🧵Will add my own thoughts to the Morozov affair. I've interviewed two Russian agents unmasked and captured by KaPo. In both cases, I spoke at length to Estonia's counterintelligence chief, Alexander Toots, about his methods.
First, anyone who suggests KaPo arrests someone on a lark without sufficient evidence or out of some sense of chauvinistic malevolence toward Russians is laughably misinformed about how this service conducts itself.
KaPo almost always manages to obtain guilty pleas and/or convictions from the agents it arrests for a very good reason: they're guilty.
Second, there is a fundamental misapprehension on this platform (quelle surprise!) as to how espionage works. Not all spies volunteer themselves. Some are compromised and coerced into spying, with money used less as a douceur and more as a cudgel to keep them going.
Estonia has a perfect case precedent, in fact: Denis Metsavas, an ethnic Russian born and raised in Tallinn. He joined the Estonian Army and wanted to faithfully serve his country as a patriot. However, he traveled to Russia often (like Morozov) and was honeytrapped by the GRU.
Worse than honeytrapped: they threatened to try Metsavas for rape if he didn't agree to spy his native country on behalf of his ancestral Motherland.
So Metsavas went along. The GRU ran him for ten years, tasked him with stealing NATO intelligence when he was promoted to Estonia's Defense HQ, paid him (not very much), and then even recruited his Russian father as a courier to keep him on the hook.
Here is Metsavas's story, which I found heartbreaking to report. Toots and KaPo did, too. In case you're wondering, they let me have access to him because they felt sorry for him and believed he was a tragic figure who wanted to atone publicly: theatlantic.com/international/…
Now here is the case of Artem Zinchenko, an ordinary Russian student from St. Petersburg who thought working for the GRU (or any Russian intelligence service) would be cool and satisfy his familial pedigree. (Zinchenko's grandfather was in SMERSH.) news.yahoo.com/exclusive-ex-r…
Zinchenko, a businessman, did penny-ante stuff for the GRU; mostly surveilled Estonian military installations and brought back publicly available literature on Estonia's economy, etc.
He was caught, tried, convicted, and sentenced, then traded back to Russia in 2018 in a swap. What happened next?
Russia (re-)invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Out of disgust at the "totalitarian" nature of his homeland, Zinchenko defected. Where did he go? Only back to Estonia, escaping St. Petersburg with the help of.... Alexander Toots, the very man who had exposed his espionage.
I interviewed Zinchenko in KaPo headquarters in 2022.
To my knowledge, this is the first example in history of a Russian spy snared and adjudicated in a Western country who, after being repatriated, seeks protection from the very spycatcher who ended his career. Which rather speaks well of Toots' professionalism, doesn't it?
Indeed, a constant refrain from agents in KaPo's custody is that they are treated with far more humanity and empathy in Estonia than they would ever be treated in Russia under similar circumstances. They confide in Toots because he earns their trust and respect.
And he is good at what he does because he sees them not as cogs in a machine but as human beings -- shortsighted, manipulated, venal, frail, but also worthy of dignity.
In short, it is doesn't mean much that Morozov is, by most accounts, a very nice man who hobnobbed with academics and analysts and seasoned Russia watchers for years. Or that he opposed Putin and certainly didn't seem like someone who'd ever go to work for Putin's spy agencies.
Your friend couldn't be a spy? Sure he could. Mark Zborowski fooled Trotsky and his son, Lev Sedov (who paid for that deception with his life). The shades of Alexander Kutepov or Sidney Reilly might tell you all about their overzealous anti-Bolshevik chums...
Or you could ask Alexander Toots himself, whose own colleague and onetime boss at KaPo, Aleksei Dressen, turned out to be... a Russian spy. ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/12008…
The agent blackmailed into service has even more incentive to behave as an opponent to the regime he works for than does the willing or enthusiastic agent. Officers of the GRU, SVR and FSB are well-trained to get people to do things they would never dream of doing.
This applies even more so if their targets for recruitment are Russians with family still living in Russia or deep personal attachments to the country.
We possess ample literature on how Russians in the diaspora are hounded or exploited by the Russian state, treated (broadly speaking) as either enemies to be dealt with or accomplices to be seconded. See @AndreiSoldatov and @irinaborogan's superb book "The Compatriots."
See, too, the GRU curricular module I obtained -- taught by faculty at the Military University in Moscow within the last decade -- on how compatriot/diasporic organizations can be used to advance state interests and prosecute RIS influence operations: newlinesmag.com/reportage/insi…
Morozov will have his day in court and a fair verdict will be rendered. But I do urge people who are asserting, with no evidence, that this allegation simply can't be true and he must be the victim of some sinister Baltic conspiracy rooted in "Russophobia" to take more care.
Estonian counterintelligence doesn't work the way they imagine it does. Neither does Russian espionage. /END
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.@holger_r and I talked to "Karl," the Estonian military analyst, about latest developments in Ukraine. Thread:
"This time, let’s start with a broader overview of the situation. It got quite messy for Ukraine from the strategic communication perspective a few weeks ago. It was a combination of several issues..."
"1. The expectations that Ukraine had for the summer counter-offensive were by far not met. 2. The still on-going confusion in U.S. Congress regarding funding Ukraine 3. Fears relating to Trump’s possible return to White House..."
Exclusive: We have emails and documents from members of GRU Unit 29155–Putin’s assassination and sabotage squad—proving their culpability for a 2011 bombing in Bulgaria. The IEDs were planted in Czechia.The target was ammunition bound for Georgia. theins.ru/en/politics/26…
Andrey Averyanov, the commander of Unit 29155, tasked three of his operatives with invented remote detain ties for the operation, the first known terrorist attack of this unit on NATO soil. Correspondence we obtained contains photos of the detonators and their technical specs:
One of the operatives and detonator inventors, Vladimir Moiseev, you may remember for his role in the abortive 2015 coup in Montenegro. bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
Seems the most likely read of the trip. I'd also wager reasserting U.S. leadership at a time when this admin's Middle East policy isn't looking so hot and Putin has abased himself even among sympathetic Israelis -- not an opportunity an incumbent president would pass up.
Trump stepped on his own dick last week with the "very smart" Hezbollah comment; by contrast, even the far right in Israel found favor with Biden's rhetoric. Plus, Iranian intervention risks U.S. intervention and nobody in this admin wants to indulge that contingency.
More evidence this wasn't designed to put pressure on Bibi to halt the ground invasion. Bibi wants the visit:
New "Karl" thread, as told to @holger_r and myself. Covers the counteroffensive, Black Sea developments, and also a bit on the emerging Israel-Hamas war:
"It is clear that there will not be a big breakthrough this year. Smaller tactical breakthroughs are still possible. The maximum that I see is that Ukraine can still advance towards Tokmak. Capturing Tokmak inside this year would mark a significant achievement."
"Ukraine is moderately calm about it. There is just so much of Russian defence facilities, lines and equipment that it wasn’t possible to destroy all of it during the summer. Kyiv has been systemic in destroying it..."
Assuming ABC News reporting is accurate re ATACMS, a very wise move by the administration. Here’s a short thread as to why: 🧵
It eliminates the last big item on Ukraine’s 16 month-long shopping list — a liar HUR provided me in Ukraine in April 2022. This is literally everything the last of what wanted since the early days of the war. (Cluster bombs were even on the list.)
It also calls Russia’s bluff about retaliation, now rendered especially ridiculous in light of successive Ukrainian strikes against strategic Russia targets (including a nuclear bomber) well within Russian territory, all of which led not to World War III.
New "Karl" observations on the state of the counteroffensive, Western agita, and the death of Prigozhin, as told to @holger_r and myself: 🧵
"Most stretches on the frontlines have remained quite stable. The only one with very high activity is the southern front where Ukraine is pushing strongly in at least two directions: most fiercely in Robotyne but actively also in the direction of Staromlynivka to the east."
"The pace of advancing in the Robotyne direction has clearly improved. It is not hyper fast but also not anymore only 1-2 kms per week. It’s faster. Ukraine’s “tooth” has already reached quite far from Robotyne. It is 15 kms ahead of the rest of the frontline in that direction."