key rate remain hight
The wave of asset nationalizations in Russia affects both foreign owners and Russians. This violates Putin's promise to his elites not to revise the results of privatization. Aguing in my recent piece for @CarnegieEndow why Putin breaks its own rules👇👇👇 carnegieendowment.org/politika/90543
Putin's deal with the elites in his first term can be summarised as "you support me, and I will not reconsider privatization". It's a ground basis of their loyalty formula. But war is a reduction of resources. Amid decreasing rents, Putin can’t live on loyalty alone.
The AG has launched dozens of lawsuits to reclaim property - including ones previously owned by people loyal to the Kremlin, since the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine began. thanks @veloshum for a comprehensive table
Sanctions have not breached Russia’s economic fortress but have put a time bomb under its foundations. Accumulated imbalances and inflated demand the reason for the dollar over 100, argue in my piece for @opinion
The effect of an emergency rate hike (now 12%) of the Bank of Russia will be more extended in time - the gravity of the financial market works. The effect of capital controls, which have so far been abstained from, will also be limited
The fundamental reasons for the fluctuating ruble rate are linked to changes in the structure of market demand: oil embargo; price cap; rising transactional costs on insurance and shipping; growing risks on tightening sanctions
How Kremlin is patching holes in the regime with Band-Aids a 🧵:
Putin has made 3 different speeches in the last 4 days. The two main pillars of Putin's regime: PR and the siloviki. The Prigozhin mutiny dealt a blow to both. The Kremlin is now busy patching up the holes
All weekend society was busy w dumskrolling, buying currency&stocking up on cash. The people of Rostov welcomed the Wagnerites. But Putin and the whole state machine spread the narrative that the society showed solidarity and patriotism
👇
for example: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the government mouthpiece, reports that people welcomed the withdrawal of troops and equipment from the streets. People on streets condemned appearance of PMCs without an order
A quick 🧵: no one from elites took Prigozhins side publicly yet. Calls to unite around Putin from reg. governors are coordinated from the Kremlin and barely sincere.Elites demonstrate co-called negative loyalty -- don't like what is going on, but not so much to protest vocally
Prigozhin never belonged to the elites in the "friend or foe" system. His entire resource was based on his personal acquaintance with Putin, the fulfillment of his informal orders with the help of PMCs, and his media independence from the Kremlin carnegieendowment.org/politika/88572
Prigozhin's rebellion elites consider: Putin has no control over his lackey. Takeover of Rostov by mercenaries in a few hours and further Wagners move towards Moscow: Putin is not in control of the situation in the country.
I'd love to write how Prigozhin ends, but I don't have a crystal ball. This is what happens when the state releases its monopoly on violence. While we're all waiting for the updates, read tw newsletter: can defense spending sustain Russian economic growth? en.thebell.io/keynes-in-khak…
Russia's economic policy increasingly resembles "military Keynesianism,"while demand stimulated by military spending and payments to the population is also more or less related to the army or the military-industrial complex
more about Keynesianism learn 👇
Military-industrial complex grows enormously:25% in Jan-Apr. Production of electrical equipment in the same period was up 29%, motor vehicles by 27%, computers by 23% and optics and electronics by 23% (this includes military electronics and optics)